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Abstract 
Due to the Internet and the convergence of technology, the media landscape has 
dramatically changed. The new problem of online media network is no longer the lack of 
information but rather the overload of information and how to find the information. This 
is because, with the abundance of information, what people see is not equal to what made 
available. The information-overload can result in narrowing the range of people’s 
attention to concentrate around a few preference sources. From the media law scholars’ 
perspective, the significant question now is whether people choose media contents 
diversely. The notion of media plurality has shifted from the concern about the diversity 
of available source and content to diversity of choices people make and diversity of actual 
content consumed by individuals, or the so-called ‘exposure diversity’. Since people 
cannot consume all information presented to them, they rely on new ‘online selection 
intermediaries’ (i.e. search engine and social media) to assist them to find relevant 
information from infinite information. As a result, there is a shift of power from 
traditional media to new ‘online selection intermediaries’ which act as a gatekeeper to 
access to information. Selection intermediaries consequently have a significant influence 
on exposure diversity. Selection intermediaries therefore need to be regulated for the 
ultimate purpose of exposure diversity. However, the current existing laws have not 
moved from the design to regulate traditional media and to ensure a wide range of source 
and viewpoints available. They are still based on the perspective of the time when there 
were scarcity of analogue spectrum and high barriers to enter to media market. 
Consequently, the existing laws are inadequate to regulate the selection intermediaries to 
achieve diversity of viewpoints exposed to citizen. This thesis, therefore, discusses that 
the media regulation should be reformed to regulate selection intermediaries to encourage 
diversity of viewpoints actually exposed to people. This thesis proposes the appropriate 
approaches to regulate these new selection intermediaries for the achievement of 
exposure diversity. 
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In the pre-internet era, traditional media, namely newspapers and broadcasters, 
acted as the essential intermediaries of society’s information flows. A few people who 
owned media companies controlled the power to speak effectively to a significant number 
of people while the audiences had no voice and were passive. The arrival of the Internet 
gave ordinary citizens the power to actively distribute media content to the public. As a 
result, the abundance of information provided by people represents an almost infinite 
choice for the public to choose from. These new form of communication technologies 
sparks some hopes in optimists that the new technology will solve the problem of an 
impoverished public sphere. Unfortunately, it reconfigures a more complex consolidation 
of power. 
In the current environment of information-overload, the major problem regarding 
media content is not the lack of information but rather how to find the information. 
Attention becomes a scarcity for speakers and people need a guide to a particular 
perspective of the world. Information overload can result in narrowing of people’s range 
of attention, so that concentrate only on a few sources. With limited time and attention 
available, people will only rely on selected sources they trust. This behaviour can generate 
audience fragmentation and audience polarisation with people participating only in like-
minded groups that confirm their own views and reinforce their existing beliefs to an 
extreme extent after discussing issues among themselves. Consequently, people’s 
behaviour of seeking out agreeable ideas creates an information cocoon which cuts them 
of from dissenting voices or contestable and opposite viewpoints; this is the so-called 
‘echo chamber’ or ‘filter bubble’. 
Therefore, media plurality recently has focused less on diversity on the supply side 
i.e. diversity of source and diversity of available content. Instead, there are concerns about 
diversity from the audience side, that is the actual diverse content individuals are exposed 
to (the so-called ‘diversity of exposure’). In other words, the significant question in the 
environment of overflowing available information is whether people choose to expose 
themselves to a diverse range of media content (and if not, what can be done to improve 
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diversity of exposure)? This is because, with the abundance of information, what people 
see does not equal to what made available. 
In the Internet network structure, exposure diversity is affected by the operation 
of selection intermediaries i.e. search engines and social media. The term ‘selection 
intermediaries’ in this thesis therefore specifically refers to the two main intermediaries 
in the Internet media i.e. search engines and social media. Selection intermediaries act as 
the middleman between the audiences and content providers. They act as a gatekeeper to 
access to information. Selection intermediaries, therefore, play a key role in helping 
people find relevant information. Audiences now depend on these selection 
intermediaries to help them find certain content from the infinite information available. 
It is typically very difficult for the content to be found without intermediaries. 
Considering the power of selection intermediaries, they have the power to influence the 
diversity of media content people are exposed to by controlling the ‘findability’ of 
content. Selection intermediaries play a crucial role in expanding or diminishing the 
diverse content people are exposed to. The intermediaries’ operation of providing content 
recommendations can be considered an indication of the level of diverse content people 
are exposed to. Therefore, selection intermediaries should be regulated in order to 
safeguard exposure diversity.  
A problem then arises regarding to what extent the existing laws, i.e. media law 
and competition law, can be applied to selection intermediaries in order to achieve 
diversity of viewpoints citizen are exposed to. The existing laws concentrate on the design 
of traditional media structure which is a TV-like service and have traditionally reflected 
the focus on diversity of sources and diversity of content. They are therefore inadequate 
to regulate these new intermediaries for the promotion of diversity of viewpoints exposed 
to citizen.  
The legal provisions to encourage people to expose themselves to diverse content 
is still an issue that has rarely been considered. It prompts the question: what would be a 
suitable approach to regulate selection intermediaries for the ultimate purpose of ensuring 
exposure diversity? To encourage exposure diversity, this thesis proposes that media law 
can (and should) take a positive role in creating the conditions which encourage people 
to actually exploit selection intermediaries in order to effectively expose themselves to 
diverse content. In particular, certain obligations should be imposed on selection 
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intermediaries to have an active role and duty to assist people to expose themselves to 
more diverse content.  
Objective and Scope of Research 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the appropriate approaches to regulate 
new selection intermediaries to achieve diversity of content actually exposed to citizens. 
The overarching topic of the thesis relates to the role of online selection intermediaries 
which has a significant influence on the exposure diversity from a legal perspective. The 
research topic of the thesis reveals three significant points of interest: 
First, the impact of social media and search engines on exposure diversity is an 
emerging topic. Nevertheless, it has not sufficiently been discussed in the legal context. 
Since the influence of the selection intermediaries on diversity of content citizens are 
exposed to is significant, it is therefore crucial to investigate the relation between 
selection intermediaries, the behaviour of people, exposure diversity and the public 
interest. The scope of exposure diversity which is under the consideration in this thesis is 
limited to news and current affairs. 
Second, the thesis will examine the issues of selection intermediaries and 
exposure diversity with a focus on the concerns of legal perspective and policymakers. In 
doing so, it aims to draw conclusions on whether and to what extent the existing laws can 
be applied to control the conduct of selection intermediaries in regard to diversity of 
exposure. Specifically, the thesis assesses the laws and regulations in media law and 
competition law in the UK and EU as related to the principal theme of the thesis.  
Lastly, the thesis also seeks to provide possible measures from other bodies of 
laws, particularly diversity by design, media literacy, net neutrality and impartiality for 
viable approaches to govern selection intermediaries for the promotion of exposure 
diversity. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to answer what level of exposure 
diversity should actually be achieved. This is because this thesis is based on the 
perspective that the government should not intervene in the optimal amount of diverse 
content people consume. Instead, the thesis suggests that media law should assist people 
to be more aware of the choices they select from these intermediaries and should create 
requirements which selection intermediaries will operate in order to encourage people to 
access diverse choices. 
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The significance and originality of the study 
This thesis contributes to a number of original analyses concerning the 
overarching topic as to how to regulate online selection intermediaries to encourage 
citizens to expose themselves to diversity of content. 
The first original contribution to the field of media law is the critical analysis of 
the issues concerning the emergence of new media and the impact of selection 
intermediaries on exposure of diversity. The issues concerning the new media structure 
and the impact of social media and search engines on society and people in various aspects 
have been discussed in the fields of sociology, political and media studies. Nevertheless, 
there is an absence of a substantive analysis from the legal perspective on the influence 
of selection intermediaries on the diversity content people are actually exposed to. 
Understanding the nature of the new media structure and the role of selection 
intermediaries is essential for the proposal of effective and viable measures to govern the 
new online intermediaries in respect of exposure diversity. 
Interestingly, only a few sources of literature in media law discusses the EU media 
policies in term of exposure diversity.  Moreover, there is a lack of discussion on the 
application of the current media law and competition law to selection intermediaries 
concerning the issue of exposure diversity. This thesis will provide an original legal 
analysis on whether and to what extent the current existing laws (i.e. media law and 
competition law) can be utilised for the regulation of the intermediaries in the issue of 
exposure diversity. 
As a result of the analysis, this thesis will conclude that the current existing laws, 
both media law and competition law, are not adequate and appropriate to regulate 
selection intermediaries to encourage exposure diversity. The important question is 
therefore what can be a suitable solution to the research question. The thesis finds that 
although it is obvious that the government cannot force people to consume specific 
content from selection intermediaries, it does not mean that the government cannot play 
an active role in promoting and facilitating exposure diversity.  
In the attempt to seek viable measures to be imposed on selection intermediaries, 
this thesis will analyse the possible regulations from other fields of law which could 
oblige selection intermediaries to encourage people to consume more diverse content. 
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Although media of all genres have the potential to impact upon the attitudes and opinions 
of people, the thesis acknowledges that it would be most efficient to focus on the scope 
of news and current affairs. As for the existing knowledge in this regard, there are a 
number of sources of literature concerning approaches in other bodies of laws which are 
relevant to regulate selection intermediaries; however, the approaches have never been 
suggested to apply to the new online intermediaries in the context of exposure diversity. 
The ultimate contribution provided by this thesis for the advancement of existing 
knowledge is therefore the proposal of the measures to regulate selection intermediaries 
for the achievement of exposure diversity. 
Methodology and Thesis Outline 
The thesis contains a series of chapters. The chapters are linked together to 
progress the narrative of the thesis as methodically as possible. Each chapter contributes 
to the analysis and discussion of selection intermediaries for the ultimate aim of creating 
the regulation framework for the promotion of exposure diversity. This research adopts a 
doctrinal methodology drawing mainly from legal literature, instruments and judicial 
decisions in international and regional instruments and the UK law. As a support to the 
doctrinal analyses, empirical researches in the fields of media and communication, 
science technology and sociology as relevant to the thesis are selected to discover the 
behaviour of people in the consumption of media content in the digital age. The research 
methodology of this thesis is delineated further below with the structure of the work. 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The following overviews will outline the 
purpose of each chapter and highlights the interesting points associated with them. Each 
overview will also provide a brief explanation on how each research question is to be 
answered and the research methodology that is to be applied.  
The first chapter will introduce the new structure of the media emerged from the 
convergence of the digital technologies. It will analyse the change of the media landscape 
and the role of selection intermediaries. The issues concerning the emergence of new 
media have been discussed in fields of sociology, political and media studies. Some 
empirical data findings concerning the impact of social media and search engines on 
society and people in various aspects have been analysed. This chapter therefore 
encompasses broad doctrinal research from these fields of study, including the literature 
that draws on various secondary sources as relevant to the research question. 
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Chapter 2 then discusses the notion of exposure diversity and its relation to 
selection intermediaries. This chapter will intensively analyse why exposure diversity is 
crucial and worthy of concern. This chapter will encompass doctrinal research on various 
secondary sources. The existing empirical studies concerning exposure diversity and 
selection intermediaries from other fields of study will also be examined as an evidence 
to support the relevant theories analysed in this chapter. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 will 
demonstrate that there is a need to regulate selection intermediaries for the achievement 
of exposure diversity.  
As concluded in Chapter 2 that selection intermediaries need to be regulated, 
Chapter 3 therefore delineates the problems of the application of existing media law and 
competition law to selection intermediaries for the diversity of exposure. The 
methodology of this chapter is predominantly doctrinal, drawing on both primary sources 
(i.e. the UK Communications Act 2003 and the AVMSD) as well as secondary sources. 
The Google Search case (COMP/AT.39740) will also be analysed in relation to 
competition law. Chapter 3 eventually concludes that the existing laws and regulations 
are insufficient to control selection intermediaries.  
Next, Chapter 4 will strive to create a new regulatory regime to impose the role 
and duty on selection intermediaries in order to accomplish exposure diversity. This 
chapter will analyse possible regulations from other fields of law to govern selection 
intermediaries in order to encourage people to consume more diverse content. This 
chapter will examine the three measures (i.e. data protection by design, media literacy, 
and net neutrality and impartiality) as an analogy to regulate selection intermediaries for 
the achievement of exposure diversity. This chapter therefore encompasses broad 
doctrinal research that draws on various secondary sources, including the literature from 
other fields of study as relevant to the research question. The studies from other academic 
fields will be provided as examples to demonstrate how selection intermediaries could 
possibly be designed to promote exposure diversity.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 will outline and summarise the key points of interest and 




Introduction: New structure of the media in the Internet age 
 
The UK and global media environment is changing because of new technologies. 
The change in the media landscape is driving the creation of new forms of media, 
reshaping media consumption patterns and having a profound impact on the way people 
relate to information at an ever accelerated rate.  For instance, digital media and the deluge 
of information available at a touch of a finger‐tip offers filtering mechanisms to screen 
out content. While this new reality empowers individuals to choose diverse content, it 
also creates more isolated communities, narrowing the variety of perspectives they are 
exposed to, thereby negatively affecting exposure diversity. 
The first chapter, therefore, begins by providing an overview of the changes in the 
media landscape as a fundamental basis for the discussions and analyses throughout the 
thesis. There are three major changes. First, in the environment of abundant information, 
the scarcity of resource is no longer the matter of the spectrum or content but the attention 
of people. In the Internet network structure, people find information through links. 
Therefore, controlling the links means controlling the attention of people. Second, the 
audiences have shifted from a passive position to an active one. The behaviour of people 
has changed from passively receiving content from media companies to actively finding 
what they are interested on the Internet. Third, there is an arrival of new selection 
intermediaries, specifically search engines and social media. These new players play a 
significant role in influencing how people receive information in the digital age. 
Part I: Online media, attention and links 
Media now has moved from traditional media to online platforms. People consider 
the Internet as a de facto platform to exchange of information and digital information is 
a de facto standard form of content. A lot of websites have become major sources of 
information: besides, information conveyed from the websites are considered as 
importance as information from traditional media. Also, traditional media entities cannot 
ignore the potential of the Internet in information exchange and consequently must 
establish or move to online platforms. According to six years’ data from a Reuter report, 
a consistent pattern is that television news and online news are the most frequent sources 
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people use for news, while readership of printed newspapers has declined significantly.1 
Also, across all countries sampled, younger age-groups are much more likely to use online 
media as the main source of news than the older groups (see Figure 1). Similarly, data 
from an Ofcom report, confirm that the total UK digital audience reached 50.4 million in 
March 2017. 2 Notably, younger children (age 3-4, 5-7s and 8-11s) going online than in 
2016 (increased by more than ten percent): as a consequence, half (53%) of 3-4s, 79% of 
5-7s and 94% of 8-11s are now online. 3 
Figure 1: Main source of news by age4 
 
The expansion of the digital world has led to the emergence of a wide range of 
sources and opinions available. Unlike the traditional media, the Internet enables 
dissemination of a high volume of information rapidly and cheaply. This shift of online 
media environment creates a model of collaboration and continuous data creation.  Even 
though the amount of data available on the Internet has increased exponentially, the 
capabilities of people to absorb information have not increased. People can effectively 
process and receive information only up to a certain point: if further information is 
                                                          
1 Nic Newman, et al., ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’ (RISJ, 2017) 10. 
2 Ofcom, ‘Communications Market Report 2017’ (Ofcom, 3 August 2017) 184. 
3 Ofcom, ‘Children and parents: media use and attitudes report 2017’ (Ofcom, 29 November 2017) 7. 
4 ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’, 10. 
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provided beyond this point, the performance of the individual will rapidly decline.5 Due 
to this limited capacity of human’s mind, people tend to be overwhelmed by the number 
of choices available. At present, information overload is a growing problem in the digital 
world. The rapid and extensive dissemination of news, information, and commentary 
makes it difficult for individuals to select relevant information. The attention of 
audiences, consequently, becomes the most valuable resource online. 6 
Online space maybe preserved for every group and voices; however, 
communication may be largely marginalised in the competition for users’ attention. 
Although it is cheaper and easier to publish content and opinions on the Internet, having 
them noticed is another matter. With millions of websites and millions more information 
being created, being noticed by more than a handful of people is extremely difficult for 
most online participants. The phenomenon that attention has become the limiting factor 
in the consumption of information and the importance of management dealing with 
human attention as a scarce commodity is referred to as ‘the attention economy’.7 Simon, 
a Nobel prize-winning economist, claims the prominent role of attention in the 
information society that: 
‘In an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of 
something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information 
consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently 
among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it.’ 8 
Consequently, the asymmetry between information and attention makes attention 
in the digital economy particularly crucial. Many online media seek attention and find a 
way to increase its popularity. When one media site gets more attention, another media 
attention is probably getting less attention. These media content producters compete for 
the limited time of consumers. Franck conceptualises attention as ‘capital’ that involves 
                                                          
5 See Martin Eppler and Jeanne Mengis, ‘The concept of information overload’ (2004) 20(5) The 
Information Society 325. 
6 James Webster, The Marketplace of Attention (MIT Press 2016) 
7 See Thomas Davenport and John Beck, Attention Economy (HBSP 2001); Tiziana Terranova, ‘Attention, 
Economy and the Brain’ (2012) 13 Culture Machine; Patrick Crogan and Samuel Kinsley, ‘Paying 
Attention:  Towards a Critique of the Attention Economy’ (2012) 13 Culture Machine. 
8 Herbert Simon, ‘Designing organizations for an information-rich world’ in Martin Greenberger (ed.), 
Computers, Communications and the Public Interest (Johns Hopkins University Press 1971) 38, 40. 
10 
a myriad of business activities, such as investment, circulation, and generation of more 
capital.9 New media makes an amount of their revenue from supplying attention. For 
example, media entities need to monetise users’ attention by selling advertising space, 
increasing network of popularity and establishing strong branding and loyalty of 
audiences. This new form of attention economy has transformed the old economy which 
based on the distribution and production of content into an economy which comprising a 
system of primarily paying, receiving, and seeking the most intrinsically limited attention 
of audiences. 10 Therefore, the rivalry for scarce attention is central to understanding 
competition among online media in the digital economy. 11 
The attentions of online audiences are led by links. A hyperlink, or a link, may be 
defined as a technological capability that enables one specific website (or webpage) to 
link with another: ‘cross-reference . . . appearing on one [W]eb page that, when activated 
by the point-and-click of a mouse, brings onto the computer screen another [W]eb page’.12 
Links are critical to communication because they facilitate access to information. 
Hyperlink have always been the central structure of the world wide web since its inception 
in the early 1990s. At the core of its architecture is the reason why the Internet is originally 
characterised as the network of networks and the way we can refer to a ‘web’. 13 Berners-
Lee developed the Internet in order to reframe the way we use information by creating a 
virtual documentation system people could share documents with ease and speed. 14  This 
universal space of information was to be navigated via hyperlinks. The ability to link 
information is a fundamental characteristic standing out as the essential differentiation 
between the Internet and other media platforms. 15 
                                                          
9 Georg Franck, ‘The Economy of Attention’ (Telepolis, 7 December 1999) 
<https://www.heise.de/tp/features/The-Economy-of-Attention-3444929.html> 
10 Michael Goldhaber, ‘The value of openness in an attention economy’ (2006) 11(6) First Monday 
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1334/1254%20(accessed%208%20May%202012)> 
11 David Evans, ‘Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms’ (2013) 9(2) J.C.L.E 313, 318. 
12 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 455 (2d Cir. 2001). 
13 In this Thesis, the terms ‘Internet’ and ‘World Wide Web’ are used interchangeably. It should be noted 
that there are distinctions between ‘Internet’ and ‘World Wide Web’. The Internet is a massive networking 
infrastructure. It connects millions of computers together globally, forming a network in which any 
computer can communicate with any other computer as long as they are both connected to the Internet. 
World Wide Web or ‘web’ is a way of accessing information over the medium of the Internet. It is an 
information-sharing model that is built on top of the Internet. The Web also utilizes browsers, such as 
Internet Explorer or Firefox, to access Web documents called Web pages that are linked to each other via 
hyperlinks. 
14 Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the web (Harper Collins Publishers 1999). 
15 Philip Napoli, ‘Hyperlinking and the forces of massification’ in Joseph Turow and Lokman Tsui (eds), 
The Hyperlinked Society (UMP 2008) 56. 
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In this Thesis, the terms ‘Internet’ and ‘World Wide Web’ are used interchangeably. 
It should be noted that there are distinctions between ‘Internet’ and ‘World Wide Web’. 
The Internet is a massive networking infrastructure. It connects millions of computers 
together globally, forming a network in which any computer can communicate with any 
other computer as long as they are both connected to the Internet. World Wide Web or 
‘web’ is a way of accessing information over the medium of the Internet. It is an 
information-sharing model that is built on top of the Internet. The Web also utilizes 
browsers, such as Internet Explorer or Firefox, to access Web documents called Web 
pages that are linked to each other via hyperlinks. 
The value of the Internet comes from the links that connected websites to each 
other. Without the links, information would only be accessible if you knew the exact 
address of the information for which you were searching.  The Internet will ‘loose its 
power if there are certain types of things to which you can’t link’. 16  Online platforms 
would have been an impenetrable mess.  Schulman illustrates the social power of 
hyperlinks that: 
‘Hyperlinks are the glue of these online communities, forming digital footprints of 
the way individuals make connections. Through a simple selection to include, exclude or 
just follow a link in our daily online interactions, we passively telegraph the way we see 
the world, what is important to us, to what degree and why.’ 17 
In the Internet network structure, it is ‘links’ that determine where certain content 
can be found among the abundance of information. People find information through links. 
The robust use of hyperlinks became critical to navigate attention of online users through 
the flood of content by establishing that one content is better or more important than 
another. Under this view, if the Internet is an endless bustling field of information then 
hyperlinks are the paths which create a clear street among websites. 
Part II: Active viewers but illiterate audiences 
                                                          
16 Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’ (1999) 46(1) Technical Communication: 
Journal of the Society for Technical Communication 79, 79. 
17 Stacey Schulman, ‘Hyperlinks and marketing insight’ in Joseph Turow and Lokman Tsui (eds), The 
Hyperlinked Society (UMP 2008) 145, 147. 
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In the pre-internet age, a characteristic of traditional media was the powerlessness 
of viewers and the lack of responsiveness of audiovisual media. 18 The activity of 
broadcasting was in the hands of the privileged who processed a licence to broadcast or 
had the wealth to invest in print media. These select few broadcaster determined content 
by providing prescheduled programmes to an anonymous mass of receivers. Audiences, 
then, had limited power to shape the media choices: they could only choose what to 
consume by switching between a few predefined program packages. The participation 
and feedback of viewers were excluded from the system. 19 This is because the media 
operators marketed the programs to advertisers rather than to the audience. 20 As 
Helberger comments: 
‘For decades, broadcasting viewers have remained discreetly in the background of 
media policy, rolling their eyes and faithfully consuming what’s on TV. …The viewers 
remained where they were: stretched out lazily on the couch, consuming popcorn and 
programmes.’21 
Thanks to the development of the Internet, digital technology and convergence 
media, the traditional idea of viewers as powerless eyeballs started to fade away. 
Audiences nowadays are empowered to seek out new information among dispersed media 
content and have a greater ability to interact with the media. 22 They are now more and 
more flexible and dynamic in choosing content23: viewers are encouraged to actively 
select content at the time and place chosen by them or simultaneously consume two or 
more screens (multitasking).24 Also, people are in many ways involved with media that 
go beyond pure reception. They carry out other kinds of activities and communicate with 
one another in a variety of ways such as sharing, commenting, creating and uploading 
content. This new environment is the framework of the participatory culture and 
                                                          
18 Thomas Gibbons, Regulating the Media (2nd edn, Sweet&Maxwell 1998). 
19 Alan Peacock, ‘The Future of Public Service Broadcasting’ in Cento Veljanovski (ed), Freedom in 
Broadcasting (IEA 1989) 53. 
20 Jerome Rothenberg, ‘Consumer Sovereignty and the Economics of Television Programming’ (1962) 4 
Studies in Public Communication 45. 
21 Natali Helberger, ‘From eyeball to creator’ (2008) 19(6) Entertainment Law Review 128, 128. 
22 Henry Jenkins, Convergence culture (New York University Press 2006) 3. 
23 Michael Curtin, ‘Matrix media’ in Graeme Turner and Jinna Tay (eds), Television Studies After TV 
(Routledge 2009) 9. 
24 Philip Napoli, Audience evolution (CoUP 2010). 
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participatory audience. 25 Viewers are no longer mere passive observers; they also actively 
engage in media production and distribution. 26 Audiences can be seen as individual nodes 
of decentralised network27  which function as active creators, aggregators, disseminators, 
raters, storers, and so on. 
For instance, New forms of media in broadcasting-like activities which compete 
with traditional broadcasting have emerged, examples of which include: pay-TV, on 
demand, pay-per-view, catch-up TV and similar business models.  At the same time, a 
new type of content produced and distributed by users on the Internet platform (referred 
to as ‘user-generated content’ or ‘UGC’) has emerged and become a new culture.28 This 
has leads to services which integrate user-generated content.29 These services include 
social networking sites (like Facebook and Twitter) which offer users the possibility to 
share photos, stories, videos, commentaries with each other, and video-sharing sites (like 
YouTube) which stores a wide and diverse sources of video content.30 Moreover, 
audiences are involved in various aspects of the supply chain of media production such 
as enabling users to rate, rank and contribute materials.31 In particular, Ikoptv32, a Dutch 
service, encourages amateurs to film and report news to win a prize. Consequently, user-
generated contents has gradually entered into the traditional broadcasters. 
With the help of mobile phones, the Internet, and digital technology, citizens 
became producers of news and break the professional journalist’s monopoly of imparting 
information, known as ‘citizen journalism’. Citizen journalism refers to active people 
who are not professional journalists but involve in the process of collecting, reporting, 
analysing and disseminating news and information.33 Since it is universally accessible 
                                                          
25 Sonia Livingstone, ‘The participation paradigm in audience research’ (2013) 16(1-2) Communication 
Review 21. 
26 Peggy Valcke, ‘Challenges of Regulating Media Pluralism in the European Union’ (2012) 15(1) 
Quaderns del CAC 25. 
27 Tim O'Reilly, ‘What is Web 2.0.’ (O'ReillyNetwork, 30 September 2005) 
<http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/6228> 
28 See e.g. Lawrence Lessig, Remix (Penguin Press 2008); Patrick McKay, ‘Culture of the Future’ (2011) 
24 Regent University Law Review 117. 
29 Lessig, Ibid.  
30 Corina Pascu et al., ‘Social computing-Implications for the EU innovation landscape’, (2008) 10(1) 
Foresight 37. 
31 See e.g. The Guardian ‘News Desk live’ (https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/newsdesk-live) and 
‘You Tell Us’ (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/series/you-tell-us) 
32 <http://www.ikoptvfinl>. 
33 See Steve Paulussen et al., ‘Doing it together’ (2007) 1(3) Observatorio (OBS) Journal 131. 
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and globally relevant, citizen journalism has now become an important part of the 
correction of official sources within traditional media. 34 Besides, the Internet allows 
ordinary people to express their opinion to millions of people worldwide via blogs. A 
blog is a type of website that allows users to write on a variety of topics, from intimate 
diaries to political commentaries. 35 Today, blog is a new form of media which provides 
information and comment the same way as an article in magazines or newspapers. 
Notably, however, not all users actively interact with media content and not all of 
them are literate audiences. The fact that digital technology produces a new dimension of 
choice does not mean that all audiences choose to consume different viewpoints. 
Becoming an active viewer does not imply that they will be a literate audience. The 
majority of viewers passively consume content; media literacy therefore becomes a 
critical matter. Further discussion about media literacy and the problem of people’s skills 
in online media will be provided in Chapter 4. 
Part III: The arrival of selection intermediaries 
The Internet changed the media landscape. In the pre-internet era, traditional media 
which are newspapers and broadcasters acted as essential intermediaries of information 
flows. 36 A few people who own media companies controlled the power to speak 
effectively to a significant number of people. The arrival of the Internet enabled ordinary 
citizens to distribute media content to the public.37 As a result, the abundance of 
information provided by people represents an almost infinite choice. With the abundance 
of information, people cannot consume all information presented to them. The major 
problem in an environment of overflowing information is how to find certain content. 
People need a guide to find and select only a few choices which present a certain aspect: 
a major question is who are the gatekeepers that can encourage people to consume diverse 
or different viewpoints? 
                                                          
34 Demir Hodzic, ‘Citizen journalism and its importance’ (FLOWS in Media and Communication, 23 May 
2013) <http://iletisim.ieu.edu.tr/flows/?cat=8> 
35 Ibid. 
36 See generally Thomas Cotter, ‘Some Observations on the Law and Economics of Intermediaries’ (2006) 
1 Michigan State Law Review 67, 69-71. 
37 Manuel Castells, ‘Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society’ (2007) 1(1) 
Int.J.Com 238. 
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On the Web, people find information through links. The hyperlinks became critical 
to navigate attention of online users and facilitate access to information through the flood 
of content. Selection intermediaries emerged as a tool to gather links for the audience in 
order to find and select content. Consequently, audiences rely on new online selection 
intermediaries to assist them in finding relevant content from infinite information. 
Selection intermediaries, therefore, have a potential to influence people’s exposure to 
diverse media content. 
The term ‘selection intermediary’ is defined by Chandler as: ‘a class of [the 
Internet] intermediaries that select and filter information en route to listeners. Examples 
of this class of “selection intermediaries” include search engines, software filters, Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”) that block or filter content, and spam blocklists’.38 Van 
Hoboken uses the term ‘selection intermediaries’ to denote a range of intermediary 
service providers and technologies which map, order, select, validate and valuate online 
information such as search engines, reputation and tagging systems, folksonomies, 
suggestion services. These intermediaries facilitate the access to information and make 
the abundance of data on the Internet more easily navigable.39 While Chandler’s selection 
intermediaries encompass intermediaries that block or filter content, the definition 
provided by van Hoboken includes search engines or information location tools in a broad 
sense but does not include filters.  
Due to the broad scope of possible selection intermediaries, this thesis focuses on 
two types of online media intermediaries for the purpose of the study on exposure 
diversity: i.e. search engines and social media. Thus the term ‘selection intermediaries’ 
used in this thesis shall only be referred to search engine and social media. The definitions 
and scopes of search engine and social media are respectively analysed below. 
1. Search engines 
Search engines can be categorised as software40, rather than machine in a traditional 
sense. They use particular methods to present search results from an index of defined data 
                                                          
38 Jennifer Chandler, ‘A Right to Reach an Audience’ (2007) 35(3) Hofstra Law Review 1095, 1096. 
39 Joris van Hoboken, ‘Legal Space for Innovative Ordering’ (2009) 13 Int.J.Com.L.P 2-3. 
40 Thus Google Chrome which combines browsing and search capacity also fall in the scope of search 
engines. 
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that is accessible using retrieval methods. 41 To simplify, search engines are programs that 
search identified items for specified keywords in a database and return a list of the results 
where the keywords were found. However, the term is often used to specifically describe 
web services that collect and organise content from all over the Internet and helps its users 
to locate content on the Internet such as Google, Bing and Yahoo! Search. A search engine 
in isolation is useless. It becomes valuable only through interactions with content 
providers and with users: when it can match users with appropriate content providers by 
aggregating information and presenting it in a useful form.42 
Search engines can be categorised into organic search and advertised search. 
Organic search or natural search refers to the search results provided at no direct cost to 
linked pages and users (not advertising results, no money charges and there is no payment 
for inclusion or for a better ranking). Search results are based on their quality and 
relevance as well as their likelihood of satisfying the searcher’s intent. Advertised search 
or paid search (‘Pay Per Click’) generates sponsored search results with payment from 
advertisers, e.g. by auction. It is a form of advertisement sold by search engines for 
advertisers to appear next to search results based on the search word or phrase. 43 Also, in 
the search industry, search engines can be conceptually divided between horizontal search 
and vertical search. Horizontal search or general search provides broad information that 
encompasses the entire spectrum of Internet material. At its simplest, anyone can search 
for anything by typing (or voicing) a query and receive links (or responded answers) to 
contents that satisfy their need. Vertical search or specialised search, by contrast, is 
designed to provide search results for a particular area to help users find specific subjects 
(products, information and services). A list of areas covered by vertical search engines 
includes financial information, entertainment products (e.g. music and videos), news (e.g. 
weather), travel information, and maps. 
For this thesis, ‘search engine’ is a web search service which helps users to find 
pages or sites on the Internet: excluding search service provided as a function to find 
specific content within certain sites and peer-to-peer systems. Also, to analyse the effect 
of search engines on media plurality, this thesis will focus on organic search engines 
                                                          
41 Bernhard Rieder, ‘Networked Control’ (2005) 3 International Review of Information Ethics 27. 
42 James Grimmelmann, ‘The Structure of Search Engine Law’ (2007) 93 Iowa Law Review 1, 7. 
43 E.g. Product Listing Ads which is a picture of advertisement for individual products appear above, or to 
the side of the search results. 
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which are capable of providing search results containing media content: particularly 
general search engines and some specialised search such as Google News.  
Search engines generate search results by storing and indexing a large number of 
web contents on its servers. They use automated programs called ‘robots’, ‘spiders’, or 
‘crawlers’ to discover content and pages.44 After pages are explored, contents from the 
pages are stored and the index of contents is created automatically. Search engines utilised 
their cached content and the index to match search queries.45 Search engines do not 
explore every site on the Internet. Whether purposely or accidentally, some are entirely 
excluded and some are partly incorporated.46 Therefore, pages that are not found, stored 
and indexed cannot appear on search results and are not drawn to people’s attention. 
Search engines receive queries from searchers and process and analyse search 
results using algorithms.47 In this process, other information of the user is also taken into 
account along with the queries including geographic location, operating system and 
browser, preference of result types and search histories. The information is exploited to 
personalise and customise search results to mostly satisfy searchers. Search results, 
therefore, are different from person to person depending on this information; this practice 
raises concerns about filter bubble effect.48 
Finally, search engines provide users with results in the form of ranking. Ranking 
results can have a crucial effect on diverse content exposed to people.  Most searchers 
usually consider only the few top-ranked results by assuming without doubt that the upper 
results are more relevant than lower ones. 49 Consequently, most of the results that appear 
further down the list are invisible to users. 
2. Social media 
                                                          
44Alexander Halavais, Search engine society (Polity 2009) 14. 
45 Mark Levene, An introduction to search engines and Web navigation (Wiley-Blackwell 2010) 82-85. 
46 Elad Segev, Google and the digital divide (Chandos Pub 2010) 26-27. 
47 ‘Algorithms refer to the components of software that make up information and communication 
infrastructures. If software is the set of instructions that direct a computer to do a specific task then 
algorithms are the instructions. They do things… involves processing an input toward an output. One 
algorithm informs another, creating a continuous modulation ….’ (Fenwick McKelvey, ‘Algorithmic 
Media Need Democratic Methods’ (2014) 39(4) Canadian Journal of Communication 597, 598) 
48 See Chapter 2 Part II 1b. 
49 Chitika Research, ‘The value of google result positioning’ (Chitika, 6 December 2013) < 
https://chitika.com/google-positioning-value> 
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Due to the variety of evolution in (both stand-alone and built-in) social media 
services, there are many definitions for social media. According to Kaplan and Haenlein, 
social media is: 
‘a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.050, and that allow the creation and exchange of User 
Generated Content.’51 
This definition makes it clear that social media is a new generation of Internet 
platform where users can participate more actively in the process of content organisation 
by using web technology. It is a platform whereby content and applications are no longer 
created and published by individuals, but are continuously modified by all users in a 
participatory and collaborative fashion. Under this definition, there are different 
categorisation of social media. For instance, Kaplan and Haenlein differentiate social 
media as collaborative projects, virtual worlds, blogs, content communities, and social 
networking.52 On the other hand, Rouse suggests that microblogging, social networking, 
social bookmarking, social curation, and wikis are among the different types of social 
media.53 However, social media can be considered as having the four common prominent 
features which are: (i) it is an interactive web 2.0 Internet-based applications, (ii) user-
generated content is the lifeblood of the social media organism, (iii) users create service-
specific profiles for the social media platform, and (iv) it facilitates online social networks 
by connecting a user with other individuals or groups.54 
In this thesis, the scope of social media is defined as platforms of interactive 
electronic communication based on web 2.0 which enable users to create and share 
information, ideas, content, personal interests, and other forms of expression (such as 
videos) to the public. It is a collective platform where users intentionally interact in media 
content-sharing, participatory-based input and collaboration the same way as media 
reporters disseminate media content. Content disseminated in social media platform are 
not created and organised by individual editor of a webpage, but are continuously 
                                                          
50 Web 2.0 refers to Internet platforms that allow for interactive participation by users. 
51 Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, ‘Users of the World, Unite!’ (2010) 53 Business Horizons 59, 
61. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Margaret Rouse, ‘Social media’ (2016) <https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/social-media> 
54 Jonathan Obar and Steven Wildman, ‘Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge’ (2015) 
39(9) Telecommunications Policy 745. 
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generated and shared by all users. The organization of content in social media (such as 
selecting, prioritizing, excluding, and arranging) is in the editorial management way of 
media entities and is automatically facilitated by algorithms. 
For this thesis, social media, therefore, is distinct from social network55 which refers 
to ‘web-based software application that helps users connect and socialise with friends, 
family members, business partners, or other individuals’.56  Boyd and Ellison also 
describe social network as web-based platforms that ‘allow individuals to construct a 
public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those 
made by others’.57 Such platforms provide individuals the ability to interact and socialise 
with one another by engaging in conversations or a discussion over a particular event in 
the same way as e-mail and telephone or communication operators. They typically include 
chatting, private messaging, video call, voice call, file sharing, blogging, and discussion 
groups. The examples of social network are such as Whatsapp, Snapchat, Skype and 
Messenger (the function of private message in Facebook). 
Notably, this differentiation does not aim to clearly classify distinct types of online 
services. Due to the convergence of platform and technology, many online platforms 
combine both the functions of social media and social networking. In practice, social 
media have many forms and some of them may overlap with other services such as news 
aggregators (see Figure 2 below). Therefore, it causes practical problems if regulators try 
to categorise each online platform separately by regarding the whole operation in certain 
service. The distinction in this thesis is for the focus on social media’s functions or 
operations in any online platforms which are under the consideration of media plurality 
concerns. Also, this thesis will focus on social media which people commonly uses for 
disseminating (or is capable of providing) media contents such as news and current 
affairs. 
                                                          
55 Normally, ‘social media’ and ‘social network’ is interchangeably. However, there are discussion on the 
difference between them. 
56 Devi Gnyawali et al., ‘Competitive Actions and Dynamics in the Digital Age’ (2010) 21(3) Information 
Systems Research 594, 595-596. 
57 danah boyd and Nicole Ellison, ‘Social Network Sites’ (2007) 13(1) Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 210, 211. 
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Figure 2: The intersection of media platforms 
 
Under this definition, Facebook is obviously a social media. The definition also 
includes platforms such as Myspace, Google+, Tumblr and other sites that have the 
features or functions similar in common. These sites facilitate the sharing of texts, 
pictures, videos, audio files, and applications. Social media includes microblogging 
which is a web service allowing registered members to broadcast or share short messages 
to a global audience of the service.  Twitter is one of the most popular microblogging 
services: Twitter users may know very few of their followers and most tweets are public 
and searchable on the Internet so Twitter links vast numbers of people otherwise unknown 
to one another. Also, content communities and social curation fall under the definition of 
social media. Content communities are sites where users can share multimedia content 
with other members of their online community.  Well-known examples of these 
communities include Flickr and YouTube. These sites have the power to make certain 
topics go viral through pictures and videos. Social curation is a collaborative sharing of 
web content organised around one or more particular themes or topics.  Well-known 
social curation sites are Digg, Pinterest, BuzzFeed and Reddit. These sites are forums 
where stories are socially curated and promoted by site members. They allow users to 
suggest links to articles and allow other readers to vote. However, social media in this 
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thesis does not include a blog, discussion board or bulletin board, Wiki and virtual worlds. 
This is because online communications in blog, discussion board or bulletin board and 
Wiki are in the same way as the interaction in social network and the organization of 
content in such platforms (i.e. selecting, prioritizing and disseminating) is not 
automatically facilitated by algorithms. Also, virtual world is commonly used for gaming 
not for disseminating media contents. 
3. Media power of selection intermediaries 
It is crucial to examine the media power of the two selection intermediaries i.e. 
search engines and social media. The search results generated by search engines and the 
content recommendation provided by social media are hereinafter referred to as ‘result 
recommendations’. 
Search engines are now a fundamental structure in the online information world. 
Search engines, on the one hand, prevent chaos from the complexity of navigating 
information; on the other, they practically are in the centre to organise the flow of 
information and to control the access to knowledge.58 Anybody who cannot be found via 
a search engine does not exist: ‘to exist is to be indexed by a search engine’59. Search 
engines connect between content providers and audiences, by selecting relevant content 
and distributing them to the audience.60 With this role, search engines can exploit their 
power to shape people’s attention and perception of the world. Search results provided 
by search engines can have influence over searchers’ behaviour and have social 
implications.61 Therefore, search engines are new powerful gatekeepers who control the 
degree of diverse content people are exposed to. 
According to a Reuter report, despite the direct consumption from the media 
websites and apps, search engines remain the most important gateways to online 
content.62 As seen in Figure 3, the direct access to media websites (32%) remains only 
slightly ahead of search engines (25%). This result is similar to findings in an Ofcom 
                                                          
58 Mark Levene, An introduction to search engines and Web navigation (2nd edn, Wiley 2010) 65. 
59 Lucas D. Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Shaping the Web’ (2000) 16(3) The Information Society 169, 
171. 
60 Azi Lev-On, ‘The Democratizing Effects of Search Engine Use’ in Amanda Spink and Michael Zimmer 
(eds), Web Search (Springer 2008) 139. 
61 Min Jiang, ‘The business and politics of search engines’ (2014) 16(2) NMC 212, 227.  
62 ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’, 14.  
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report which reported that a majority of Internet users (97%) had used search engines as 
their main source of online information.63 It is the most popular source and the only source 
which used by more than half of adults who go online (see Figure 3). Likewise, Google 
Search had around 40 million UK visitors in March 2017.64 Not only be the large number 
of users but search engines are also considered a trusted source by audiences. Children 
age 12-15s are turning to Google for ‘true and accurate information’.65 One in four of the 
children66 and one in five of the adults67 surveyed believe that if certain information is 
listed by search engines, the results will be unbiased and can be trusted.  
Figure 3: Main source of online information: Reuter (above)68 Ofcom (Below) 69  
                                                          
63 Ofcom, ‘Adults’ media use and attitudes report 2017’ (Ofcom, 14 June 2017) 8. 
64 Ofcom, ‘Communications Market Report 2017’ (Ofcom, 3 August 2017) 188.  
65 Ofcom, ‘Children and parents: media use and attitudes report 2016’ (Ofcom, 16 November 2016) 8. 
66 Ofcom, ‘Children and parents: media use and attitudes report 2017’ (Ofcom, 29 November 2017) 13. 
67 Ofcom, ‘Adults’ media use and attitudes report 2017’ (Ofcom, 14 June 2017) 139. 
68 ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’, 14. 
69 Ofcom, ‘Adults’ media use and attitudes report 2017’ (Ofcom, 14 June 2017) 103. 
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Apart from search engines, social media are becoming increasingly influential 
sources of news source. Although, Reuter reported that social media is trusted less than 
traditional media, it can be argued that the cause of doubts comes from political bias and 
audience polarisation.70 Even though people express low trust in social media, they in fact 
continuously consume and share agreeable content from like-mind people on such 
platforms. Both citizens and political entities increasingly use social media as a source of 
information about public affairs and as a tool to express their viewpoints. The crucial role 
of social media can be considered in two aspects: first, the aspect of quantity, e.g. the 
number of people using social media; and second, the aspect of the impact it has on the 
everyday life of users and on the way that society is represented at a given point of time.  
In term of quantity, the growth of news accessed via social media sites like 
Facebook and Twitter is continuously increasing. Millions of people around the world, 
regardless of geographical and ideological barriers, utilise social media platforms as 
gateways to online content (see Figure 3: Reuter). According to Figure 4 (below) from 
the Reuters Institute report 2017, more than four in ten (41%) of UK audiences get their 
news via social media while over half (51%) of Americans (51%) now say they uses 
                                                          
70 ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’, 9, 21-22 (‘There is a sense in some countries that feeds are 
being overwhelmed or polluted by different political agendas’) (‘In the United States, the vast majority of 
mistrust is generated from the right (Trump supporters and Republicans), because of the media’s perceived 
‘liberal agenda’. In the UK, mistrust is more likely to come from the left, due to a sense that the right-wing 
press is pushing a pro-Brexit and pro-government agenda.’).  
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social media for news. These percentages increased by 6 points for the UK and 5 points 
for the US last year.71 The data also shows that young people express a significant 
preference for online sources. A third of children aged 18–24s (33%) now say social 
media are their main source of news which is more than online news sites (31%) and more 
than TV news and printed newspapers put together (29%)72 (see Figure 1). This result 
accords with an Ofcom report which found that social media was the second most popular 
source of news and news updates for UK children aged 12-15s (56%) (see Figure 5). 
There has also been a significant increase in the number of Internet users aged 75 and 
over embracing social media (41% having a social media profile in 2016 compared to 
19% in 2015).73 This phenomenon illustrates high popularity of social media as anew 
communication and media channel. Thus, there is no other media platform that connects 
people in such an effective and influential way as social media.  
Figure 4: Social media as a source of news: US (left) UK (right) 74 
 
                                                          
71 ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’, 53,10.  
72 Ibid, 10.  
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74 ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017’, 10-11. 
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Figure 5: Sources of news used by 12-15s75 
 
 
As for the impact social media has on people and society, social media as an 
information source has influenced political activities, social interactions and democratic 
processes. For example, in the US, social media became a key player in the story of the 
election since 2008.76 In 2016, many US citizens received news and campaign 
information about candidates from social media during the US presidential election: in 
particular, Donald Trump appears to have benefited from the use of Twitter. In October 
2017, social media was exploited as a channel against sexual crime relating to women. 
After a tweet by actor Alyssa Milano, the hashtag #MeToo became a rallying cry against 
sexual assault and harassment. Within 24 hours, 4.7 million people around the world 
engaged in the conversation with over 12 million posts, comments, and reactions. 
Consequently, the movement has also inspired men to admit inappropriate behaviours by 
offshoot hashtags such as #IDidThat and #HowIWillChange.77 Moreover, the role of 
social media was critical for protesters during the Arab Spring to facilitate the 
communication between participants, to disseminate information about their activities, 
and to spread awareness about the ongoing events to the rest of the world.78 Therefore, 
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social media are now indispensable tools for navigating people’s attention to particular 
aspect of the world. 
In conclusion, selection intermediaries are slowly replacing traditional media and 
rapidly becoming the gatekeepers of our ‘information’ society. Selection intermediaries 
represent an essential part of the way in which digital information is made easily 
accessible. However, they can also become a bottleneck in access to information due to 
the links structure of the Internet, the scarcity of attention and the overload of information. 
The fact that a large number of people depend on selection intermediaries to find 
information raises an issue about to what extent these media platforms provide diverse 
viewpoints to people. The recommendation results provided by these intermediaries have 
an effect on the way people consume media content. Therefore, it is important to analyse 
what is the effect of selection intermediaries on the concept of media plurality. The next 
chapter will discuss the consequence of the change of the media landscape on the shift of 
media plurality concerns and will intensively analyse the relationship between selection 




Exposure diversity and the justifications of the regulation of selection 
intermediaries 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the media landscape has changed to an environment of 
information overflowing on the Internet and the emergence of selection intermediaries. 
This change has raised issues about media plurality. However, in Europe, at least, the 
fundamental debate about media plurality and selection intermediaries has hardly been 
seriously discussed in media law and policy. The issues about media plurality on the 
Internet include: are media plurality concerns an obsolete issue now? If not, which aspect 
of media plurality would be a concern for media law and policy?, and should selection 
intermediaries have a role in promoting media plurality? If so, why? In this Thesis, the 
terms ‘media plurality’ and ‘media diversity’ are used interchangeably. It should be noted 
that there are distinctions between ‘media plurality’ and ‘media diversity’. While media 
plurality is commonly used in Europe, media diversity is mainly used in the US. However, 
it is beyond the scope of this Thesis to differentiate between the two concepts.1 
This chapter, therefore, argues that the focus of media plurality concerns has moved 
from diversity of ownership and available content to concern about the diversity of 
content actually consumed by people. It explores the relevant arguments concerning the 
concept of exposure diversity and the justification for regulating selection intermediaries. 
It is divided into two parts. The first part considers the scope and definition of exposure 
diversity and the reasons why it is important. The second part then analyses the influence 
of selection intermediaries on the way people are exposed to diverse content and the 
justification for regulating selection intermediaries in order to achieve diversity in the 
viewpoints people are exposed to. 
Part I: Exposure diversity 
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Part I introduces the principle of exposure diversity. It is divided into three sections. 
The first section will discuss the reason why the concerns about media plurality have 
shifted from diversity of ownership and diversity of available content to exposure 
diversity. The following sections then conceptualise the idea of exposure diversity and its 
importance in public interests. 
1. The shift from diversity from the supply side to diversity on the demand side 
Concerns about media plurality are at the heart of media law and policy.2 The 
concept of media plurality is based on the fact that media are powerful gatekeepers of 
public communication. Historically, due to a scarcity resource of analogue spectrum, the 
broadcasting model in the pre-internet age allowed only the wealthy to own media and 
produce content. The capacity to speak effectively to a large number of people and 
influence public opinion was controlled by a few people.3 The concentration of power 
and control over the channels of communication lead to concentrated control over 
content.4 As a consequence, content made available was concentrated around mainstream 
preferences and marginal viewpoints were ignored.  
Therefore, discussions on how to guarantee media plurality focused on promoting 
diversity of material sources. Variety of media sources could be achieved by creating 
media structures which provided a range of different media ownership. Another approach 
to guarantee media plurality was the encouragement of diversity of content. This approach 
required media outlets to provide a wide range of opinions which reflected the interests 
of whole people in society. Thus, in the pre-internet age, media plurality was safeguarded 
by providing diversity on the supply side of the media market. 
However, with the proliferation of information available on the Internet, media 
plurality concerns have been questioned. As Karppinen stated, ‘[i]n what sense is it then 
meaningful to speak of diversity and pluralism when media systems as a whole are 
characterised more by abundance than scarcity?’.5 
a. The arrival of the Internet and digital optimists 
                                                          
2 See Jan van Cuilenburg and Denis McQuail, ‘Media Policy Paradigm Shifts’ (2003) 18(2) Eur.J.Com 181. 
3 Stefaan Verhulst, ‘Mediation, Mediators and New Intermediaries’ in Philip M. Napoli (ed.), Media 
Diversity and Localism (LEA 2007) 117. 
4 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (YUP 2006) 119-204. 
5 Kari Karppinen, Rethinking Media Pluralism (FUP 2013) 104. 
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In many respects, the Internet media model provides a vast expansion of choices. 
The abundance of information brings about the end of scarcity and the concerns about the 
availability of diverse content from different sources have gone forever. Many scholars 
and policymakers celebrate that the Internet leads to the pluralization of the public 
discourse.6 For example, Kellner praises the Internet as a space offering opportunities for 
marginal voices. He states that: 
‘It [the Internet] is constantly astonishing to discover the extensive array of 
material available, articulating every conceivable point of view and providing news, 
opinion, and sources of a striking variety and diversity. …. The Internet can send disparate 
types and sources of information and images instantly throughout the world and is 
increasingly being used by a variety of oppositional groups.’ 7 
Castells argues that the Internet brought a changes from the communication 
system which centered around mass media (‘characterized by the mass distribution of a 
one-way message from one to many’) to the new form of communication of ‘the global 
web of horizontal communication networks that include the multimodal exchange of 
interactive messages from many to many’.8 This opens up the unlimited diversity of 
communication flows. 
Consequently, it seems that this new form of communication enables 
opportunities for citizens to reach diverse media without the need of any regulatory 
intervention. Therefore, some scholars suggest that the regulation to promote media 
plurality will no longer be necessary. Negroponte, for example, argues that the 
cooperation of technology and human nature will bring greater plurality than any laws 
Congress could make.9  
However, the conclusion that all concerns about media plurality have been solved 
is critically misleading. The substantial news sources which influence people are still 
generated by traditional media entities. Consumption and trust in news media is still 
                                                          
6 See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (YUP 2006); Brian McNair, Cultural chaos (Routledge 
2006). 
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8 Manuel Castells, ‘Communication, power and counter-power in the network society’ (2007) 1(1) 
Int.J.Com 238. 
9 Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (Vintage Books 1996) 57-58. 
30 
concentrated in traditional media due to brand loyalty. This phenomenon seems to cause 
the two distinct screens: the concentration by traditional mass media as well as new 
dominant enterprises, and a myriad of small media. Therefore, it does not mean that the 
concern about diversity on the supply side, which has always been in the centre of media 
policy, has now been solved or become an obsolete issue. Moreover, although it is true 
that the Internet brings exposure to a much greater number of views, it reconfigures a 
more complex problem of how people choose media content diversely. 
b. New problem: consume limited information 
The ultimate aim to promote diversity of source and available content is to 
encourage people to consume diverse information and opposite viewpoints. However, the 
abundance of information on the Internet may not always ensure people are exposed to 
more diverse content. There are a number of factors which limit the diversity of 
information presented to people. First, an information-overloaded environment can result 
in narrowing of the range of people’s attention to concentrate on a few sources. This is 
because a human can only process a limited amount of information.10 With limited time 
and attention, people will only rely on selected sources they trust.11 
The second reason is the unequal accessibility of resources. Although almost 
infinite information is technically available on the Internet, all of this information is not 
equally distributed to the public due to technical obstacles.12 Hindman, for instance, 
argues that the structure of the Internet which bases on links and intermediaries directs 
users to a few popular sources.13 Thus the most visited sites will become more seen while 
other sites become even more invisible. Another example is ‘enclosure’. Basically, 
‘enclosure’ means the restriction of the accessibility to information. It can be in the form 
of subscription services, disallowing of external links and the lack of interoperability.14 
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The third reason is Internet functions such as filtering mechanisms and 
personalisation will reinforce the tendency of people to select only topics and activities 
which are relevant to them.15 This behaviour can result in audience fragmentation and 
audience polarisation. Audience fragmentation is the segmentation of different groups of 
audiences using different media which leads to the dissolution of public affairs knowledge 
or political beliefs into smaller units in a society’.16 The divide between smaller segments 
of people can result in being less exposed to unnoticed problems and losing a range of 
shared common experiences and a unified social agenda for the public as a whole.17 For 
Tewksbury and Rittenberg, fragmentation of the information environment has generated 
the phenomenon of audience polarisation.18 
Audience polarisation is the tendency of individuals to concentrate their patterns 
of consumption on a homogenous assortment of media content or outlets and to avoid 
being exposed to more diverse offerings.19 While the polarisation of the audience has 
been differently labelled such as ‘echo chambers’20, ‘sphericules’21, ‘cyberghettos’22 and 
‘cyberbalkanization’23, they all point to polarisation into an information cocoon which 
systematically avoids dissenting voices. Audience polarisation is in harmony with the 
concept of selective exposure. Selective exposure is the behaviour of seeking out 
agreeable ideas.24 Consequently, groups of like-minded people prejudice their existing 
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beliefs and reinforced their views to an extreme version after discussing ideas among 
themselves. As the High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism comments: 
‘Such developments undoubtedly have a potentially negative impact on 
democracy. Thus we may come to read and hear what we want, and nothing but what we 
want. …The concern is people forgetting that alternatives do exist and hence becoming 
encapsulated in rigid positions that may hinder consensus-building in society.’ 25 
There are many pieces of empirical research about selective exposure behaviour 
and the audience polarisation phenomenon. According to a Reuters report, the proportion 
of those who look for news ‘that share their point of view’ is remarkable. 23% of the 
respondents in all countries where the survey was conducted preferred to tune into sources 
that shared ‘their own point of view’; while only 11.2% of the respondents state that they 
choose sources which ‘challenge their own point of view’.26 In the UK, the data show that 
liberal supporters are more likely to consume news from liberal media; and equally 
conservative supporters are more likely to consume news from conservative media.27 
Moreover, young audiences are more likely to seek out sources that ‘share their point of 
view’ (28.7% of those who are between 25 and 35 years) than older adult (20% of those 
over 55).28 Therefore, people are likely to interact with like-minded individuals. 
The audience polarisation phenomenon does not only occur in Europe and UK. In 
the US, for example, although its media landscape is different from Europe and UK, the 
trend is in the same direction of the Reuters report. Results from a Pew Research Center 
study confirms that there is audience polarisation situation in the US (and it may be even 
worse than the UK). It found that half of those who consistently conservative named Fox 
News as their single or main source for news.29 As for the trusted source, although the 
consistently liberals voters trusted a wide range of news outlets (28 of 36 news sources 
listed), the distrustful levels of those distrusted sources were high (e.g. 81% for Fox 
News).30 In contrast, the consistently conservative voters draw more distrust than the trust 
of new sources listed. Besides, seven out of eight outlets which the conservatives trusted 
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were distrusted by consistently liberal voters.31 Moreover, the conservatives were likely 
to see political opinions on social media posts that were in line with their own views; 
while the liberals were likely to block or defriend someone on social media because of 
disagreement about political posts.32 Therefore, this result confirms the existence of 
audience polarisation and partial web sources.33 
The audience polarization phenomenon was confirmed in a Reuter report in 2017. 
According to the report, people follow politicians they agree with on social media and 
avoid those they do not. In particular, respondents on the left are five times more likely 
to follow left-leaning politicians on social media than politicians from the right (see 
Figure 1). This suggests that following politicians on social media may be contributing to 
greater polarisation.  
Figure 1: Polarization in following politicians on social media34 
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Also, as illustrated in Figure 2, the US shows the furthest left and furthest right 
bubbles are further apart. This illustrates a deeply polarised media landscape, which 
reflects an equally polarised society. The websites of TV networks like New York Times 
and CNN are viewed far more by people who self-identify as left-wing. By contrast the 
Fox News and Breitbart websites are mostly accessed by people with right-wing views. 
Although the figure shows only online sites, polarisation also exists in the print and TV 
markets. In the UK, Figure 3 similarly shows a picture of polarisation amongst the top 
online sources although it is less extreme than the US. The Guardian online, with its left-
leaning audience, has a score which places it on the left-hand side, whereas the Mail 
Online is placed on the right. Notably, the data reveal that audience polarization has been 
increasing quite rapidly in the UK and the US since 2014.35 
Figure 2: Polarization in US media audiences36 
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Figure 3: Polarization in UK media audiences37 
 
In conclusion, it is clear from the empirical studies that the abundance of available 
information does not guarantee people will expand their media consumption choices. The 
simplistic assumption that the Internet increases the variety of content people actually 
consume can be seriously challenged. Communicative abundance alone does not solve 
the issue of media plurality. The real issue for media plurality now is not the availability 
of diverse content but the actual accessibility. As Karppinen points out, media plurality 
should be viewed more broadly in terms of the distribution of communicative power 
rather than in terms of consumer choices or specific issues such as media ownership.38 
Therefore, more emphasis needs to be put on exposure to different ideas and opinions of 
various alternatives. In this aspect, Garnham states that ‘we need to take into account both 
the range of communication option made available ….and the ability of people actually 
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to make use of those options’.39 In other words, the concerns about media plurality have 
moved to the diversity of actual content exposed to people or ‘exposure diversity’. 
2. Concept and scope of exposure diversity 
The section above has illustrated the shift of media plurality concerns from diversity 
of ownership and diversity of available content to the diversity of exposure. This section, 
therefore, will discuss the concept of exposure diversity; including the definition and 
classification of exposure diversity, and exposure diversity in media policy. 
a. Definition of exposure diversity 
Diversity of exposure refers to actual diverse media content and sources that the 
audience are exposed to. Initially, the notion of exposure diversity is recognised from an 
empirical perspective. It is derived from one aspect of the media plurality classification 
by McQuail. He differentiates ‘content as sent’ from ‘content as received’ and the latter 
‘identifies a different universe of content than that sent—what the audience actually 
selects’.40 According to McQuail, ‘content as received will show a narrower range (thus 
less diversity) than content as sent…’.41 In other words, what is being sent is not necessary 
as what is being consumed. 
Napoli develops the idea of ‘content as received’ further by suggesting the concept 
of ‘exposure diversity’ to be another dimension of media plurality. This additional 
diversity is distinct from the traditional two components (diversity of source and available 
content) that have emphasised plurality discourse so far.42 It is an aspect of media plurality 
which focuses on the audience side, and it is distinct from source diversity and content 
diversity which focuses on the supply side. Napoli also emphasises that media policy 
goals should pave the way ahead to realise the importance of exposure diversity.43 
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The aspect of exposure diversity has been expanded by van der Wurff. He 
discusses that the notions of ‘content as received’ or ‘exposure diversity’ explain ‘the 
extent to which different programme types are represented in total …consumption’ but 
do not reflect ‘the absolute availability (or use) of different programme types’.44 The 
content people actually choose is the one which actually available offering to them. 
Therefore, van der Wurff provides an additional dimension of exposure diversity: 
‘diversity of choice’ which is ‘the absolute amount of different programme types that 
viewers can choose from’.45 
Helberger supports Wurff’s idea that this aspect of exposure diversity is important 
especially when concerning the obstacles of actual exposure in reality; such as business 
models, new intermediaries, the terms and conditions, and the technical design of Internet 
services.46 For Helberger, diversity of choice means a chance for people to consider 
possible alternatives. In other words, the concerns of exposure diversity are about the 
process of making choices.47 Therefore, from the exposure diversity point of view, the 
questions are to what extent do people choose to consume a wide range of political and 
social views or different sources? What are the factors which affect the diversity of 
available content to actually reach audience and result in exposure diversity? And, how 
can people realistically access diverse media content? 
b. Classification of exposure diversity 
Exposure diversity can be classified by many perspectives. For example, Napoli 
has classified exposure diversity as being ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ for the purpose of 
empirical assessment. Horizontal exposure diversity focuses on ‘the distribution of 
audiences across all available content options’ which relates to the concept of audience 
fragmentation; vertical exposure diversity refers to ‘the diversity of content consumption 
within individual audiences’ which relates to the concept of audience polarisation.48 
Besides, exposure diversity can be divided as ‘exposure to external diversity’ and 
‘exposure to internal diversity’. The former promotes exposure diversity in the form of 
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consumption from a diverse choice of outlets from different providers; whereas the latter 
refers to the diversity of viewpoints within a few quality channels exposed to the 
audience.49 
For the purpose of this thesis, the classification of exposure diversity, as inspired 
by Helberger’s works50, is on the aspect of regarding exposure diversity as a means to 
achieve different media policy goals. In this view, exposure diversity is not seen in 
isolation as valuable in itself, rather it relates to the objectives which media policies are 
supposed to serve.51 Therefore, this section will present three different conceptualizations 
of exposure diversity as a policy goal: to enlighten people, contribute to democratic 
debate, and promote personal autonomy.  
The enlightenment of people can refer to discovering truth, wise decision-making 
and understanding the difference between people. In order to do so, people need perfect 
or near-perfect information. Seen in this light, exposure diversity means ‘discovering the 
difference’. The role of exposure diversity in this context is to increase people’s 
awareness of divergent views, cultures, and opinions. It also sharpens people’s ability to 
discover the difference and critically evaluate possible alternatives. Besides, exposure 
diversity can be seen as a means of ‘promoting surprising or serendipitous encounters’.52 
Serendipity53 can break established routines and spark interest in investigating the matter 
further which lead people to arrive at new insights. 
From the perspective of contributing to democracy, exposure diversity refers to 
‘the openness to diverse speakers or media outlets’. In other words, it supports and 
enlarges the opportunities for minor voices to create space for the public attention. Central 
to this conception could be a diverse forum reflecting the heterogeneous interests in 
society that particularly contribute to active participation and democratic deliberation. 
Moreover, one could argue that a role of exposure diversity could be ‘facilitating 
comparison’ which is an important element of engagement with diverse content and 
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democratic debate. As Meiklejohn has commented in the context of voting: ‘Both facts 
and interests must be given in such a way that all the alternative lines of action can be 
wisely measured in relation to one another’.54 As such, exposure diversity should be in a 
form of information that allows for comparison. 
While the previous two conceptualizations of exposure diversity emphasise public 
interest considerations, another approach would focus on the individual, with personal 
autonomy at the centre. For the autonomous conception, exposure diversity enables 
individuals to realise their personal freedom of choice and to encourage self-fulfilment 
through the diverse information presented to them. Therefore, no one other than the 
individual themselves should be entitled to determine what content to consume. In this 
regard, exposure diversity is ‘the choice to choose freely’. The only assessment of the 
diversity of information exposed to the individual is whether they are sufficient to 
contribute personal autonomy. 
To conclude, exposure diversity has five main aspects, i.e. (i) discovering the 
difference, (ii) exposure to diverse media outlets/speakers, (iii) facilitating comparison, 
(iv) promoting serendipity, and (v) the choice to choose freely from a sufficient variety 
of content exposed to the individual. It should be noted that these conceptualizations are 
not mutually exclusive, but they can intersect with each other. This classification will be 
used as the benchmark for the discussion of creating a new regulatory regime to achieve 
exposure diversity in Chapter 4. 
c. Exposure diversity and media policy 
Exposure diversity has traditionally been neglected and placed at the margin of 
media policy debates although it is crucial as source or content diversity. There are many 
reasons for this. 
First, the traditional assumption underlying media policy is that increasing 
diversity of sources will lead to an increase in content diversity.55 Furthermore, it has 
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often been assumed that promoting diversity of available content will automatically result 
in a greater diversity of content consumed by people.56 However, as discussed in the 
previous section, diversity of available content and exposure diversity are two different 
things and do not always coincide. Besides, the overload of sources and available content 
can negatively affect people to narrow their attention and to concentrate around a few 
selected sources. As McQuail observed, although diversity of available content is a 
necessary precondition for people to consume diverse content, diverse supplied content 
on its own cannot secure diversity of actual content exposed to people.57 
The second reason is the question whether exposure diversity is beyond the 
bounds of media policy? Some have stressed that the issues about exposure diversity are 
irrelevant from a policy perspective; thus, it is not within regulatory concerns with how 
people navigate content offering to them.58 Another reason is that any forms of 
involvement with exposure diversity are considered on a sensitive ground. The law cannot 
force people to choose media content diversely or consume certain content. Such 
interventions conflict with individual fundamental freedoms.59 The last reason is how the 
concept should be applied to be possible concrete measures? While precise legislation 
such as numbers of thresholds to media ownership or exact quotas for certain can be 
provided for content source and content diversity, it is difficult to set precise policy goals 
in the area of exposure diversity. 
However, as Valcke argues, there are undoubtedly positive roles for the law to 
create the conditions which encourage people to exercise their freedom to effectively 
expose themselves to diverse content without infringing individual personal rights.60 This 
thesis, therefore, asserts that exposure diversity has the public interest values which 
should be under media policy concerns. Besides, the possible concrete measure to 
promote exposure diversity without conflicting with the fundamental freedom of people 
is the regulation of selection intermediaries to assist people to view diverse content. The 
justification that exposure diversity is within media policy concerns and how to achieve 
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exposure diversity will be discussed in the following parts of this chapter and in Chapter 
4. 
3. Exposure diversity and the public interests 
This section examines the reasons why media law and policy should be concerned 
about exposure diversity. It explores the importance of exposure diversity in the public 
interests which are freedom of speech, democratic value and personal autonomy. First, it 
analyses the importance of exposure diversity to encourage freedom of speech. Then, the 
relation between exposure diversity and democracy value will be analysed. Lastly, this 
section explores the relation between exposure diversity and personal autonomy. 
a. Exposure diversity and freedom of speech 
The analysis of the relation between exposure diversity and freedom of speech is 
comprised of two aspects. The first aspect will discuss how exposure diversity supports 
the theoretical justifications underlying freedom of speech. The analysis in the second 
aspect concerns how exposure diversity strengthens the interest of free speech involved 
speakers and audiences. 
i. Exposure diversity supports the justifications for freedom of expression 
There are three theoretical arguments underlying the justifications of freedom of 
expression: the argument from truth, the argument from autonomy or self-fulfilment and 
the argument from democracy. These justifications give the meaning to free speech 
because speech is not valued for its own sake but for leading to other desirable outcomes. 
Therefore, to understand the relation between free speech and exposure diversity, these 
justifications should be referred to. The discussion of how exposure diversity encourages 
free speech to achieve these justifications are presented here. 
1) The argument from discovering of truth 
One historical justification for freedom of speech has been based on its 
importance as an instrument to the discovery of truth. The most famous explanation of 
this argument went back to the work of John Mill’s On liberty.61 Mill expressed that:  
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‘[…] the peculiar evil of silencing an opinion is, that it is robbing the human 
race; […]; those who dissent from the opinion still more that those who hold it. If the 
opinion is right they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if 
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
expression of truth produced by its collision with error.’ 62  
For this argument, freedom of expression is the best way to ensure the 
discovery of truth since truth emerges from discussion and debate between different 
viewpoints. Therefore, the restriction of free speech prevents society from reaching 
accurate facts and valuable opinions.63 For free speech to effectively lead to the truth, free 
and uninhibited exposure to diverse information is necessary for eliminating 
misconceptions of fact and value. The notion that exposure diversity encourages free 
speech to achieve discovering of truth relates to the marketplace of idea theory. As Justice 
Holmes, the dissenting judge, proposed in Abrams v US: 
‘The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.’64 
In the marketplace of ideas, different points of view compete to most 
convincingly reach participants in the debate. The truth would emerge as the result of the 
public confrontation of free trade in ideas and intellectual competition.65 Although the 
marketplace of ideas theory is usually applied to the expression of opinion, it can also 
well be used to support exposure diversity to discover the truth. This is because the 
possession of various information is a prerequisite for individuals to utilise the 
competition of different viewpoints to reach the truth. As a metaphor, the marketplace of 
ideas simply stresses the need for people to be exposed to diverse ideas for information 
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
63 The justification from discovering of truth is frequently criticised by a number versions of argument. For 
example, the argument from truth are resting on naively optimistic view regarding overvaluation of human 
intellect. It is also questionable that free discussion necessarily leads to the acceptance of truth. However, 
on its own the justification from discovering of truth is one of the common argument to justify free speech. 
For further discussions see Eric Barendt, Freedom of speech (OUP 2005) 7-13; Larry Alexander, Is there 
a right of freedom of expression? (CUP 2005) 128-130. 
64 Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919). 
65 Joan Barata, ‘The Different Concepts of Free Expression and its Link with Democracy, the Public Sphere 
and Other Concepts’ in Monroe E. Price et al. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Media Law (Routledge 2013) 
125, 128. 
43 
to be exchanged and evaluated. Therefore, exposure diversity is an important factor for 
encouraging freedom of speech to achieve ‘discovering of truth’ justification. 
2) The argument from self-fulfilment 
Whereas the argument from discovering of truth lies on a common good, the 
argument from self-fulfilment places on the fundamental value of the individual. This 
second justification of free speech recognises that freedom of speech is necessary to 
enable human development. In particular, the ability of people to develop their capacity 
is guaranteed by exercising free speech to obtain knowledge and transmit expression of 
ideas, thoughts or sentiments.66 Besides, a right to express their beliefs and attitude can 
be recognised as an individual communicative conduct which reflects ‘what it is to be 
human’.67 Therefore, the suppression of what people say/write or hear/read should be 
considered as inadequate because it inhibits the main element of the contribution to 
individual self-determination and personality.68 As expressed in Handyside v UK:  
‘[f]reedom of expression constitutes […] one of the basic conditions for […] 
the development of every man.’69 
This justification of free speech to achieve self-fulfilment takes exposure 
diversity as the fundamental point. Individuals cannot develop morally and intellectually 
unless free speech is exploited by individuals to expose themselves to various viewpoints 
and ideas. The diversity of information exposed to listeners enhances their autonomy 
because it is the precondition of people’s ability to create their individual growth. 
Therefore, exposure diversity is the need for free speech to accomplish the self-fulfilment 
of the individual. 
3) The argument from democracy 
This justification regards freedom of speech as a fundamental element for 
people to control self-governance and ensure the accountability of public powers in a 
democratic society. Expression and communication in society is an instrument to 
facilitate public deliberation, the circulation of political discussion and the process of 
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collective decision in an important social issue.70 Besides, in a representative democracy, 
free speech is crucial for the voting decisions because it makes the elected know the 
opinions of citizens, and vice versa.  
The argument from democracy is primarily associated with the American 
philosopher Meiklejohn. He argued that open debate is essential because a reasonable 
understanding of political issues is a pre-requirement for citizens to effectively participate 
in a democracy.71 As democracy rests upon the idea of citizen’s sophisticated 
participation, the justification of free speech to encourage democracy encompasses the 
need to expose citizens to a wide variety of viewpoints and to provide people with enough 
diverse information. Therefore, freedom of speech and the right to receive information 
has its meaning to inform public and form an opinion about matters of public concerns 
when exposure diversity is guaranteed. 
The judgements of the ECtHR also illustrate the justification of free speech 
to support democracy. For example, in Lingens v Austria, the court stated: 
‘the Court has to recall that freedom of expression…constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its 
progress …’72 
Moreover, the ECtHR has also demonstrated that free speech not only applied 
to ‘‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as 
a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any 
sector of the population’.73 Democracy is not only based on public debate and expression 
but includes a plurality of diverging view to be accommodated: ‘Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic 
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society’’74. Therefore, this justification for free speech has a close link to exposure 
diversity in order to protect all form of expression to be noticed in public attention. 
ii. Exposure diversity and free speech interests 
Apart from the justification of freedom of speech, another approach to analyse 
the importance of exposure diversity to encourage free speech is the exploration of the 
free speech’s interests of people involved. The interests of free speech can be considered 
from the perspective of speaker and audience. This section will discuss the relation 
between exposure diversity and freedom of expression from the aspect of the interests of 
people involved and to what extent exposure diversity strengthens these interests. 
1) Speakers’ interests of free speech 
The free speech interests of speakers seem to be obvious. The exact interests 
of speakers, as Scanlon expressed, is that they are able to disseminate their thought and 
arguments to the attention of wide audiences.75 This ability to express and communicate 
also benefits speakers by linking to self-development and the participation in a democratic 
process as mentioned above. Therefore, freedom of speech has traditionally been 
protected as a negative right which prevents a state from censorship or causing chilling 
effect due to the fear of reprisal.76 However, it does not mean that free speech does not 
have an aspect of positive right which requires the state to ensure people’s ability to speak 
effectively. 
If we consider freedom of speech from the aspect of communicative social 
activity, speech has its meaning when communication is established between speakers 
and audience.77 Therefore, the interest of speakers in free speech lies in the ability to 
speak to someone else (the ability to communicate) not in speaking without being heard 
by no one. Particularly, this consideration should be concerned in the Internet 
environment. The wealth of choice makes it difficult for an individual speaker to find its 
way to interested audience’s attention. From the speaker’s perspective, the chances of 
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being heard or reaching a receptive audience are exacerbated than the time of limited 
choices available.  
 
This recognition suggests that the protection of free speech’s interest lies in each 
of the steps of establishing and maintaining the communicative relationship.78 Therefore, 
in the age of the Internet, the protected interests of speakers under the right to freedom of 
expression should also encompass the right to reach the audiences. As Chandler states 
‘the theories of free speech all depend fundamentally on communication…As a result, it 
is not enough simply to be able to speak or to receive information…This includes the 
processes of reaching an audience or finding a speaker’. 79  Free speech does not 
encompass only the right to speak and the right to hear, but also the right to the unimpeded 
ability to reach an audience (i.e. the right to be free of the imposition of discriminatory 
filters imposed by selection intermediaries). The right to reach an audience focuses on the 
effects of selection intermediaries who select certain speech for preference, sometimes 
effectively silencing disfavored speakers.80  This must include the ability to hear the 
communicative overtures launched by others in the society, as well as the ability to launch 
one’s own communicative overtures to an audience. Chandler suggests the implications 
of this right: for instance, selection intermediaries should not remove websites from the 
database selection intermediaries unless required by law to do so. Any removal of any 
website and the reason for the removal should then be made known within a publicly 
accessible list.81  
It should be noted that whereas the right to reach the audience deters selection 
intermediaries from blocking or discriminating against a speaker on grounds that listeners 
would not have selected; exposure diversity, on the other hand, does not merely include 
the right to reach the audience (i.e. the right to be free from the unimpeded ability to reach 
the listener) but also impose that selection intermediaries ensure availability of diverse 
information.  
                                                          
78 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: a philosophical inquiry (CUP, 1983) 47-49. 
79 Jennifer Chandler, ‘A Right to Reach an Audience’ (2007) 35(3) Hofstra Law Review 1095. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, 1117. 
47 
The right to reach the audience correlates with exposure diversity. In particularly, 
the right to reach the audience can be strengthened by exposure diversity. This is because 
the encouragement of people to consume diverse content means that speakers have more 
chance to expose their speech in the attention of the audience. Whereas it is impossible 
for the audience to be bound to listen to any speakers, exposure diversity is an indirect 
way for speakers to effectively disseminate their thought and arguments to the attention 
of wide audiences. Therefore, the need to support speaker’s interest to reach the audience 
can be considered as the argument to promote exposure diversity.  
2) Audience’s interests of free speech 
Schauer argued that audiences are the primary concern of free speech interest 
and free speech of speakers are recognised in order to safeguard the interest of the 
audience.82 The interest of people as audience under the right to freedom of expression 
can be characterised as the freedom to inform themselves.83 This is because one cannot 
make use of free speech unless they sufficiently receive information in order to contribute 
ideas and participate in public discourse.84 Ultimately, it is the fundamental interest of 
people to become an informed citizen. Therefore, the benefits from the free availability 
of ideas and information belong to audiences in order to enable them to have enough 
materials to make informed choices.85  
The interest of the audience in free speech are covered in Article 10 of the 
ECHR.86 According to Article 10, truly freedom of expression is not only about the right 
to express an opinion but also includes freedom to receive information. To achieve this 
notion, it is essential to establish the environment where diverse and different points of 
views expose to audiences. This can also be seen in the EU Charter which respects media 
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plurality under the protection of freedom of expression and information.87 In the concern 
of audience polarisation, media plurality should refer to exposure diversity which is the 
process of people to be exposed to diverse information, ideas and resources in the public 
networked information environment. Exposure diversity assists audience to be well-
informed citizens by increasing their knowledge and encountering opposite viewpoints. 
Therefore, without exposure diversity, free speech’s interest of audience would not be 
existed. 
b. Exposure diversity and democratic discourse 
Apart from its importance on freedom of speech, exposure diversity also has value 
on democratic society. This section, therefore, examines the democratic values of 
exposure diversity as a justification for media policy’s concerns. Since there are many 
distinct theories of democracy, this section will first provide the aspect of exposure 
diversity in the different theories of democracy. Then, it will summarise the value of 
exposure diversity which underlying all theories of democracy. 
i. Theories of democracy and exposure diversity 
This section addresses the notion of exposure diversity from the perspective of 
democratic theory. A choice among possible theories may be infinite, three approaches 
which have influenced academic and political debates on media and democracy are 
considered in this section.88 They are an elite democracy, liberal democracy and 
deliberative democracy. This section will illustrate that exposure diversity is a crucial 
element underlying in all theories of democracy. 
1) Elite democracy 
The notion of elite democracy is that the government must be governed by 
experts and specialists who understand the technical complexity of problems in the 
modern world.89 Under this account, most people are not capable of understanding the 
economic analysis, social problems and the details of political decisions that government 
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have to respond routinely.90 As a result, the participation of people in a democracy is 
limited through the power of deciding a vote in an election in order to accept or refuse 
elite competitors who are to rule them. In other words, elite democracy can be seen as a 
competition between rival groups of political leaders that chosen through an election.91 
The democratic election is a structural means to remove less effective ruler with the one 
better and to create incentives for better performance. It also prevents or limits the level 
of overt corruption and tyranny.92  
Given the limited role of citizens, the elitist democracy protects the right to 
vote and points to free discussion to achieve a formal understanding of different electoral 
choices. To fulfil this mission, elite democracy requires exposure diversity, in particular, 
the process in which people consume diverse opinions from every candidate and 
criticisms from different groups in society. The free discussions from various viewpoints 
cannot contribute people to understand electoral choice unless the discussions are put 
before people’s acknowledgement.  
Besides, exposure diversity provides political equality for a candidate to have 
an equal opportunity to influence citizen in electoral competition. In this context, the 
consumption of diverse information is a means to sufficiently widely distribute public 
debate to ensure that ‘no single voice is very secure in the government’.93 Democratic 
election and choices to vote have a meaning only when there are equal competition and 
comparison of distinct political competitors presented to people.  
Another consideration is that exposure diversity supports elite democratic 
election by securing the remedy of corruption and incompetent leader.  Only listen to the 
favourable political group can possibly lead the abuse of power and inefficient 
performance to be unchecked. In contrast, exposure to different viewpoints of opposite 
groups promotes the rotation of government which deters corruption and creates 
incentives for a proper performance. Consequently, such an approach could call for voices 
from different sources presented to citizens for them to fully participate in the democratic 
election. 
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2) Liberal democracy 
Liberal democracy acknowledges that each individual or social group has 
their own interests which are different from each other. All of us has their own perception 
of what is good for our life based on what we believe and our position in society and these 
various interests always conflict with those of the others.94 Therefore, liberal democracy 
accepts that the conceptions of good cannot be compromised to any single value.95 Since 
there is no right answer to the question of the common good, citizens do not have to justify 
or give reasons for their choices.96 From the liberal democracy aspect, conflicts among 
interests and views of value are fruitful and necessary for human progress. Rawls also 
pointed out to support this argument that the recognition of disagreement and the clash of 
incompatible opinions are an enduring feature of contemporary society and are inherently 
positive to a political process.97 Liberal democracy, therefore, praises the value of 
freedom of choice. 
Exposure diversity is an important element of liberal democracy. This is 
because the situation which people restricts themselves to concentrate around their 
group’s views are a problem according to the liberal view. Although liberal democracy 
respects different interests and opinions, it does not mean that each interest only acts 
separately in their group. In contrast, liberal democratic society requires the debate and 
competition between conflicts among incompatible views. Citizens must be aware of 
different opinions and options in order to be the judge of their own interests. Therefore, 
the consumption of diverse information is a prerequisite for people to have the ability to 
choose freely and to develop the independence of mind or autonomous rationality. 
The conceptual framework of liberal democracy can be understood through 
the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. Under this approach, the liberal democratic 
process can be seen as the leverage and bargaining of different interests in society in order 
to pressure or influence the generation of political order.98 Citizens gather into groups 
presenting particular interests and convince others to support their political interests. This 
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form of democracy sees political mobilisation as a competition between incompatible 
views to seek the advantage for their own interests. Through this mechanism, various 
interests aggregate and result in government’s decision.99 Liberal democracy, therefore, 
emphasises the opportunity for participation of different interests and assures that those 
interests are taken into account and properly weighed.100 
The true political competition in liberal democratic society requires a debate 
about possible alternatives.101 This competition should not only occur in the public but 
should appear in the acknowledgement of individuals. Within the marketplace of ideas 
frameworks, expose diversity assists citizens to be presented to ‘widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’.102 The role of 
exposure diversity in a liberal democracy is to contribute to the consumption of the debate 
over different views of the conflicting interests by providing the places for these 
alternatives to be expressed and to be heard by the people in society. By exposing 
themselves to diverse incompatible opinions, citizens are well-informed and become the 
capable decision-makers to effectively compete in liberal democratic participation. 
Besides, exposure diversity prevents the dangers from the permanent majority of a single 
interest group by providing marginal views presented as an alternative. This can also be 
considered as the assurance of different interests to have equal opportunity for 
participation in a political competition. 
3) Deliberative democracy 
Deliberative democracy proposes that ‘central to democracy should be a 
particular kind of communication, involving the giving of good reasons and reflection 
upon points advanced by others’.103 The concept of this democracy has two crucial 
features. First, it values the deliberation process as an ideal method to achieve public 
consensus concerning the common good. The process of deliberation does not simply 
mean that the individual advances his views by persuading others but it means that his 
own opinion can be changed or transformed during the course of discussion with 
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others.104 In other words, deliberation is the provision of reasons and the process of open 
discussion to mutual understanding.105 Another element is the concept of the public 
sphere. According to Habermas, the public sphere refers to the metaphorical arena where 
people gathers to participate in the rational communication.106 It is the space of formation 
of public opinion and is distinct from the marketplace of ideas which is the forum of 
competitive interests. 
Under this democratic approach, people raises public concerns and rationally 
debates together about how the best to solve them. This approach believes that the 
common good that all people accept can be reached by the deliberative procedure.107 The 
goal of this democratic process is more than a mere agreement or a bargaining of 
incompatible interests as the liberal democracy but it is a true rational consensus.108 
Therefore, from deliberate democratic views, exposure diversity is a crucial process of 
public consensus and finding common good. This is because deliberative democracy 
requires people to hear a range of diverse and inclusive ideas in order to be able to revise 
and adapt their views. As Price states: 
‘[w]hat makes opinion deliberative is not merely that it has been built upon 
careful contemplation, evidence, and supportive arguments, but also that it has grasped 
and taken into consideration the opposing view of others.’109 
Exposure to conflict viewpoints prevents audience polarisation which is a 
problem from deliberative aspects. If audience polarisation occurs, the pool of available 
information and ideas will be less diverse and the chance to discover new perspective or 
facts will be diminished. If we only get to see the things we already agree, we will not 
contest our own ideas and viewpoints. The lack of challenging by opposing viewpoints 
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leads us not to be aware of disagreements. As a result, the public consensus between 
incompatible views will be difﬁcult to refine.  
Therefore, it is crucial that members of the relevant groups are not isolated 
from the different views within society. For the need to maintain a well-functioning 
system of deliberative democracy, people should be exposed to materials and topics that 
they would not have chosen in advance. The unplanned or unanticipated encounter of new 
topics is essential for engagement between differing views and supports deliberative 
participation.110 
ii. Exposure diversity encourages democratic society 
As discussed in the previous section, there are many distinct theories of 
democracy; however, exposure diversity is a crucial element in every democratic theory. 
Therefore, after exploring exposure diversity from the perspective of each democratic 
theory in the previous section, this section summarises the value of exposure diversity 
which underlying all these theories of democracy. The section considers three major 
reasons to favour the widest possible dispersal of viewpoints exposed to people; they are 
well-informed citizens, securing democratic process, and equality in the democratic 
distribution of communication power.  
1) Well-informed citizens 
Possibly most obvious among the benefits of exposure diversity in a 
democracy is that it assists people in society to be well informed. To effectively 
participate in democratic discourse, people requires the capacity to reasonably understand 
political issues, social matters and public concerns in order to form public opinion. For 
this purpose, the basic standard for democracy is the environment of very wide and fair 
dispersal of different voices and of ubiquitous opportunities to present opinion. As 
Bagdikian pointed out: 
‘…Modern democracies need a choice of politics and ideas, and that choice 
requires access to truly diverse and competing sources of news, literature, entertainment 
and popular culture.’ 111 
                                                          
110 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (PUP 2001) 8-9. 
111 Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Beacon Press, 1992). 
54 
To be well-informed citizens, people need to receive diverse information and 
thoughtful communications. A good argument can arrive from any part of the society, 
especially from the challenge of the marginal voices. Therefore, all groups should have a 
real share of people’s attention and no one group or individual should have been neglected 
or subordinated.  
This concern has traditionally interpreted, in the age of scarcity media, as a 
structural requirement to maximise the dispersal of media ownership and available media 
content. The problem now, however, is that the abundance of information is neglected by 
audience polarisation. Thus, in addition to the availability of different voices as an 
information resource, for citizens to participate fully in the democratic discourse, they 
also require the consumption of diverse views, opinions and policy choices.112 The 
consumption of diverse information encourages people to discuss and question about 
conflict viewpoints they known which are necessary for formulating their own views.  
Moreover, exposure diversity promotes people’s tolerance of difference. By 
being exposed to diverse information, individuals unconsciously become more tolerant 
toward disagreed opinions and ‘accept difference as a normal and unthreatening facet of 
society’.113 This is a desirable condition for open-minded discussion and being well-
informed citizens. Therefore, democracy requires an environment where not only 
different versions of the facts can be contrasted and tested in the public, but where also 
differing emphasis and diverse opinions given to those facts can actually be exposed to 
individuals’ concerns.114 
2) Securing democratic process 
One of the most important roles of exposure diversity is the safeguard it 
creates for the democratic process. The common agreement between many democratic 
theories is that the heart of the strong democratic society is the open and reflexive 
contestation of diverse political positions in order to prevent the unchecked 
irresponsibility power; in particular, the election for elite democracy, competition among 
conflict interests for liberal democracy, and participation in the public sphere for 
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deliberative democracy. As Baker pointed, the good democratic institutional designs do 
not allow any risks from the unchecked irresponsibility power to occur, even if the risk 
had never exercised to bad results.115 This is clearly illustrated from many instruments 
provided to safeguard the accountability of the government, such as the system of 
separation of power, fair electoral process, and freedom of media.116 Similarly, as 
discussed above, exposure to diverse media content is also a structural means to reduce 
the risk of abuses of power in controlling society. In particular, exposure diversity 
prevents the corruption and incompetent leader in elite democracy; it secures equal 
opportunity for participation in political competition in liberal democracy; and it prevents 
a single view to be misled as public consensus in deliberative democracy. 
Democracy can be threatened by the consumption behaviour of citizens which 
concentrates around a narrow view, unrepresentative group or even a single person. 
History illustrates countless instances of the concentrated communicative power causing 
the exercise of the unchecked irresponsibility power. For example, the media 
conglomerate in German by Alfred Hugenberg supported the rise of Hitler in power.117 
Although historical stories are about the concentration of media ownership, the 
polarisation of audiences around the few sources while ignoring abundant alternatives is 
not any better.118 Only listening to the like-minded partisans, especially majority group, 
prevents the awareness of both the important matters that people may disagree with and 
the information on the basis of raising critical questions. The absence of clashing opposite 
opinions in individuals’ views and the ignorance about minorities voices can result in the 
abuse of unchecked power. The dispersal of distinct opinion exposed to people prevents 
audience polarisation which has a negative effect on democracy. Therefore, preventing 
this undemocratic communicative behaviour provides the reason that exposure diversity, 
like separation of power, is a key structural safeguard for democracy. 
3) Equality in democratic distribution of communication power 
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The last democratic value of exposure diversity discussed here is the 
provision of equality in the distribution of communicative power. Every normative theory 
of democracy is generally committed to some form of people’s equality right to 
participate in democratic process. In particular, elite democracy emphasises on equal 
opportunity for a candidate to influence citizen in electoral process whereas liberal 
democracy is concerned about equal opportunity for conflict interests to participate in the 
political competition. For the deliberative democracy, Wolin described that 
‘…[Deliberative democracy] is about how we equalise politically in acting together for 
shared purposes’.119 Therefore, democracy is widely understood as the equality that each 
person should have an opportunity to say and given attention. 
The one-person/one-vote principle is a good illustration to interpret a classic 
statement of political equality in public decision-making. Though the principle does not 
provide actual equality, it guarantees the structure respecting citizen’s equal claim to be 
recognised in the democratic process. Baker commented that: 
‘The egalitarian premise that justifies the formal one person, one vote 
requirement also applies to voice within the public sphere. Voice, more than vote, creates 
public opinion and provides the possibility of deliberation.’120 
In other words, a right to vote would not have a meaning if each person is not 
given equal value to say.121 In the context of exposure diversity, the commitment to 
political equality does not only mean that people have a right to speak but each political 
viewpoint should be granted an equal opportunity to be heard and considered. The 
consumption of diverse information is a means to distribute public debate to ensure that 
no permanent single opinion is a privilege to influence others. As Dworkin points, the 
best form of democracy is the form that treats all members of the community with equal 
concerns.122 
In a democratic society, therefore, the standard is that citizens have an equal 
opportunity to influence public discourse. This standard requires people to have an equal 
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‘starting point’ but not always the similar results.123 Providing diverse viewpoints 
presented to each individual can be regarded as equal ‘starting point’ for various opinions 
to influence public debate. Therefore, exposure diversity is what needs to be encouraged 
to ensure that everyone has a fair chance. 
c. Exposure diversity and personal autonomy 
The last justification why exposure diversity should be concerned in media law 
and policy is its importance on personal autonomy. This section, therefore, explores the 
relation between exposure diversity and personal autonomy. It first provides the concept 
of personal autonomy; then follows with the analytical provision of exposure diversity as 
a crucial element of personal autonomy. 
i. Definition and theory of personal autonomy 
Personal autonomy has a broad meaning depending on the aspects of interests it 
refers to. In this thesis, however, it can be conceptualised as the ideal of individuals to be 
the author of his own life and to control the successive decisions throughout his life by 
his own hands.124 Personal autonomy also requires the right to form a certain kind of 
unusually important decisions that will affect his own destiny.125 This notion of personal 
autonomy reflects ‘freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate 
conduct’.126 Consequently, it praises ‘the right to differ as to things that touch the heart 
of the existing order’.127 Therefore, autonomy safeguards the ability to define one’s 
identity and makes an individual have the authority over self-creation of his unique 
personality. To summarise, personal autonomy is the life characterised as ‘self-
determination’ or ‘self-government’ on behalf of oneself.128 
The conception of personal autonomy should be understood as being compatible 
with the notion of subjectivism and relativism: what is good for some is not necessarily 
good for all. The vital part of autonomous life, then, is that people choose what they think 
is good for themselves which may not fit for others from a range of various choices. The 
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choice is a necessary requirement for a fulfilling and authentic existence. Therefore, to 
have an autonomous life, a person must be free to choose a choice from an adequate range 
of options accommodating the diversity of interests and tastes. 
ii. Exposure diversity as a crucial element of personal autonomy 
As mentioned above, personal autonomy must allow choices and the change to 
be made continually. In other words, a fundamental requirement of personal autonomy is 
the capacity to perceive the state of the world, to conceive of available options for action 
and evaluate alternative outcomes. All of the components of creating personal autonomy 
are constituted by information and communications environment individuals occupy. 
These conditions should not mean only what made available but its importance is what 
individuals actually consumed. To be autonomous, diverse and antagonistic viewpoints 
have to be exposed to the attention of individuals. Therefore, central to the autonomous 
value of exposure diversity is ‘to enable or empower the individual to realise her personal 
freedom of choice and self-fulfilment through the media contents she decides to 
consume’.129 
In the Wealth of Networks, Benkler gives a good example of the relationship 
between media plurality and personal autonomy.130 Though the example focuses on the 
diversity of media ownership, it can be drawn as an analogy to exposure diversity. 
Therefore, to illustrate the importance of exposure diversity on personal autonomy, the 
discussion here will describe the example from the perspective of exposure diversity. 
Benkler starts that there are three different societies; the Reds, the Blues, and the Greens. 
The Red society agrees that there is only one storyteller and he is in a hereditary position 
to decide alone which stories to tell. Consequently, Red people consume only one source 
of information which is exposed to them. On the contrary, the Blue society uses a majority 
rule to select storyteller every day. Thus, viewpoints exposed to the Blue society reflects 
the preference of the majority. In contrast, in the Green society, every one of Green people 
can tell stories anytime and everywhere. People stop and listen, sometimes in small 
groups of two or three, and sometimes in very large groups. 
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Benkler describes that ‘stories in each of these societies play a very important 
role in understanding and evaluating the world. They are the way people describe the 
world as they know it. They serve as testing grounds to imagine how the world might be, 
and as a way to work out what is good and desirable and what is bad and undesirable’.131 
People in each society can be a representative of different types of people in the real 
world. In particular, whereas there is an infinite of media content on the Internet, people 
may choose what to be exposed to: only one or few preferred sources, or popular content 
favoured by the majority, or diverse content. 
For the Reds, the storyteller’s perception of the range of options defines the 
universe of options the Reds can have. This clearly limits the size and diversity of the 
range of views to shape the Reds’ aspirations and actions. For the Blues, their autonomy 
is influenced by the popular among the majority. If the majority selects only a narrow 
choice of entertaining, popular or pleasing perspective, then the Blues’ perception of the 
range of options will be only slightly wider than the Reds’. In contrast, for the Greens, no 
one person, and no majority, determines for them whose stories or the range and diversity 
of stories they can listen to. They can be exposed to a wider variety of conceptions of how 
life can and ought to be lived. It is clearly illustrated that the Greens have a greater chance 
to exercise freedom to choose and fulfil their personality from a range of stories than the 
Reds and the Blues. The wider diversity of perceptions consumed, the greater choice and 
increases individuals’ ability to compose his own life story out of the more varied 
materials at their disposal. Therefore, the Greens can be more self-authored than either 
the Reds or the Blues. 
We can now summarise on how the example provides a way of understanding 
the autonomous value of exposure diversity. In order to sustain personal autonomy, one 
would be exposed to diverse choices that included at least some unconventional and non-
mainstream views. If all the views the individual consumed are conventional or 
mainstream, then one loses an important dimension of self-creation. This does not mean 
that truly autonomous value must be unconventional, but as Benkler stated: 
‘…[I]f self-governance for an individual consists in critical reﬂection and re-
creation by making choices over the course of his life, then some of the options open must 
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be different from what he would choose simply by drifting through life, adopting a life 
plan for no reason other than that it is accepted by most others. A person who chooses a 
conventional life in the presence of the option to live otherwise makes that conventional 
life his or her own in a way that a person who lives a conventional life without knowing 
about alternatives does not’132 
 
In conclusion, Part I illustrates the shift of media plurality concerns in the Internet 
age from diversity of ownership and available content to exposure diversity. Although 
news sources are still concentrated on traditional media due to the brand loyalty and 
diversity on the supply side is still the issue, the problems now are not about the scarcity 
of media resources but about the behaviour of audience fragmentation and audience 
polarisation. Therefore, exposure diversity which refers to actual diverse media content 
exposed to the audience raises an importance in media law and policy. However, the 
current media policy still traditionally marginalises and neglects the aspect of exposure 
diversity. This part also analyses the public interests value of exposure diversity (which 
are freedom of speech, democratic value and personal autonomy) as the justification why 
media law and policy should be concerned about exposure diversity. 
It can be argued that although exposure diversity is crucial, it is inappropriate for 
the government to force the audience to choose diversely or consume certain information 
even the valuable ones. This direct interference can be regarded as illegitimate because it 
potentially conflicts with fundamental freedoms of people. However, as will be discussed 
in the next Part, the government can take a positive role to create the conditions which 
encourage people to exercise their freedom to effectively expose themselves to diverse 
content. In particular, in an environment of information overload, the government can 
empower the audience by imposing obligations on selection intermediaries to assist the 
audience to reach diverse content. Selection intermediaries are the tools people rely on in 
order to find and select what they consume in this information overload environment. 
Influencing by filters, ranking and targeted recommendations, these new selection 
intermediaries determine the consumption behaviour of people and the viewpoints which 
are actually exposed to the audience. Therefore, the effect of selection intermediaries on 
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exposure diversity and the justification to regulate selection intermediaries to promote 
exposure are worthy of concern. 
 
Part II: Exposure diversity and selection intermediaries 
As discussed in the previous part, exposure diversity has a public interest value so 
it should be within media policy concerns. Once it has been established that there are 
reasons to support exposure diversity, the next issue is what form can be taken to achieve 
this goal. One possible concrete measure in this context, that is central to the thesis, is the 
regulation of selection intermediaries to promote diverse content exposed to people. This 
Part, therefore, discusses the relation between exposure diversity and selection 
intermediaries. It is divided into two sections. The first section examines the influence of 
selection intermediaries on exposure diversity. The following section then analyses the 
justification why the selection intermediaries should be regulated in order to promote 
exposure diversity. 
1. The relation between exposure diversity and the operation of selection 
intermediaries 
When raising the issue about search engines and social media, notions of 
gatekeepers are often not far behind. Besides, from the standpoint of safeguarding media 
plurality, media law and policy have had a long tradition of regulating gatekeepers. 
Therefore, this section will use the concept of ‘gatekeepers’ to analyse the influence of 
selection intermediaries on exposure diversity. Empirical research will also be provided 
as the support to illustrate the relation between exposure diversity and the operation of 
selection intermediaries. It will be clearly illustrated in this section that selection 
intermediaries can assist or obstruct the level of diverse content presented to people. 
a. Definition and concept of gatekeepers 
Generally, gatekeepers are entities which exercise the power to choose what can 
pass through a gate. The original concept of gatekeepers can be traced to the work of 
Lewin in 1947. His theory of gatekeeping examines a ‘key position’ to influence the 
change of the society as a whole.133 Lewin commented that social change can be achieved 
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by changing the mind of the gatekeepers (key position).134 He provided the example that 
the decision of a housewife about what to buy will determine what food is placed on the 
dinner table.135 The housewife, therefore, is the gatekeeper controlling the movement of 
foods to be accepted and rejected. 
After Lewin, the notion of gatekeepers has been adapted and developed in various 
fields of social study.136 However, the first explicit application of the concept of 
gatekeeper to mass media appears is in White’s work.137 White analysed the selection 
process in newspapers. In this process, news item passes through many people such as 
reporters and rewriters to make an initial selection based on their own background before 
the editor made a final decision. Therefore, the media gatekeepers do not determine the 
objective perspective of the public events, but ‘a fact only those events which the 
newsman, as the representative of his culture, believe to be true’.138 Following White, 
scholars in the field of mass media have most often characterised the gatekeeper’s 
decision-making process as the selection of news by journalists.139 
The Internet, however, has presented new challenges to these traditional models 
of gatekeepers. Most existing conceptualisations still focus primarily on the role of a 
journalist rather than understanding how network and users disseminate content. 
Consequently, the existing concepts do not function in identifying the gatekeepers in an 
online network environment. 
Barzilai- Nahon, therefore, proposes Network Gatekeeper Theory as a new 
conceptual framework for gatekeepers. This theory brings the gatekeeper concept into the 
online network by moving the gatekeeper notion from the focus on ‘information selection 
and distribution’ to ‘information control’.140 In his theory, network gatekeepers are 
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entities that control the process of ‘gatekeeping’ through a ‘gatekeeping mechanism’.141 
The network gatekeeping is the ‘process of controlling information as it moves through a 
gate’.142 This process is not only a selection of news, but also involves the process such 
as: shaping or manipulating information into a particular form, channelling or localising 
information through a channel, and deleting information. The gatekeeping mechanism is 
a ‘tool, technology, or methodology used to carry out the process of gatekeeping’.143 For 
example, the mechanisms are: channelling mechanisms such as search engines and 
hyperlinks, censorship mechanisms such as filtering and blocking, and infrastructural 
mechanisms controling an access to the network at the algorithmic and infrastructural 
levels. Following Barzilai-Nahon, the concept of gatekeepers is seen as intermediaries of 
information who control information as it passes through a gate. 
b. New gatekeepers: selection intermediaries 
In an environment of overflowing available information, a major question is who 
are the gatekeepers that can encourage people to consume diverse or different viewpoints. 
While there is infinite information on the Internet, people need a guide to find and select 
only a few choices which present a certain aspect. Consequently, information control in 
the online network is not the production or distribution of content, but the means to 
control users’ attention. On the Internet structure, people with limited attention find 
information through links. Unless they know the exact link to a location of a web page, it 
may not be possible for the content to be found. Unlike the offline world where people 
can walk through every shelf in a library to find a book and people can read through all 
newspapers to find what they are searching for, contents on the Internet appear only when 
they are determined by links. 
In this situation, selection intermediaries emerged as the tool to gather links for 
the audience in order to find and select content. Selection intermediaries can make content 
detectable, noticeable, and available in the attention of users. Audience now rely on 
selection intermediaries to assist them to make choices from the infinite information. 
They, therefore, are gatekeepers and become the key people needed in order to find the 
relevant information. 
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Search engines and social media, which are the selection intermediaries focused 
on in this thesis, exercise their power as gatekeepers to control people’s attention as 
follows:  
Search engines can use the filtering or blocking algorithms (censorship 
mechanisms144) to exclude some content from the search results. They can also shape the 
information environment by the value-adding mechanisms.145 Personalisation, 
customisation and the ranking algorithms are the value-adding tools to increase the 
attractiveness of some content providers over other sites. These gatekeeping mechanisms 
can serve as a lock-in mechanism to attract people’s attention to particular information 
(e.g. top search results) or prevent people from finding alternative views. 
For social media, they provide a platform with the functions for users to 
participate in exercising the gatekeeping process. For example, Facebook allows users to 
make choices about ‘what information to add, withhold, and disregard in user’s 
newsfeed’.146 Twitter channels147 information through its site by facilitating the functions 
of ‘followed’ and ‘retweeting’. Any users of Twitter can follow any other in order to 
receive all tweets from those they follow and retweeting or forwarding the tweets of other 
users to disseminate certain content. Although these social media may not exercise the 
editorial control as conceptualised by the traditional gatekeeping theory, they perform 
their own network gatekeeping by manipulating148  information available on their 
platform. Some content (especially interested or popular ones) can be promoted to the 
front page, while some receive a little attention. 
Selection intermediaries, therefore, are the new gatekeepers. They do not simply 
locate content but determine the actual choices and what opinions are available for users 
to choose. 
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c. Gatekeepers and exposure diversity 
As discussed, the gatekeepers make decisions about what information to let 
through and what to keep out. They, therefore, have a crucial impact on the actual content 
that is exposed to people behind the gate. The influence of the operation of gatekeepers 
on exposure diversity can clearly be illustrated by Shoemaker’s description of 
gatekeeping process: 
‘Simply put, gatekeeping is the process by which the billions of messages that are 
available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages that 
reach a given person on a given day.’149 
As a result, the operation of gatekeepers can be considered as a pre-selection 
process of the absolute amount of different types or aspects of information that viewers 
can choose from. If the concerns of exposure diversity are about the process of making 
choices from various content which is actually available to individuals150, then 
gatekeepers are the major factors which affect a wide range of the political and social 
views or the different sources actually reach an audience. 
The relation between exposure diversity and gatekeepers can also be analysed 
from the distinct types of gatekeepers: the role of media entities and the intermediaries 
that control critical accessibility services. The different types of gatekeepers have a 
different inﬂuence on exposure diversity. 
For the former type of gatekeepers, media entities exercise the editorial control to 
select the type, format and order of content that is presented to the audience. The impact 
of these decisions has made many versions or extremely opposing perspectives of a 
controversial issue. As White stated, the media gatekeeper determines the picture of the 
events to the public based on the gatekeeper’s own experiences, attitudes, and 
expectations.151 Consequently, exposure diversity in term of discovering the difference152 
depends on the number of the various views presented by journalists (impartiality). 
                                                          
149 Pamela Shoemaker, Gatekeeping (Sage Publications, 1991) 1; See also Pamela Shoemaker, Gatekeeping 
Theory (Routledge, 2009) 1 (‘…process of culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited 
number of messages that reach people every day’). 
150 See Part I.2a Definition of exposure diversity, p.45. 
151 David White, ‘The “gate keeper”’ (1950) 27(4) Journalism Quarterly 383, 384. 
152 See Part I.2b Classification of exposure diversity, p.47. 
66 
Therefore, the consumption of diverse content (in order to be aware of the divergent 
opinions and can critically evaluate the possible alternatives) is influenced by the 
gatekeeping process called editorial control. 
The latter type of gatekeepers is, for example, the Internet service providers 
(ISPs). These gatekeepers control the network structures that is needed for transmitting 
content from senders to receivers. Referring to the Network Gatekeeper Theory, these 
gatekeepers can inﬂuence diverse opinions exposed to people by the network gatekeeping 
process such as refraining from allowing certain information to pass through the gate 
(withholding).153 In particular, by exercising the gatekeeping mechanism such as the 
censorship mechanisms (e.g. ﬁltering and blocking)154, they have an effect on the 
ﬁndability of content. Therefore, the operations of these gatekeepers have affected 
exposure diversity in term of the openness to diverse speakers. It can also impact exposure 
diversity in the aspect of the choices to choose freely from the sufficient variety of 
content.155 
As gatekeepers, selection intermediaries certainly have an influence on exposure 
diversity. Selection intermediaries combine the characteristics of both types of 
gatekeepers mentioned above. They play an important role in controlling an access to 
information by being the platform for the content providers to meet users. What is 
excluded in the content recommendations can be said that it is not presented in an online 
network. At the same time, they function as editor-like by selecting and ordering 
information to catch people’s attention. These two characteristics affect the consumption 
behaviours of people and the absolute amount of different information that viewers can 
choose from. Selection intermediaries, therefore, have a potential to influence people’s 
exposure to diverse media content. These intermediaries’ operation of providing content 
recommendations can be considered as an indication of the level of diverse content 
exposed to people. As Goodman observes, the ‘power of media consumption today lies 
as much with those who guide individuals to content through such tools as search 
engines…’.156 
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d. Selection intermediaries and exposure diversity: the concern for filter 
bubble 
The relation between the operation of selection intermediaries and exposure 
diversity can also be illustrated by the concern about ‘filter bubble’. The term filter 
bubble, coined by Pariser, is ‘a unique universe of information for each of us’.157 It is an 
individual’s personal online public sphere he/she lived in that depends on who he is and 
what she does. The filter bubble is the result of the personalization158 algorithms exercised 
by search engines and social media in order to fit the interested perspectives and keep 
away the opposing viewpoints on behalf of users. According to Pariser, this might lead to 
the situation in which the user: receives biased information, or never sees contrasting 
viewpoints, and does not even know what they are missing. 
Pariser claims that he noticed the filter bubble due to the disappearance of 
conservative friends from his Facebook page.159 This is because what appears in your 
‘News Feed’ depends on every action you take on Facebook such as clicking ‘Like’, 
commenting and sharing (count as ‘Edges’). The relationships and content that do not get 
enough ‘Edges’ will be blocked out of the existence. For example, any friends whom you 
fail to click or comment on their posts will cause a stopping delivery of their posts to your 
feed, and vice versa. Also, the default ‘Top Stories’ setting of your News Feed is 
determined by the amount of friends’ comments on certain content.160 There is no way 
for you to know what gets edited out. Your friends will assume that you are still reading 
his updates, and vice versa. Consequently, your feeds may actually present only 50 out of 
your 500 friends. 
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Pariser also examined search results and found that users might get different 
search results even at the very same time for the same keyword. He asked his friends to 
google ‘Egypt’ and to send him the screenshots of what they got. One of his friends’ 
search results did not display anything at all about the protests in Egypt (which was the 
big story of the day at that time), while another of his friend got a full of this story in his 
top search results.161 This is because search results can be prioritised, ﬁltered and hidden 
depending on the user’s previous interaction. 
Therefore, the personalisation of selection intermediaries and the filter bubble can 
reduce the consumption of information diversity. They allow people to participate in 
groups that confirm their own views and cut themselves oﬀ from the awareness of the 
contestable and opposite viewpoints. A group of like-minded people can create 
polarisation which prevents them from experiencing a broader view of the world. 
Consequently, individuals may lead each other in the direction of error and falsehood 
because their arguments will not be reﬁned as they might not challenge their existing 
beliefs. Therefore, if selection intermediaries create bubbles, the exposure to information 
and ideas will be less diverse. Besides, the discovery of new ideas or the unknown facts 
outside the bubble will be more difﬁcult since the personalisation does not allow an 
unexpected encounter or an exposure by chance (called ‘serendipity’162) to happen 
anymore. 
e. The empirical evidence of selection intermediaries’ effect on exposure 
diversity 
There can be counter arguments that the filter bubble is the result of the 
individual’s choices but not the operation of selection intermediaries.163 In other words, 
the level of the diverse content people consume is determined by user’s choosing to see 
certain things more than the algorithmic filters. However, it makes no sense to blame only 
the personal choices or the selection intermediaries’ operation (and exclude the others) as 
if they are disconnected and completely separate. Exposure diversity is in fact tied directly 
to these two things: i.e. the diversity of personal choices derives from the pre-selection of 
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selection intermediaries. Therefore, it is a fallacy to argue that one is worse than the other. 
As Jurgenson stated: 
‘Individual users choosing news they agree with and Facebook’s algorithm 
providing what those individuals already agree with is not either-or but additive. … [A]s 
if anyone critiquing how Facebook structures our information flows ever strawpersoned 
themselves into saying individual choice wasn’t important too. What’s important is the 
finding that, in addition to confirmation biasy individuals, the Facebook newsfeed 
algorithm exacerbates and furthers this filter-bubble bias over and above the baseline.’164 
There are many studies that illustrate the influence of selection intermediaries on 
exposure diversity, both aspects of the positive and negative impact. 
For the negative impact, the act of selection intermediaries as gatekeepers can 
reduce the diversity of content presented to people. For example, Sela and his colleagues 
conducted a study about the spread of opinions in modern society by comparing the 
processes through the word-of-mouth and through the online search engines.165 The 
examination run by developing a simulated model and applying a real experimental study 
on human subjects. The study’s result show that the opinions people adopt through an 
exposure to their friend’s opinions are far more diverse than the opinions adopt when they 
use a search engine based on the PageRank algorithm. In other words, when people adopt 
the decisions through the use of search engines, they are exposed to a few dominant search 
results while other views are barely expressed. Consequently, the use of search engines 
substantially decreases the diversity of opinions166: people searching information through 
a search engine end up with far more homogeneous opinions as compared to the word-
of-mouth spreading. 
Bakshy examined how 10.1 million US Facebook users interacted with the 
socially shared news and the extent to which individuals comparatively encountered more 
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or less diverse content via Facebook’s algorithmically ranked News Feed.167 The study 
found that there were 903 million of stories given exposure in individuals’ News Feeds 
from around 3.8 billion of the friend’s shared content regardless of whether it appeared 
in the individual’s News Feed. People encountered roughly 15% less cross-cutting 
content in their news feeds due to the algorithmic ranking and they also clicked through 
to 70% less of this cross-cutting content. Therefore, there is on average slightly less cross-
cutting content after the algorithmic ranking.  
Furthermore, Hong examined the social media’s potential role in contributing to 
partisan polarisation.168 The study empirically investigated whether politicians with 
extreme ideological positions had a larger online readership on Twitter by considering 
the social media activities of members of the 111 US House of Representatives. The 
evidence indicates that politicians with extreme ideological positions had, all else being 
equal, a greater number of Twitter followers than their moderate peers. Therefore, the 
result of this study suggests that a strong polarisation on social media outlets such as 
Twitter has the potential to contribute to partisan polarisation which supports the echo 
chambers view.169 
In contrast, there is a research suggested that selection intermediaries encourage 
people to consume more diverse content. In particular, Flaxman empirically examined 
and analysed the web browsing histories (the records collected via the Bing Toolbar) for 
50,000 US-located users who regularly read online news.170 The study found that social 
networks and search engines were associated with an increase in an individual’s exposure 
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to material from his or her less preferred side of the political spectrum. Specifically, 
although articles found via social media or search engines were indeed associated with 
higher ideological segregation than directly visiting the news sites, somewhat 
counterintuitively, ‘these channels are associated with greater exposure to opposing 
perspectives’.171 
Heatherly examined the relationship between the use of social media and the 
involvement in both cross-cutting and like-minded discussions.172 The research used data 
from a nationally representative survey of the US Democrats and Republicans. The results 
revealed that both like-minded discussions and cross-cutting discussions were occurring 
on social media. While like-minded conversations occur more frequently, substantial 
levels of the cross-cutting exchanges are also occurring on social media. Besides, the 
findings of this study imply that social media do not appear to encourage the discussion 
among the parties’ polarised members. For individuals who lack the interest in politics or 
do not engage in a political discussion regularly, the study also suggests that the use of 
social media promotes the exposure to and the exchange of ideas among people who hold 
different political views.173 
Valeriani and Vaccari studied the accidental exposure to political information on 
social media based on the three Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing surveys 
(representative samples of German, Italian, and British Internet users).174 They found that 
the accidental exposure to political information on social media is positively and 
significantly correlated with the online participation in all three countries. The study also 
challenged the notion that social media are solely capable of enhancing the patterns of 
selective exposure to politics. The findings suggest that the inadvertent encounters with 
political content on social media are potentially broadening the range of voices that make 
themselves heard. 
In conclusion, selection intermediaries are the gatekeepers in the Internet world 
which directly influence the diversity of content exposed to people. These new 
gatekeepers control the findability of content by organising and prioritising the 
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recommendation results, filtering the media choices people make, and personalising the 
recommended content. If we consider that people can possibly consume diverse choices 
only if they have a chance to choose the alternatives, then exposure diversity would 
depend on the selection intermediaries’ process of providing choices. Therefore, it is 
clearly illustrated that selection intermediaries play a crucial role in expanding or 
diminishing the diverse content people are exposed to. Keeping all these impacts of 
selection intermediaries in mind, it is not an exaggeration that a possible concrete measure 
to achieve exposure diversity goal is the regulation of selection intermediaries. 
2. The justification to regulate selection intermediaries to achieve exposure 
diversity 
After exploring the relation between selection intermediaries and exposure diversity 
in the previous section, the regulation of selection intermediaries can be considered as a 
measure to achieve exposure diversity. However, the imposition of obligations on 
selection intermediaries has to be concerned about the protection of the rights of selection 
intermediaries, especially freedom of speech. This section, therefore, analyses the 
justification of regulating selection intermediaries to promote exposure diversity. It first 
starts by exploring the rights of selection intermediaries. Then, the next subsection 
examine the other public interests which can be considered as the restriction of the rights 
of selection intermediaries. Finally, the last subsection analyses that the right to free 




a. The right to freedom of speech of selection intermediaries 
When discussing the regulation of selection intermediaries, the critical issue is 
whether the operation of selection intermediaries is under the protection of free speech. 
This is because selection intermediaries are not directly run by a human but involve the 
use of algorithms. However, it should be noted that algorithms do not function apart from 
humans: humans design algorithms and can manipulate its operation. Selection 
intermediaries rely on algorithms to determine which links, messages, or stories will rise 
to the top of their recommendation results. Although algorithms itself are non-human and 
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are not speech, their outputs (the decisions created by algorithms) may be speech. The 
recognition that the operations of selection intermediaries are speech has a major impact 
on the regulation to achieve exposure diversity. If the algorithm-based decisions are 
treated as speech, the regulations are subject to the strict scrutiny by requiring more 
justification and being easier to be rejected on the constitutional grounds. In contrast, if 
free speech does not encompass this automatic operation, the government can easily 
intervene in the recommendation results such as censorship which disadvantages 
exposure diversity. 
In the US, there is case law that directly confronts the First Amendment’s 
application to search results. Although such cases are specific to the First Amendment 
context and are decided in the federal district courts, they are the only cases for which 
this issue has been litigated thus far. Since there are no such cases in Europe to draw from, 
these US cases can provide a guidance on the issues of search engines’ free speech. 
In the initial case, Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc175, Search King 
sued Google for interference with search results that causes its website not being included 
in the search results. Google defended itself by arguing that the search rankings generated 
by its algorithms were the protected speech under the First Amendment. The court held 
that Google’s ranking is ‘an opinion of the significance of particular websites as it 
corresponds to a search query’176 and is ‘inherently subjective in nature’. Accordingly, 
the court concluded that Google’s PageRanks was ‘entitled to full constitutional 
protection’.177 
Likewise, in Langdon v. Google, Inc. 178, a website operator accused Google of 
failing to include his website in search results. The court found that the plaintiff’s 
insistence that search engines must carry his ads and rank his websites would contravene 
search engines First Amendment rights’.179 
In Europe, although there are no court decisions directly on the issues of search 
engines’ free speech, there is case law referred to this issue. For example, Google Spain 
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v. GonzAlez180, Mr Costeja GonzAles complained Google to delist the search results of 
his name which linked to a tiny newspaper referring to his past financial problems. The 
Advocate General, in this case, remarked that ‘an internet search engine service provider 
lawfully exercises (...) his (...) freedom of expression when he makes available internet 
information location tools relying on a search engine’.181 However, the CJEU asserted 
that people have the right to have their name delisted from search results. The judgment 
contains no explicit reference to the freedom of expression of the search engine operators 
but states that ‘[data protection] rights override…the economic interest of the operator of 
the search engine’.182 
The acknowledgement of search engines’ freedom of expression can also be seen 
in the media policy documents. In particular, the CoE stressed that ‘it essential that search 
engines be allowed to freely crawl and index the information that is openly available on 
the Web and intended for mass outreach’183 and ‘search engines have freedom to crawl 
and index information available on the World Wide Web’184. However, it is not clear on 
the statements about to what extent public authorities can oblige selection intermediaries’ 
operation. Besides, there is no specific scope of to what extent these intermediaries can 
exercise this freedom. Notably, van Hoboken analyses that:  
‘under Article 10 ECHR the search engine should be able to claim protection for 
its publication of references on its website as well as the process of crawling that makes 
it possible to offer a search engine in the first place…[and]…the choice of search engine 
operators how to select, rank, and present should be considered … which deserves 
protection under the right to freedom of expression’185 
For social media, none of the case law or the policy statement recognised the right 
to free speech of social media.186 Besides, there is little discussion in the academic field 
about this issue. However, free speech of social media may be considered by comparing 
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to search engines. The automatically algorithmic provision of content recommendation 
by social media seems highly comparable to the technological nature of the search 
engines’ selection and ranking from the index. Social media’s operation makes 
information accessible and makes the decisions that entail a valuation of information and 
ideas. In other words, social media provides a subjective opinion by imposing the specific 
hierarchies on the relative accessibility of information through their services. By 
considering all these, social media produces information itself the same way as search 
engines. Therefore, this may imply that the operation of social media should be similarly 
protected under freedom of expression. 
Even if the operation of selection intermediaries can be regarded under the 
protection of freedom of speech, this is only a half of the story when it comes to the 
regulation of these intermediaries. The most important question is what level of protection 
should be attributed to selection intermediaries. It is possible that the weight of protection 
could depend on the interest of their action and other public interests which are discussed 
in the following section. 
b. Selection intermediaries and other public interests 
This section discusses that although selection intermediaries can claim the 
protection from freedom of expression, their right can be restricted in order to safeguard 
other public interests (i.e. free speech of people and democratic value). It also illustrates 
the effect of selection intermediaries on the free speech of people and democracy. Since 
exposure diversity can be considered as the means to encourage free speech and 
democracy, the necessity to protect these public interests is the justification to regulate 
selection intermediaries to promote exposure diversity. 
i. Free speech and right to receive information of individuals 
Normally, all rights and liberties are not absolute and contain restriction clauses. 
The right to freedom of expression of selection intermediaries is not an exception. Among 
the lists of restriction that are mentioned in Article 10 of the ECHR187, the one which is 
relevant here is ‘the protection of the rights of others’. The European Convention 
recognised ‘the duties of everyone to the community and the limitation on rights in order 
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to secure and protect respect for the right of others’.188 Considering the role of selection 
intermediaries as gatekeepers, ‘the rights of others’ are the free speech of people as an 
audience and as a speaker. 
The interest of people as audiences under the right to freedom of expression can 
be characterised as the right to receive information.189 The ECtHR puts it that ‘the internet 
plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the 
sharing and dissemination of information generally’.190 However, the power of an 
individual is not as wide as the common perceptions might suggest. This is because 
selection intermediaries are the gatekeepers who grant people access to content. In the 
process of providing recommendation results, bias systematically occurs in every step to 
favour some opinions over others. In these cases, the range of choice and the conditions 
under which people can receive information depend on the operation previously taken by 
selection intermediaries. This distortion would not only affect the freedom to receive 
information but may also erode the free access for citizens to content with a diverse range 
of different voices.191 
Therefore, in this context, free speech of individuals as an audience refers to the 
ability to use selection intermediaries to enhance the findability of diverse information, 
ideas and resources in the public networked information environment.192 This is because 
freedom of expression is ineffective unless people sufficiently receive information in 
order to contribute ideas and participate in public discourse.193  
For people as speakers or publishers of information on the Internet, they have 
the right to freedom of expression. This right also protects the means of communication. 
As the ECtHR notes, ‘Article l0 [of the ECHR] applies not only to the content of 
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information but also to the means of transmission or reception since any restriction 
imposed on the means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart 
information’.194 In particular, in the context of selection intermediaries, the protected 
interests of speakers under the right to freedom of expression should encompass the right 
to reach the audience.195 This right of speakers can be considered as the right to be treated 
fairly, reasonably and justifiably by selection intermediaries regarding a provision of 
diverse choices for people to choose. Besides, in the context of competing for attracting 
the users’ attention on the Internet, to exist online is to be presented by selection 
intermediaries.196 Therefore, recommendation results which are hierarchically ranked for 
a user may lock speakers into a fierce zero-sum competition for recognition. 
In Europe, the protection of individual’s freedom of expression is not only 
regarded as a negative right which prevents the state from exercising power to 
interference but it is also considered as a positive right. The government, in this view, has 
a positive role to promote free speech and to provide for the social conditions in which 
this free exercise can prosper. Moreover, this positive right covers both the relations 
between the public authorities and the private parties (vertical relation) and the relations 
between the private parties amongst each other (horizontal relation).197 As the ECtHR 
states: 
‘Genuine, effective exercise of [the right to freedom of expression] does not 
depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of 
protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals.’ 198 
Therefore, in this context, the ECHR doctrine calls for the government to protect 
a balance between the right to free speech of selection intermediaries and the freedom of 
expression of people including preventing a conflict between the rights of these private 
parties. 
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Van Hoboken provides that ‘the most important example of a positive obligation 
in the European context of freedom of expression is the obligation to promote 
pluralism’.199 As discussed in Part I section 3a, exposure diversity is the means to 
encourage free speech. In particular, exposure diversity is an indirect way for speakers 
having more chance to effectively disseminate their speech in the attention of the wide 
audiences. On the other hand, exposure diversity is the essential process to establish the 
environment where people can receive diversely opposite viewpoints and can be well-
informed. Therefore, the necessity to protect free speech and the right to receive 
information of an individual is the justification to regulate selection intermediaries to 
promote exposure diversity. 
In conclusion, free speech of selection intermediaries can be restricted in order 
to protect the right to free speech and the right to information of people. The protection 
of individual’s rights can be linked to the promotion of exposure diversity. As Raz argues, 
‘freedom of expression can be supported as part of a pluralist argument for using the law 
to promote pluralism in the society’.200 Therefore, the operations of selection 
intermediaries which are under the protection of freedom of expression can be regulated 
to ensure that exposure diversity is safeguarded. 
ii. Democratic value 
In addition to the restriction on ‘the protection of the rights of others’, free speech 
of selection intermediaries can be limited by the reason of a necessity in a democratic 
society.201 Although the right to freedom of expression is of supreme important, 
individuals may abuse their right in order to be subversive of the idea of liberal 
democracy. The ECtHR, therefore, has ruled that if there was a ‘pressin social need’ in a 
particular circumstance, free speech can be restricted but should only be treated as 
necessary.202 Specifically, the restriction has to balance on the basis of the proportionality 
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between the aims pursued and the effect of the measure. Besides, the reason and measure 
of the interference must be relevant and sufficient.203 
The Internet contributes to the democratic culture by increasing the information 
that is available to us. The expanded access to information on the Internet increases the 
opportunities to participate in circulating information, commenting on it, or even 
modifying its content.204  In other words, the Internet offers a space in which a rational 
communication might take place. Anyone can be a publisher, and anyone can access to 
the abundance of information and ideas unavailable in the tailored mass-media 
environment.205 If we regard democracy as the organisations of citizens engaging socially 
and politically, the Internet’s capacity to facilitating the political participation and the 
circulation of information can be seen as a pre-condition to creating a democratic society. 
However, the power of selection intermediaries to distribute some opinions to 
people and ignore others affects the democratic participation on the Internet. The position 
of selection intermediaries as gatekeepers can control the flows of online information and 
the manipulation of public opinion which can lead to a concentration of power. This 
power threatens the democratic values which are the openness and the diversity of 
information flow.206 This is because a fundamental principle of democratic systems is the 
ability to participate in the process of public decision-making with an equal opportunity 
to other members of the society.207 In the Internet age, if citizens are to exploit these rights 
to the fullest, they must have the free access to information available online. Since 
democracy requires a well‐informed, inclusive and a wide array of opinions, the online 
deliberative process should be free from the interference of the selection intermediaries. 
The operation of selection intermediaries threatening democratic society is 
clearly illustrated in the Facebook scandal. This scandal emerged in May 2016 after 
Gizmodo accused that Facebook had bias against right-wing sources since it suppressed 
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conservative news in its ‘trending topics’ feature.208 The allegations in the Gizmodo 
article claimed the statement from the ex-workers that Facebook’s ‘trending topics’ bar 
had been tweaked so that it did not include more conservative news; even though the 
news stories of interest to conservative readers were organically trending among the site’s 
users. This scandal reflects the biases of Facebook’s workers and the institutional 
imperatives of the corporation which has influenced behind algorithms. Imposing human 
editorial values onto algorithms makes Facebook operates like a traditional newsroom. 
Interestingly, Facebook announced that in order to reduce bias, it had laid off its 
contractors who were hired to write and edit short descriptions that accompanied each 
trend in the attempt that this would make the Trending feature more automated; 
nevertheless, a few days later a fake story headlined still appeared on the list of trending 
stories. 209 
This scandal is not the only case. There are many accusations that Facebook 
blocks the individual member pages reflecting a conservative point of view.210 For 
example, in 2013, a Facebook page for the conservative website ‘Chicks on The Right’ 
was shut down (with a notice that it ‘violated the site’s standards’) after posting a message 
criticising White House Press Secretary Jay Carney.211 In 2015, 12-year-old’s account 
was locked due to ‘suspicious activity’ after posting a video where he agreed with former 
NYC Mayor Giuliani's criticism of President Obama.212 Lastly, Joe Newby, a blogger, 
reported that Facebook took down the ‘2 Million Bikers to DC’ page after the page 
comments that a number of bikers who attended the Million Muslim March was much 
less than the official count.213  
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If we want to avoid the incidents which threaten democracy such as those 
described above, there should be a development of the regulation or specific rule about 
the governance of the selection intermediaries’ operation. As discussed in Part I section 
3b, exposure diversity assists the structure of democratic society. By regulating selection 
intermediaries to promote exposure diversity, it prevents the corruption and the abuse of 
power in controlling society. It also encourages people to be well-informed and to be able 
to participate fully in the democratic discourse.  
Besides, the promotion of exposure diversity includes the prohibition of 
unreasonable restriction of access to information and a support of the provision of access 
to sufﬁcient information. In other words, one of the measures to achieve exposure 
diversity is the imposition of certain obligation on selection intermediaries to provide 
people with actual ability to access to diverse information on the Internet.214 The more 
information people can access to in their common life, the greater possibility for them to 
face alternatives of one’s views and to consume greater variety of content. Constraints of 
information accessibility can obviously affect democracy and the diversity of content 
people are exposed to. Therefore, the regulation of selection intermediaries to achieve 
exposure diversity is justified in order to safeguard the democratic society. 
In conclusion, the operations of selection intermediaries are under the protection 
of freedom of expression under the US First Amendment and the Article 10 of the ECHR. 
However, since the operation of selection intermediaries can conflict with the public 
interests in an individual’s free speech and the democratic value, the government can 
restrict their rights in order to safeguard these public interests. According to Article 10 
paragraph 2 of the ECHR, the exercise of the right to free speech carries with it duties 
and responsibilities and may be subject restrictions. Regulating for exposure diversity can 
be a restriction on the free speech right of selection intermediaries as exposure diversity 
are necessary in a democratic society and for the public interest. Therefore, this necessity 
to protect individuals’ free speech and the democratic value is the justification to regulate 
selection intermediaries to promote exposure diversity. 
c. Free speech of selection intermediaries and media freedom 
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Apart from the reason to protect other public interests in the previous section, this 
section also puts the analysis further that free speech of selection intermediaries should 
have the duty and responsibility similar to media freedom. This is because the position of 
gatekeepers of selection intermediaries resembles the position of traditional media. 
Therefore, selection intermediaries are not only limited their action to promote exposure 
diversity but also have a positive role in supporting exposure diversity. This is another 
justification for the regulation of selection intermediaries. 
i. The concept of media freedom 
In order to impose any duties and responsibilities on selection intermediaries, 
these intermediaries must carry out activities that are important for the function of society. 
The analogy, therefore, will be made from the recognition that traditional media carries 
out the importance to society. The concern of the duty and responsibility for both the 
traditional media and selection intermediaries is rooted in their shared role as the 
conveyors of information and the facilitators of public discourse. This role as gatekeepers 
provides the distinction between media freedom (e.g. editorial control and freedom of the 
press) and the freedom of expression enjoyed by individuals. It also includes the provision 
of specific duty and the privilege in addition to freedom of speech. In the broad sense, 
media freedom should be entitled to all form of media: not only the established press but 
also the broadcasting media and the new electronic media. 
The special status of media and media freedom derives from the nature of media 
power and the potential it has to impact on society. The obvious power wielded by the 
media is its capacity to communicate to a large audience. They exercise power in 
gathering, processing and interpreting mass information to mass people.215 Mass media, 
especially press and broadcasting, also play a vital role in influencing public opinion. As 
gatekeepers, they have the ability to allow or censor others to criticise and inform of the 
events. In the modern world, if a particular individual or a group of individuals are denied 
access to the press to promote their views, their ability to reach audiences is diminished.216 
In the Stoll case, the ECtHR establishes the importance of media in the present-day 
conditions: 
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‘…given the influence wielded by the media in contemporary society: not only 
do they inform, they can also suggest by the way in which they present the information 
how it is to be assessed. In a world in which the individual is confronted with vast 
quantities of information circulated via traditional [media] … monitoring compliance 
with journalistic ethics takes on added importance.’217 
The ECtHR has consistently tied the special status of the media to its role in the 
public interest. Specifically, the traditional media are the primary source of news and 
information for citizens to participate in the democratic society. They contribute to the 
free flow of communications which is necessary to the public debate. Therefore, the 
public interest in media freedom is the standard of public communication that ‘allow 
readers, listeners and viewers to gain information and form judgements, and so as to 
participate in social, cultural and democratic life’.218 
With this crucial position of media in society, media freedom (e.g. editorial 
control and freedom of the press) is entitled to some legal privileges under the protection 
of Article 10 of the ECHR. Particularly, media freedom has a high level of the 
admissibility of interferences and the margin of appreciation is limited. Generally, when 
dealing with the media, the ECtHR will restrictively apply the second paragraph of Article 
10: 
 ‘The most careful scrutiny on the part of the court is called for when… the 
measures taken or sanctions imposed by the national authority are capable of discouraging 
the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate public concern [...].’ 219 
and 
‘The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements 
… should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.’ 220 
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Moreover, media freedom includes special rights beyond freedom of expression 
which are essential for the media to enable its role and unique provision.221 These rights 
are distinct depending on the different types of media and its contribution of information. 
For example, the traditional media who exercises editorial control has privilege defences 
to defamation claims such as an accurate report of certain public occasions. 222 The press 
has a privilege not to disclose their sources of information unless an authorisation 
obtained by the application to the court.223 Internet access providers can claim a protection 
from public authorities’ interference which obliged them to restrict from transmitting 
information or imposing them to block or filter content.224 
The most important aspect of media freedom regarded in this thesis is that media 
freedom has the duty and responsibility to serve the public. In other words, media freedom 
is not a right to be solely advantaged by the media themselves but it is a right exercised 
on behalf of everyone. Media freedom is protected only because it promotes certain 
values: particularly, enriching public discourse, providing people with a wide variety of 
information and ideas, and safeguarding the value of free speech.225 This duty and 
responsibility originate from the essential role of media in disseminating ideas and 
information. As the ECtHR has repeatedly referred to media freedom and the task of 
informing the public: 
‘[the press] affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming 
an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders.’ 226 and ‘the public has a right to 
receive information as a corollary of the specific function of journalists, which is to impart 
information and ideas on matters of public interest.’ 227 
The ECtHR has tied the protection of media freedom to the interests of readers 
in general. The court has also stressed the importance of media freedom due to the role 
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of media as gatekeepers. These reasons imply that media freedom serves the interests of 
others than the media institution. The essence of media freedom is not an interest in free 
self-expression but in free communication and free flow of knowledge. Therefore, the 
ECtHR has made it clear that media freedom is guaranteed only inasmuch as it contributes 
to the formation of public opinion. It is recognised as an instrument to promote people 
for receiving diversity of ideas and sources of information.228 If the media is to function 
in a way not in accordance with these concerns, there will be less reason to protect it 
against interferences. 
ii. Free speech of selection intermediaries as media freedom 
The Internet has transformed how we communicate. As discussed in Part II 
section 1, selection intermediaries are the new gatekeepers in our information society. 
They do not only inform people about viewpoints but also influence the accessibility of 
people to available information. For this reason, selection intermediaries, at the present, 
become the sources people use to consume news and the current affairs the same way as 
people used newspapers and broadcastings in the past. The position of gatekeepers of 
selection intermediaries resembles the position of the traditional media in three ways: 
First, selection intermediaries have the capacity to reach a wide audience the 
same way as the communication to a large audience of the traditional media. As selection 
intermediaries have become the information gatekeepers, they control the communication 
structure of the Internet. Since an online communication of people depends upon the 
complex electronic information and the communication networks, selection 
intermediaries are now the portals through which the information on the Internet is 
experienced.229 Moreover, selection intermediaries do not only control the information 
ﬂow to people like the mass media but also separately respond to what information is 
possibly accessed to the individual request of each audience. 
Second, selection intermediaries can exercise power to lead certain views 
dominating the public sphere and other views being squeezed out. Although these new 
intermediaries mostly operate by the algorithms not by the human editorial control like 
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the press, a bias systematically occurs in every process of providing particular content 
recommendations to favour certain types of content and ignore others.230 Algorithms are 
not neutral: in fact, they are full of human involvement in making decisions on what have 
to be made to produce something. Human can take part, for instance, as engineers who 
design algorithms or curators who turn the output of the algorithms into something 
presentable. Consequently, the provision of content that selection intermediaries make 
eventually have human choices behind it. The result recommendations people see is not 
the output of an algorithm by itself, but rather of an effort that combined human activity 
and computational analysis together to produce it. As Naughton comments: 
‘Any algorithm that has to make choices has criteria that are specified by its 
designers. And those criteria are expressions of human values. Engineers may think they 
are “neutral”, but long experience has shown us they are babes in the woods of politics, 
economics and ideology.’ 231 
Noteworthy, selection intermediaries normally have bias regarding their 
business incentive. If selection intermediaries sense a threat to their business (or their 
affiliated content providers) from an innovation outside his control, they may exercise 
their power to acquire or squash competitors; for example, selection intermediaries may 
prioritise their own goods ahead of or instead of those of their competitors.232 Also, 
companies will always act to maximise profits: they will often do so at the expense of 
their content providers by way of price discrimination. If a content provider on their 
service is seen to reap significant profits on the back of the network, it is in the short-term 
interest of the selection intermediaries to ransom network access for a share of those 
profits.233 Therefore, selection intermediaries do not operate objectively but have bias to 
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favour certain types of content dominating the public attention and degrade some content 
from the attention of people. 
Selection intermediaries do not produce content themselves like the publishers; 
however, their role is directly related to the way in which they actively select and facilitate 
the findability of information.234 This process can be compared to the editorial selection 
of the press. Writers of columns in the press can choose what they consider important to 
be presented in the newspapers. In the environment of scarcity resources, a few selections 
included in the expression of the press will become the widespread views to the public. 
In contrast, the present problem in the environment of an abundance information is a high 
cost to get an attention from the public. For this reason, what is excluded from the 
recommendation of selection intermediaries will not appear in the sight of 
consideration.235 Therefore, the similarity between the operation of selection 
intermediaries and the press is the ability to marginalise certain opinions to be less trivial 
in the discursive arenas. 
Lastly, the operation of selection intermediaries contributes to the matters of 
public interests. Selection intermediaries are not a simple business but have a political 
dimension to sustain the democratic society the same way as the traditional media. Their 
management to ﬁlter, categorise and interpret information for the public has affected the 
accessibility of information and ideas online. This action is important since the practical 
free speech of people is deeply tied to the operation of selection intermediaries regarding 
what kind of access and opportunities they offer to citizens.236 Besides, the information 
selectively presented by selection intermediaries can shape an individual user’s 
experience and the public opinion.237 Therefore, selection intermediaries are the main 
social institution and the principal means of public expression in the contemporary 
society. 
Selection intermediaries, therefore, are in the position of gatekeepers which are as 
crucial as the traditional media. Since the operation of selection intermediaries 
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encourages the public interests in the free dissemination of information for individuals 
and the public, selection intermediaries should be under the protection of media freedom. 
Under media freedom, they, therefore, can strengthen their claims against the government 
to not interfere or downgrade their contribution of communication underlying the 
interests of the audiences and the content providers. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the acknowledgement of media freedom does 
not mean that selection intermediaries have freedom of the press. This is because a free 
press is tied to the specific role of the press and journalist as the ‘public watchdog’.238 
Similarly, a right of editorial judgement in traditional media can only be claimed by the 
editors who are in the role to determine the content of newspapers or to schedule the 
broadcasting programme.239 As mentioned in the previous section, the special rights of 
media freedom beyond free speech are distinct (and various) depending on the different 
types of media. Selection intermediaries can claim this right only to essentially enable its 
unique role. For example, van Hoboken analyses that search engines have a right to 
referencing information as well as the process of crawling, selecting and ranking that 
make it possible to offer a search engine in the first place.240 However, the detail and 
scope of the privilege of selection intermediaries under media freedom are not the focus 
of this thesis. 
The main issue here is that the exercise of media freedom by selection 
intermediaries undertakes the specific duties and responsibilities. The acknowledgement 
of the media freedom of selection intermediaries does not imply that such right would be 
unlimited. In contrast, media freedom of selection intermediaries should be restricted 
because of the duty and responsibility to ensure people’s free speech and the freedom to 
receive information. This is similar to the reason why freedom of the press should be tied 
to the duty and responsibility.241 By regarding the essential role of the press in 
contributing the information and ideas to the public debate, the ECtHR has made it clear 
that press freedom is recognised in order to safeguard the interest of people. As states in 
the case of Handyside that: 
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‘…whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes ‘duties and 
responsibilities’ the scope of which depends on his situation and the technical means he 
uses. The Court cannot overlook such a person’s “duties” and “responsibilities” when it 
enquires…whether “restrictions” or “penalties” were conducive to the “protection of 
morals” which made them “necessary” in a “democratic society”.’242 
For this reason, the operations of selection intermediaries under the media 
freedom have the duty and responsibility based on the interest of people, especially in 
freely convey and receive diverse viewpoints. 
iii. The duty and responsibility of selection intermediaries: promoting exposure 
diversity 
As analysed above, selection intermediaries are crucial gatekeepers like the 
traditional media. Regarding the position of selection intermediaries as gatekeepers, free 
speech of selection intermediaries should have the duty and responsibility similar to 
media freedom. Under media freedom, they then have the duty and responsibility to serve 
the public. The ground for protecting media freedom of these intermediaries ultimately 
lies in the public interest of the findability of information on the Internet. In other words, 
selection intermediaries’ freedom derives from the ideas underlying freedom of 
expression and the communicative liberties of the networked information environment as 
a whole. As Shapiro commented:  
 ‘those who control access to information have a responsibility to support the 
public interest, these gatekeepers must assume an obligation as trustees of the greater 
good.’243  
Traditionally, the positive duty of media institution is different between the three 
kinds of media: the print media, the access service provider, and the broadcasting. For 
example, the broadcasting media has usually been more strictly regulated than the 
press.244 However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse in detail the broad range 
of the duty and which model of media institution properly applied to selection 
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intermediaries.245 Rather, for the purpose of this thesis, this section will specifically 
consider the positive duty of the traditional media and selection intermediaries to 
encourage media plurality which is underlying freedom of speech and the democratic 
value. 
The relationship between media freedom and media plurality is twofold. On the 
one side, media plurality supports media freedom: the government has to take measures 
to protect an independent media in order to guarantee media plurality.246 On the other 
side, media plurality constitutes legitimate aim justifying an interference with media 
freedom: i.e. media plurality is a legal obligation imposing a responsibility on media 
freedom. For instance, the ECJ has recognised media plurality as an overriding 
requirement regarding general interest to restrict the freedom to provide media service.247 
Also, the ECJ acknowledged that the maintenance of media plurality is connected to 
freedom of expression and media plurality in the aspect of cultural policy constituting the 
justification to limit media freedom.248 
The traditional media has a positive duty regarding media plurality. One goal is 
to ensure that people are well-informed, have their voices heard, and receive diverse 
views reflected in public debate.249 These are the fundamental factor for people to have a 
right to engage actively as participants in civic discourse.250 Therefore, the regulation on 
media is designed to promote media plurality; including different aspects such as diversity 
of ownership, variety in the source of information and providing the range of available 
outputs or contents. For example, the broadcasting media is obliged to provide a wide 
variety of types of programme251 and a range of diverse viewpoints252 to enable different 
groups to disseminate their information and idea via broadcasting. This includes a 
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positive obligation of broadcasters to grant transmission time to third parties for the 
purpose of reflecting a variety of opinion in their channels under certain circumstance 
such as in the time of an election.253 
The press and broadcaster are also regulated to publish a right to reply for the 
persons attacked by the media.254 Right to reply aims to reflect a wide range of views and 
an interest of minorities (or other parts of the population). Besides, both the newspapers 
and broadcasters have to comply with the standard of impartiality.255 The ECtHR 
principally confirms that employed journalists should not be prevented from imparting a 
plurality of news and opinions.256 The court states that journalists are protected from self-
censorship when approaching issues which are delicate for the owners of media company. 
The court further observed that it is the government itself that must be the ultimate 
guarantor of pluralism and that it has a duty to ensure that the public has access through 
television and radio to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinions and 
comments, reflecting the diversity of political outlook within a country. Impartiality 
requires domestic provisions within media entities to guarantee internal diversity and 
editorial independence. To conclude, traditional media has a particularly positive role in 
enhancing media plurality. 
Selection intermediaries should also have a positive duty to promote media 
plurality similar to the traditional media, especially exposure diversity. This is because 
the value of media plurality links to the duty and responsibility of selection intermediaries 
underlying free speech and democratic value as discussed in Part I. Selection 
intermediaries are the gatekeepers in the Internet world which directly influence diversity 
of content. These new gatekeepers control the findability of content: they can make 
content detectable, noticeable, and available in the attention of users. Influencing by 
filters, ranking and targeted recommendations, these new selection intermediaries 
determine the consumption behaviour of people. They do not simply locate content but 
construct and organise the meaning of information. They play an important role in 
controlling an access to information in democratic participation by being the platform for 
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the content providers to meet users. At the same time, they function as editor-like by 
selecting and ordering speech of media speakers to catch people’s attention. Speech which 
is excluded in the content recommendations can be said that it is not presented in a public 
discussion. These intermediaries’ operation of providing content recommendations affect 
the absolute amount of media plurality in the Internet.  
Selection intermediaries make decisions by which the billions of messages that 
are available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages 
that are presented in their platforms. The operation of selection intermediaries can be 
considered as a pre-selection process of the amount of different types or aspects of 
information. In other words, the content recommendations by selection intermediaries 
determine the actual choices which are available for users to choose. If the concerns of 
exposure diversity are about the process of making choices from various content which 
is actually available to individuals, exposure diversity would depend on the selection 
intermediaries’ process of providing choices. Therefore, it is clearly illustrated that 
selection intermediaries play a crucial role in expanding or diminishing the diverse 
content people are exposed to.  
As analysed the relation between selection intermediaries, exposure diversity and 
free speech in this chapter, the recommendation results provided by selection 
intermediaries can be considered as an indication of the level of diverse content exposed 
to people. Ultimately, it is the fundamental democratic interest of people to become an 
informed citizen by consuming diverse opinions available on the Internet. Therefore, the 
legal duty is justified to be imposed on selection intermediaries in order to have a positive 
role to encourage exposure diversity. Particularly, the duty and responsibility of selection 
intermediaries include the positive role in which information and ideas are being 
presented in view of the difference. 
In particular, selection intermediaries should be obliged to present diverse 
viewpoints on particular social issues in their recommendation results. They should also 
be regulated to prioritise exposure diversity regarding various types of sources of 
information such as official government, individual blog/page and group discussion 
forums. These types of sources of information will provide the consumption of people 
with different possible perspectives. In addition, selection intermediaries may develop 
their operation that satisfies the value of serendipitous encounters for the audience. The 
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positive duty of selection intermediaries should also include the compliance with the 
standard to enhance media literacy of citizens. All these measurements imposed on 
selection intermediaries to achieve exposure diversity will be examined in Chapter 4. 
In conclusion, free speech of selection intermediaries, like media freedom, is 
recognised to promote the interest of the public rather than to protect the interest of 
themselves. By respecting free speech of people and democratic value, the legislation 
enacted to support the value of exposure diversity is justified. 
 
To summarise, this chapter illustrates that exposure diversity has now become a 
crucial aspect of media plurality concerns. In the Internet age, the problem may not be 
the scarcity of source and content made available but rather the concern of filter bubble 
and audience polarisation. The solution to this problem is the encouragement of people 
to be exposed to or consume diverse media content. Exposure diversity is also a crucial 
factor of freedom of speech, democratic society, and personal autonomy. These public 
interests are the justification why exposure diversity should be under the concern of media 
law and policy. 
The chapter then further examines that the possible concrete measure to achieve 
exposure diversity is the regulation of selection intermediaries to promote this goal. This 
is because the operation of selection intermediaries has the influence on the absolute 
amount of different types or aspects of information that viewers can choose from. 
Exposure diversity is relevant to the process of making choices from the various content 
actually available to an individual. Therefore, the operation of selection intermediaries 
can be considered as an indication of a wide range of diverse content exposed to the 
audience. 
Moreover, this chapter provides two justifications why the selection 
intermediaries should be regulated in order to promote exposure diversity. The first 
justification is the necessity to protect free speech and democratic value. The right of 
selection intermediaries can be restricted since exposure diversity can be considered as a 
means to encourage these public interests. Another justification is the duty and 
responsibility of selection intermediaries under media freedom. Free speech of selection 
intermediaries has the positive role to serve the interest of the public rather than to protect 
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the interest of themselves. Therefore, the regulation imposed on selection intermediaries 
to encourage exposure diversity is justified. 
To what extent selection intermediaries can be regulated to encourage exposure 
diversity and what possible concrete legal instruments should be applied will be further 
discussed in Chapter 4. Before discussing the proposal issues, the next chapter will 
examine the problems of the application of the current laws and regulations in the 




Limitations of the existing model of media regulations to achieve exposure 
diversity 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the environment of overflowing available information, 
the significant question is whether people choose media content diversely. This is 
because, with the abundance of information, what people see is not equal to what made 
available. Since people cannot consume all information presented to them, they rely on 
new online selection intermediaries (i.e. search engine and social media) to assist them to 
find relevant information from infinite information. Selection intermediaries have the 
power to control the way diverse content being exposed to people on the Internet. 
Therefore, selection intermediaries should be regulated in order to encourage diversity of 
exposure. 
There is an attempt to put forward traditional tools to regulate these selection 
intermediaries in order to protect exposure diversity. However, to what extent can the 
existing tools be applied to selection intermediaries in the new media environment? This 
chapter, therefore, analyses the problems of the application of the current laws to 
safeguard exposure diversity. It is divided into two parts. Part I analyses existing specific 
media laws (i.e. the AVMSD and the UK Communications Act 2003) and their problems 
to control the power of selection intermediaries and to protect exposure diversity. Then, 
Part II examines the limitation of competition law in regulating selection intermediaries 
to promote exposure diversity. This chapter will illustrate that the current existing laws 
(both media law and competition law) are not adequately developed to be applied to 
regulate these new intermediaries and protect exposure diversity.  
Part I: The problems of the existing media law 
This part examines whether the media lawmakers and policymakers have 
sufficiently considered the issues of exposure diversity and the concerns of new selection 
intermediaries. It will focus on two issues: to what extent exposure diversity is recognised 
in the media policy and reflected in the current laws? and whether it is effective and 
suitable to apply the existing law to selection intermediaries? This part will critically 
evaluate the existing specific media regulations and the media plurality policies.   It will 
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focus on the regulations of the EU and the UK. It will consider the AVMSD, the UK 
Communications Act 2003 and the relevant policy documents from the EU, CoE and 
Ofcom.  
This part is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the position of 
exposure diversity in media law and policies. It will illustrate that the current existing 
laws and policies have traditionally reflected the focus on diversity of sources and 
diversity of content, rather than diversity of exposure. The second section then examines 
selection intermediaries and their legal obligation in media law. The analysis leads to the 
conclusion that traditional media are still the main legal concerns rather than search 
engines and social media. The discussions in the two sections lead to the conclusion that 
the importance of selection intermediaries in promoting people to expose to diverse 
content is still the issue that has rarely been discussed. 
1. Exposure diversity and media law 
This section assesses whether the existing regulatory measures have promoted 
exposure diversity.  It will examine the traditional media policies and different legal 
approaches adopted by the EU and the UK to safeguard media plurality. It is divided into 
four subsections. First, it starts by exploring the underlying framework or mindset of 
media policy regarding media plurality concept. What aspects of media plurality have 
been recognised by media policymakers and reflected in regulations? Do policymakers 
consider exposure diversity? Then, the second subsection will discuss the measures 
regarding media plurality in existing media laws. Particularly, the discussion focuses on 
the current AVMSD and the UK Communications Act 2003. It will analyse whether these 
regulations have measures to effectively promote exposure diversity. Lastly, the last two 
subsections will examine the new regulations which is in the process of amendment (i.e. 
the proposal revision of the AVMSD and the UK proposal measurement framework for 
media plurality) and the direction of media policy regarding exposure diversity in the 
future. 
a. Exposure diversity and the underlying media policy 
Exposure diversity has traditionally been neglected from the consideration about 
media plurality. For decades, the media policies have presented concerns about media 
plurality merely in term of a wide range of outlets and viewpoints made available. In other 
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words, from the media policymakers’ viewpoint, the issues about media plurality are the 
need to ensure source diversity and content diversity. This has been done throughout a 
series of media pluralism related documents both at the UK and the European level. For 
example, the CoE states in the Recommendation on Measures to Promote Media 
Pluralism (1999) that: 
‘… the notion of “media pluralism” should be understood as diversity of media 
supply, … as well as a diversity of media types and contents (views and opinions) made 
available to the public...’ and  
‘…pluralism is about diversity in the media that is made available to the public, 
which does not always coincide with what is actually consumed.’1 
In other words, the CoE, whose recommendations have significantly influenced 
media plurality policies in Europe, explicitly exclude the aspect of diverse content people 
actually consumed from its definition of media plurality. Consequently, a wide range of 
recommendations on the measures to promote media plurality all deal with either 
structural or ownership diversity or content diversity.2  
In the UK, Ofcom also defines in 2012 the desired outcomes of media plurality as 
‘ensuring there is a diversity of viewpoints available and consumed across and within 
media enterprises and preventing any one media owner or voice having too much 
influence over public opinion and the political agenda’.3 The traditional assumption 
underlying media policy is that increasing diversity of source will lead to an increase of 
content diversity.4 Furthermore, it has often been assumed that promoting diversity of 
                                                          
1 Recommendation No. R (99) 1 on measures to promote media pluralism [1999] 6. 
2 E.g. Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)2 on Media Pluralism and Diversity of Media Content; European 
Commission, ‘Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union’ (Staff Working Document, 
16 January 2007); House of Lords, ‘Media convergence’ (Select Committee on Communications 2nd 
Report of Session 2012–13, 27 March 2013); House of Lords, ‘Media plurality’ (Select Committee on 
Communications 1st Report of Session 2013–14, 4 February 2014). 
3 Ofcom, ‘Measuring media plurality’ (Ofcom, 5 November 2015) 1. 
4 E.g. United Kingdom, Department of National Heritage, ‘Media Ownership: The Government’s Proposals 
(Green Paper)’ (1995); CoE, Steering Committee on the Mass Media, ‘Report on Media Pluralism in the 
Digital Environment’ (2000); However, the presumption about the relationship between source diversity 
and content diversity are questioned and challenged. For further discussion see e.g. Mara Einstein, Media 
Diversity (LEA 2004); Philip Napoli, ‘Deconstructing the Diversity Principle’ (1999) 49(4) J.Com 7. 
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available content will automatically result in a greater diversity of content consumed by 
people.5 
As analysed above, the media policies underlying existing media laws in Europe 
and the UK do not provide any concerns that intend to directly regulate the way diverse 
content is chosen by people. The reason why exposure diversity is hardly regarded in the 
media policies is because the conventional media policies originated at the time when 
scarcity of spectrums was the main problem. In an environment where there are high 
barriers to entry into media market, encouraging production and distribution of diverse 
media content from diverse media entities was the top priority for media regulation. 
Therefore, the issue about exposure diversity was less regarded than the concern about 
how to guarantee a sufficient supply of different viewpoints from diverse sources.  
However, scarcity of resources and high barriers to entry into media market is now 
less of an issue in the digital age. Instead, the new problem is the influence of selection 
intermediaries over the way people choose media content. The abundance of available 
information results in diversity of supply but does not automatically guarantee diversity 
of content people consume. In the era of overflowing information, diversity from the 
viewpoint of content actually exposed to audience has become increasingly important. 
Consequently, there are concerns about the change of media policy towards exposure 
diversity. 
b. Exposure diversity and the current measures in the AVMSD and the UK 
Communications Act 2003. 
With the objective of media policies to encourage diverse media’s output as 
discussed above, the current regulations have disregarded the measure to encourage 
diversity of exposure. To promote media plurality, the various instruments provided in 
the existing laws can be roughly divided into two types of regulations: (i) the measures 
to prevent the concentration of media companies in media market6; and (ii) the 
requirements to promote quality content and various available viewpoints.7  
                                                          
5 Philip Napoli, ‘Exposure Diversity Reconsidered’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 246, 248.  
6 E.g. Section 348-356 of CA 2003; Section 58(2A) - (2C) of the UK Enterprise Act 2002. 
7 A clearly illustrated example is the six Australia media legislative Bills purposed in 2013. None of the six 
Bills refer to measure to promote exposure diversity. Besides, The Convergence Review and Other 
Measures Bill (one of the two Bills which is under consideration at the moment) deal with ownership matter 
and content transmission quotas. 
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The measures to prevent the concentration of media ownership are created to 
promote diversity of sources or independent media outlets. These measures are various; 
they are such as the limit of the number of media licences people can hold and the 
imposition of the ceiling on the total amount of market share. For instance, the UK 20/20 
rule8 prohibits a person from holding or having 20 per cent interest in Channel Three 
licence if he has more than 20 per cent of the national newspapers market share. The UK 
public interest test9 authorises the government to intervene in media mergers when 
plurality concern is raised. There is also the measure to exclude certain persons from 
owning or controlling media companies. In particular, the UK disqualification rules10 
prevent politicians, religious bodies and advertising agencies, from holding licences. The 
goal of all these measures is to ensure market openness, competitiveness and sufficient 
diverse independent outlets available in the market. However, all these measures do not 
ensure or directly encourage that diverse sources will actually be consumed by people.  
Another set of measures in the existing laws to protect media plurality is the 
provisions to promote quality content and various available viewpoints. These measures 
focus on the diversity of output, for example, the measures to guarantee a diverse 
composition of programmes being broadcasted. This can be manifest from the measures 
provided within the AVMSD, i.e. the European cultural quota11, the short news 
reporting12 and the events list mechanism13. The European cultural quota requires 
broadcaster and providers of on-demand audiovisual media to produce and promote a 
certain volume of European works. Short news reporting obliges broadcasters holding 
exclusive broadcasting right of high interest event to grant other broadcasters to use short 
extracts in general news programs. The events list mechanism obliges those exercising 
exclusive broadcasting right of major important events (such as Olympic Games or the 
football World Cup) to allow second broadcaster to provide free live coverage of these 
events. It should be noted that the measures regarding media plurality in a new legislative 
                                                          
8 Schedule 14, Pt I of CA 2003. 
9 Sections 58(2A) - (2C) of the Enterprise Act 2002 (inserted 29 December 2003) by CA 2003 (c. 21), 
sections 375(1), 411(2)(3) (with transitional provisions in Sch. 18); S.I. 2003/3142, art. 3(1), Sch. 1 (subject 
to arts. 3(3), 11). Schedule 14, Pt I of CA 2003. 
10 Schedule 2, Pt II of the UK Broadcasting Act 1990. 
11 Articles13, 16, 17 of AVMSD 
12 Article 15 of AVMSD. 
13 Article 14 of AVMSD. 
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proposal amending the AVMSD remain status quo as the existing rules mentioned 
above.14 
Considering the rationale of these measures, they may be regarded as indirectly 
dealing with exposure diversity15 because they seek to secure broad exposure of the public 
interest content. However, by regarding the classification of exposure diversity discussed 
in Chapter 216, there is an absence of current legal measures which directly assist people 
to diversely choose media content or consume different media outlets . Also, these rules 
do not directly deal with creating the conditions that the audience can actually consume 
diverse viewpoints in the overwhelming information environment.17 They do not provide 
content exposed to people in the form of comparison or serendipity encounter. They only 
encourage the accessibility of people to reach content made available by guaranteeing 
certain quantity of particular content presenting to the public.18 Therefore, the measures 
in AVMSD should be categorised as direct measures for content diversity since they 
prevent content from the supply side to not be made available exclusively or not disappear 
from the public. To summarise, as examined above, the traditional regulatory provisions 
used to promote diversity of source and available viewpoints cannot achieve diversity of 
exposure.  
In the UK, the doctrine of ‘due prominence’ has been implemented to require 
Electronic Programme Guide (EPG) providers to give public broadcasters an equal or 
favoured treatment in their page-ranking system.19 EPGs facilitate consumers to find their 
way in the abundance offer of programmes and channels. In compliance with the 
Communications Act of 2003, Ofcom drew up a code of practice on EPGs to be respected 
by EPG providers. The code requires that EPG providers ensure that their agreement with 
broadcasters is made on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. EPG providers 
                                                          
14 European Commission, ‘Proposal for amending Directive 2010/13/EU concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities’ (COM/2016/0287 final - 2016/0151 
(COD), 25 May 2016) 
15 Peggy Valcke, ‘Looking for the users in media pluralism regulation’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 287, 298. 
16 See Part I.2b Classification of exposure diversity, p.47-48. 
17 This argument can also be applied to national law which obliges broadcasters to provide certain volume 
of original programs or production quota of local language, minority languages and minority interests e.g. 
Section 277, 309 (independent productions) section 278 (original production) section 286 (regional 
program-making) of CA 2003. 
18 Similar considerations have applied to ‘must carry rule’ which can be regarded as only indirectly 
acknowledges exposure diversity by ensuring users’ access to certain content (Universal Service Directive) 
19 Section 310 of CA 2003. 
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must also comply with an objectively justifiable method of allocating listings, for 
example, objectively justifiable methods could include ‘first come, first served’, 
alphabetical listings, and those based on audience shares. They must also refrain from 
giving undue prominence in any listing or display to a channel to which they are 
connected, except where required in the light of the appropriate prominence provisions. 
Besides, it is prohibited to impose “any condition in an agreement for EPG services 
between an EPG operator and a channel provider specifying exclusivity to one EPG for 
any service or feature”.20 Nevertheless, the regulations on EPGs ensure platform openness 
and emphasise fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access for program providers to 
EPGs as the result of the concern of free and fair competition in the market rather than 
the possible role of EPG providers in guiding the audience to a diversity of media or even 
proactively encouraging diverse exposure. 
c. Exposure diversity and the revision of the AVMSD and the UK 
measurement framework for media plurality 
Recently, the aspect of exposure diversity slowly begins to take holds in the policy 
discourse. Particularly, Ofcom proposal measurement framework for media plurality in 
2015 includes media plurality from the exposure diversity aspect. Due to the challenged 
assessment of media influence and ownership in News Corporation/BskyB case in 200921, 
Ofcom has developed new metrics from new perspective by shifting the measurement 
framework from the supply side to the way audiences actually consume content. This 
audience perspective indicators are such as audience reach22 and time-exposure share23. 
It illustrates how widespread exposure to a particular source is across all users and 
indicates what proportion of the total audience select particular programmes. The CoE 
also comments that ‘the audience share indicator is one of the most relevant and useful 
                                                          
20 Section 16 paragraph g of Code of practice on electronic programme guides.  
21 The case relates to a convergent context that merged different media segments into one market and 
involves public interest test. See Ofcom, ‘Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of 
British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News Corporation’ (Ofcom, 31 December 2010).   
22 Audience reach can be defined as ‘the percentage of the total audience which is exposed to a specific 
news provider’. In other words, this metric shows how many people are ‘reached’ by a specific news 
provider. See Ibid, 7. 
23 Time-based consumption directly analyses individual audience spending time consuming content across 
different providers. It shows the overview of each provider’s influent weight in the average individual’s 
public sphere. See Davide Morisi, ‘Measuring media pluralism in the convergence era: The case of News 
Corp’s proposed acquisition of BSkyB’ (Media@LSE, 2012). 
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since it reflects the real influence of an operator in a given media market’.24 Consequently, 
Ofcom proposal measurement framework for media plurality in 2015 includes audience 
perspective metric such as consumption metrics (measuring the number of people using 
news sources and the frequency they spend consuming it) and impact metrics (measuring 
how news content can have personal importance in influencing people’s opinions such as 
reliability and trust).25 In the acquisition in 21st Century Fox/Sky News case, the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) uses the audience perspective indicators 
proposed in Ofcom’s media plurality measurement framework for the assessment of 
media influence and ownership. CMA does not only consider the availability or the 
number of media providers available at the point of consumption but also measures 
consumption metrics (audience reach, time-exposure share and share of reference) and 
impact metrics (such as measures of importance and trust).26 The UK new assessment 
framework of media ownership concentration can be considered as including an aspect 
of exposure diversity.27 However, this measure is not the methods aiming to promote 
people to be exposed to diverse sources: it is only an assessment framework of media 
influence and concentration. 
In contrast, the proposal revision of the AVMSD does not provide any measure in 
regard to exposure diversity. The existing regulations regarding media plurality remain 
status quo. There is a little change in the obligation to the promotion of European works: 
the proposal amendment imposes on-demand service providers to offer at least 20 percent 
of the audiovisual offer of their catalogues to give prominence to European works.28 
Article 7a of the revised AVMSD imposes that ‘Member States may take measures to 
ensure the appropriate prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest’ 
which regards the doctrine of due prominence. However, as discussed above, while ‘due 
prominence’ rules support openness and emphasise fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory access, they do not directly deal with creating the conditions so that the 
audience can actually consume diverse viewpoints in the abundant programmes and 
channels. The other changes in the new legislation are such as the obligation to protect 
                                                          
24 CoE, ‘Media Diversity in Europe’ (Media Division, Directorate General of Human Rights, December 
2002) 28. 
25 Ofcom, ‘Measurement framework for media plurality’ (Ofcom, 5 November 2015) 15.   
26 The Competition and Markets Authority, ‘A report on the anticipated acquisition by 21st Century Fox, 
Inc of Sky Plc’ (CMA, 1 May 2018). 
27 Davide Morisi, ‘Measuring media pluralism in the convergence era’ (Media@LSE, 2012) 24. 
28 European Commission, ‘Proposal for amending Directive 2010/13/EU’ 
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minors against harmful content and the prohibition of hate speech. These rules are applied 
to all audiovisual media services without distinction: they will also apply to on-demand 
services. The most harmful content shall be subject to the strictest measures, such as PIN 
codes and encryption. Besides, EU countries have to ensure that audiovisual media 
service providers give sufficient information to viewers about harmful content to 
minors.29 All of these rules are not relevant to exposure diversity issues. Therefore, in the 
EU, exposure diversity tends to not be safeguarded by legal provisions in the coming 
years. 
d. Media literacy and the recent media policy 
Regarding the exposure diversity in the future media policy, in its recent 
Recommendation on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership in 2018, the 
CoE highlight the importance of the way people being exposed to diverse content, as it 
recommended that: 
 ‘This ongoing evolution also raises concerns for media pluralism. Internet 
intermediaries have acquired increasing control over the flow, availability, findability and 
accessibility of information and other content online. This may affect the variety of media 
sources that individuals are exposed to and result in their selecting or being exposed to 
information that confirms their existing views and opinions, which is further reinforced 
by exchange with other like-minded individuals (this phenomenon is sometimes referred 
to as a “filter bubble” or “echo chamber”). Selective exposure to media content and the 
resulting limitations on its use can generate fragmentation and result in a more polarised 
society.’30 
The CoE also provides a guideline on the improvement of effective exposure of 
users to the broadest possible diversity of media content online31:  
‘The visibility, findability, accessibility and promotion of media content online are 
increasingly influenced by automated processes, whether used alone or in combination 
with human decisions. States should encourage social media … search and 
recommendation engines … which use algorithms … that: 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Recommendation CM/Rec (2018)1 on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, 2. 
31 Ibid, 5-6 
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… 
– assess the impact of [the processes of online distribution of media content] on 
users’ effective exposure to a broad diversity of media content; 
– seek to improve these distribution processes in order to enhance users’ effective 
exposure to the broadest possible diversity of media content; 
– provide clear information to users on how to find, access and derive maximum 
benefit from the wide range of content that is available; …’ 
This is certainly an innovative approach which clearly acknowledges the 
importance of exposure diversity in media policy. The recommendation illustrates that 
the problems now are about filter bubble and audience polarisation. In other words, media 
policymakers realise that the abundance of available information does not guarantee 
people to expand their media use. Furthermore, the recommendation acknowledges the 
potential of selection intermediaries in supporting people’s exposure to diverse media 
content. The possible concrete measure to achieve exposure diversity is the regulation of 
selection intermediaries to improve their distribution process in order to enhance users’ 
effective exposure to a broad diversity of media content. The recommendation underpins 
the justification in placing a measure concerning exposure diversity on selection 
intermediaries as discussed in Chapter 2. It also encourages selection intermediaries to 
have a proactive role to recommend more diverse content.  
However, it is not without problems. The recommendation gives no clear 
benchmarks of how and what the possible policy implications could be. It, therefore, is 
questionable on what is a meaningful and sufficient measurement to constitute the 
achievement of exposure diversity. The most relevant existing media policy which can 
possibly be considered as a method to support exposure diversity is media literacy.32 
Media literacy is coherence with the last guideline mentioned above (i.e. ‘provide clear 
information to users on how to find, access …wide range of content that is available’). 
Media literacy, according to its description in the AVMSD, refers to skills or knowledge 
of people that enable them to have informed access to the greatest possible variety of 
                                                          
32 E.g. European Parliament, ‘Report on media literacy in a digital world’ (2008/2129(INI), 24 November 
2008); Recommendation C(2009)6464 on Media Literacy in the Digital Environment for a More 
Competitive Audiovisual and Content Industry and an Inclusive Knowledge Society (Recommendation on 
Media Literacy); Ofcom, ‘Response to the European Commission’ (Ofcom, 30 September 2013). 
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information.33 Media literacy also includes the ability of people to understand and 
critically evaluate different aspects of the media, the accuracy of information and the 
trustworthiness of the content.34 As recommended by the CoE, the audience should learn 
how to improve their use of selection intermediaries and study the impact of how their 
information combined with queries can produce specific content recommendations for 
them.35 Users should also be educated that high ranking search results and the top 
suggestions provided by social media do not necessarily reflect the importance, relevance 
or trustworthiness of the source.  
By considering the limitation of the government to directly interfere in the way 
people consume media content, the empowerment of people to wisely choose media 
content is an effective measure to encourage people to consume diverse viewpoints. This 
method can be achieved by, for example, providing education about media to general 
people and providing specific Internet training aimed at children and parents.36  The more 
media literacy people have, the more possibility people will choose diverse media 
content. Therefore, media literacy can be considered as a measure concerning exposure 
diversity.37 
However, the empowerment of audience to have media literacy by providing 
education alone is not sufficient to achieve exposure diversity.  At the present, media 
literacy merely focuses on the measures of training people to be more skilled audience. 
The media policymakers have not yet considered an approach applying to media entities 
to assist or inform people to achieve media literacy. In particular, even if the audience is 
aware of the power of selection intermediaries to influence diverse content exposed to 
them but if the system does not allow them to practically check the trustworthiness or the 
variety of the source, it is meaningless. If audiences have the skills to find variety of 
viewpoints but selection intermediaries provide merely one-sided information, how can 
their skills be exploited effectively? If users do not have the power or choice to change 
the recommendations exposed to them by selection intermediaries, it is hardly to say that 
                                                          
33 Recital 47 of AVMSD; See also section 11 of CA 2003. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Recommendation CM/Rec (2012)3 on the protection of human rights with regard to search engines. 
36 Ibid.; Recommendation on Media Literacy 
37 Peggy Valcke, ‘Looking for the user in media pluralism regulation’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 287, 303. 
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people truly have the skills to access variety of information and have the skills to evaluate 
the accuracy and trustworthiness of the content. 
Exposure diversity cannot be achieved by solely depending on media literacy. This 
thesis argues that the burden to promote media literacy should not merely be on the public 
sector and the government. There should be a legal duty for selection intermediaries to 
assist or inform people to achieve media literacy. There also should be a regulation 
imposing an active role on selection intermediaries to encourage diverse content exposed 
to people. The further discussion of media literacy and other measures for achieving 
exposure diversity will be provided in Chapter 4. 
   
In conclusion, the current existing regulations (particularly the AVMSD and the 
UK Communications Act 2003) are not effective and suitable for the achievement of 
exposure diversity . The design of the existing media laws is based on promoting diversity 
of source and available content on the supply side. Besides, in media policy, the notion 
of media plurality from the viewpoints of content actually exposed to the audience is still 
in their infancy.  Also, the influence of selection intermediaries to encourage exposure 
diversity is still an issue that has barely been regarded. Next section, then, will examine 
whether it is effective and suitable to apply the existing law to selection intermediaries in 
order to encourage media plurality, especially diversity of exposure. 
2. Selection intermediaries and media law 
This section examines the existing media laws concerning the regulation of 
selection intermediaries. It will illustrate that not only that the current media laws are 
inefficient in supporting exposure diversity as discussed in the previous section, they do 
not have any obligation imposing on selection intermediaries. Even if we extend the 
existing media plurality rules (i.e. AVMSD) to apply to selection intermediaries, these 
rules are not suitable for the nature of selection intermediaries in the Internet environment. 
Therefore, it is not effective and appropriate to apply the existing laws to selection 
intermediaries in order to encourage media plurality, especially diversity of exposure.  
This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection discusses 
selection intermediaries and the current AVMSD. Then, the second subsection will 
examine the issue of selection intermediaries in the proposal revision of the AVMSD and 
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the UK proposal measurement framework for media plurality. It will explore whether the 
new regulations which is now under revision have any concerns about measures to 
effectively regulate selection intermediaries. Finally, the last subsection analyses the 
reasons why the current media plurality rules are not effective and suitable to apply to 
selection intermediaries. 
a. Selection intermediaries and the AVMSD 
Selection intermediaries are not under the scope of the regulations of the AVMSD 
and the UK Communications Act 2003. These existing specific media laws regulate 
merely traditional media and television-like services on the Internet.38 In particular, the 
media plurality rules in the AVMSD only apply to an ‘audiovisual media service’ which 
is a service under the ‘editorial responsibility’ of a media service provider. According to 
article 1(c) of the AVMSD 39, ‘editorial responsibility’ is the exercise of effective control 
over the production of content, i.e. the selection of the programmes and the organization 
for a chronological broadcast schedule or a catalogue of on-demand services. The media 
services under the definition of an ‘audiovisual media service’ are television 
broadcasting40 and on-demand audiovisual media services41.  
Selection intermediaries do not have editorial responsibility. They do not produce 
content and organise programmes in a chronological schedule as television broadcasts or 
in a catalogue as on-demand audiovisual media services. Selection intermediaries merely 
transmit content for which the editorial responsibility lies with third parties such as 
website operators.42 Although selection intermediaries determine some content to appear 
on the top of their platforms, this selection automatically operates by algorithms not by 
human editorial control. Selection intermediaries do not select audiovisual content in the 
same manner as the editorial design or the final compilation of a fixed programme 
                                                          
38 See e.g. Article 1(a) of AVMSD: ‘audiovisual media service’ means:….is either a television broadcast 
as defined in point (e) of this paragraph or an on-demand audiovisual media service…’ 
39 Article 1(c) of AVMSD 
40 Article 1(e) of AVMSD: ‘television broadcasting’ or ‘television broadcast’ (i.e. a linear audiovisual 
media service) means an audiovisual media service provided by a media service provider for simultaneous 
viewing of programs on the basis of a program schedule’. 
41 Article 1(g) of AVMSD: ‘on-demand audiovisual media service’ (i.e. a non-linear audiovisual media 
service) means an audiovisual media service provided by a media service provider for the viewing of 
programmes at the moment chosen by the user and at his individual request on the basis of a catalogue of 
programmes selected by the media service provider’. 
42 For further discussion about editorial control see European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘IRIS Special: 
Editorial Responsibility’ (CoE, 23 October 2008). 
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schedule by professional media service providers. They therefore, are not an ‘audiovisual 
media service’ and are not regulated under the AVMSD.43 The media plurality rules in 
the UK Communications Act 2003 are only imposed on traditional media services which 
require a licence, i.e. television and radio services.44 Thus, the UK current media 
regulations leave other online services particularly search engines and social media to be 
unregulated. 
Even if we extend the application of the existing media plurality rules to selection 
intermediaries, the existing provisions do not suit for the operation of selection 
intermediaries. The AVMSD (i.e. the European cultural quota, the short news reporting 
and the events list mechanism) will be used as an example. To illustrate, the European 
cultural quota does not fit into the nature of selection intermediaries. We cannot oblige 
selection intermediaries to provide a certain quantity of European works since the content 
these intermediaries present to users depends on how users interact with the 
intermediaries. As for the rules on short news reporting and the events list mechanism, 
these rules deal with the exploitation of exclusive broadcasting rights of major important 
events. However, selection intermediaries by themselves do not broadcast these high 
interest events or hold the exclusive broadcasting rights. They merely link people to 
content providers who provide the short news reports or provide a live and deferred 
coverage of such events. Their action does not render an issue about the infringement of 
these exclusive rights. Therefore, the short news reporting and events list mechanism are 
not to be applied to the operation of selection intermediaries. 
The aforementioned characteristics of the existing regulations derived from the 
media policies in the pre-internet age. Before the 21st century, media policymakers were 
exclusively concerned on traditional media and electric communication technologies 
which were the new issues at that time.45 It is not until the early of the 21st century that 
policymakers start to focus on the significance of the Internet as a new important media 
platform. Nevertheless, there is no specific considerations on the power of search engines 
                                                          
43 For further discussion about the scope of audiovisual media service under AVMSD see European 
Audiovisual Observatory, ‘On-demand services and the material scope of the AVMSD’ (CoE, June 2016). 
44 E.g. Section 277, 309 (independent productions) section 278 (original production) section 286 (regional 
program-making) of CA 2003. 
45 E.g. Recommendation No. R (99) 1 on measures to promote media pluralism [1999]; Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2007)2 on Media Pluralism and Diversity of Media Content. 
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and social media.46 The rise of search engines and social media has triggered concerns 
about media plurality only in recent years. Due to the swiftly increasing influence of 
selection intermediaries in the online platforms, the EU47 and the CoE48 and national 
authorities49 now have significantly concerned that selection intermediaries might 
constitute a gateway for people to be exposed to information and can be detrimental to 
media plurality. 
b. Selection intermediaries and the proposal revision of the AVMSD and the 
UK new measurement framework for media plurality 
In 2015, the EU has provided a consultation of an amendment of the AVMSD.50 
The European Commission has listed media plurality as one of its priorities in the 
consultation and has also considered about the findability of public service content which 
have implications for plurality and media freedom. The consultation provides various 
issues and some of them would mean drastic changes to the framework governing 
television and other audiovisual services across Europe. One of the issues in the 
consultation is the services to which the AVMSD should apply: the question is whether 
the Directive should extend all or some of its provisions to other services, especially those 
of search engines and social media.  
As the Commission notes the market power of new media players, it states that it 
will carry out a comprehensive investigation and consultation on the role of platforms in 
content recommendations.51 Concerning the enhanced role of these new players in the 
value chain, they may directly influence or control the content offer and the choice of 
audiences. The Commission is concerned about the need to ensure a level playing field 
between all players and the findability of content providers: these concerns implicate the 
                                                          
46 E.g. Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)16 on measures to promote the public service value of the Internet; 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, ‘Convergence Review’ (Australian 
Government, March 2012) 19 (‘When the current media ownership and control rules were passed by 
Parliament in 2006, social media was in its infancy’). 
47 E.g. European Commission, ‘Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union’; CoE, 
‘Conclusions on media freedom and pluralism in the digital environment’ (2014/C 32/04). 
48 E.g. Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7 on a new notion of media; Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 on 
a Guide to human rights for Internet users. 
49 For UK see e.g. Lord Justice Leveson, ‘An Inquiry into the Culture’ (UK Government, 29 November 
2012) 1464; Ofcom, ‘Response to the European Commission’ (Ofcom, 30 September 2013) 
50 European Commission, ‘Consultation on Directive 2010/13/EU on audiovisual media services 
(AVMSD)’ (European Commission, 6 July 2015). 
51 European Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (COM/2015/0192 final, 6 May 
2015). 
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telecommunications regime as well as Internet service providers.52 Therefore, the 
Commission questions whether proportionate regulation is needed for new intermediary 
services which are not subject to the same regulatory burden of TV-like services.  
The consultation, however, does not mention any further details about how to 
regulate selection intermediaries. In the case that the Directive extends its provisions to 
regulate selection intermediaries, to what extent the current provisions regarding the 
protection of media plurality are suitable to regulate selection intermediaries? The 
consultation does not clearly illustrate which specific provisions will be applied to 
selection intermediaries in relation to the protection of media plurality. Therefore, before 
considering such extension of the scope of the AVMSD to cover selection intermediaries, 
we need an understanding of public expectations regarding various online services and 
their responsibility on content recommendations. As the UK Government responses to 
the consultation of the amendment of the AVMSD: 
‘The AVMSD reflects the characteristics and functions of services with editorial 
responsibility; they do not make sense on services with no editorial control.’53 
It is not simple to extend the scope of the AVMSD because the distinction between 
broadcasting-like content services and other audiovisual platforms (where the provider 
has no editorial responsibility). In particular, the difference in nature of operation will 
make it difficult to apply the AVMSD rules to social media.54 Consequently, in 2018, the 
revision of the AVMSD, i.e. article 28b, only includes video-sharing platforms (which 
are platforms that store a large amount of videos without editorial responsibility) to ensure 
that video-sharing platform providers take appropriate measures e.g. to protect minors 
from programmes which may impair their physical, mental or moral development and to 
protect the general public from programmes containing incitement to violence or hatred 
and activity which is a criminal offence such as offences concerning child pornography, 
                                                          
52 Another public consultation is ‘The consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing, and the collaborative economy’. It deals with the identification 
of the characteristics of a range of new kinds of services providing content online and finds out what roles 
are they playing in the economy of the single market. Nevertheless, this consultation directly deals with the 
issues of consumer protection, the use of users’ data, authorship and liability of online services. See 
European Commission, ‘Public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy’ (European Commission, 24 
September 2015). 
53 The UK government, ‘UK Government response to the European Commission consultation on the review 
of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)’ (2016) 
54 Ibid. 
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racism and xenophobia.55 . The extension of the audiovisual media service under the 
scope of the Directive suggests a paradigm shift from traditional television as the 
benchmark and towards a more open and arguably broader understanding of media 
service. However, social media services are not included, except if they provide a service 
that falls under the definition of a video-sharing platform. Also, there is no mention of 
search engines in the new revised legislative. Therefore, the amended AVMSD tends to 
have no provisions concerning selection intermediaries. 
At the present, The CoE recognises that media content is not only distributed, but 
also increasingly managed, edited and curated by selection intermediaries. These various 
roles of selection intermediaries in dissemination content also have varying degrees of 
impact on exposure diversity. It is imperative that the influence of selection intermediaries 
is appropriately reflected in media regulation in order to maintain the democratic process. 
The CoE, therefore, emphasises that new policy responses and strategic solutions are 
needed to enhance accessibility to diverse content of citizen: 
‘Where intermediaries produce or manage content available on their platforms or 
where intermediaries play a curatorial or editorial role, including through the use of 
algorithms, State authorities should apply an approach that is graduated and 
differentiated. … States should determine appropriate levels of protection, as well as 
duties and responsibilities according to the role that intermediaries play in content 
production and dissemination processes, while paying due attention to their obligation to 
protect and promote pluralism and diversity in the online distribution of content.’56 
As discussed in the previous section, the 2018 Recommendation on media pluralism 
and transparency of media ownership also guides that selection intermediaries should 
seek to improve their content distribution in order to enhance users’ effective exposure to 
the broadest possible diversity of media content.57 However, it does not provide further 
detail of how to implement this requirement. 
In the UK, media policymakers are also increasingly concerned about the power of 
selection intermediaries and its impact on the content exposed to audiences. For instance, 
Ofcom has become aware of the significant increase of online news consumptions from 
                                                          
55 Article 28b of the AVMSD. 
56 Recommendation CM/Rec (2018)2 on the roles and responsibilities of Internet intermediaries, 6. 
57 Recommendation CM/Rec (2018)1 on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, 5-6. 
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Facebook and Google News and the shift of these intermediaries to become the ‘second 
most important source of online news’.58 The concerns about the influence of selection 
intermediaries are manifest in many Ofcom’s statements; for example, ‘social media is 
becoming a valuable source for breaking news…’59 and ‘search engines such as Google, 
taking consumers directly to a range of different news sources based on their search 
results’60. Although Ofcom recognises that selection intermediaries can positively 
increase the diversity of viewpoints available to citizens, it also expresses that selection 
intermediaries have the potential to reduce plurality of consumption. 
As the UK government and Ofcom state61, the scope of media plurality 
consideration should include all organisations (the UK consumers has an access to) that 
impact the news and current affairs, including search engines and social media. 
Consequently, in 2015, the UK was in the process of adopting new regulations on these 
selection intermediaries.62 The new measurement frameworks and baseline assessments 
for media plurality considers all parts of the news value chain, from the collection of 
information to the dissemination and aggregation of content. Eventually, Ofcom proposal 
is that the use of selection intermediaries should be measured when considering the 
consumption of news sources63: and intermediaries should be considered as a separate 
category distinct from the news sources themselves (retail and wholesale) when looking 
at media consumption metrics. This approach will help identify the role that selection 
intermediaries play and the extent to which selection intermediaries are used in accessing 
to online news. Thus, these new regulatory frameworks also assess the impact on media 
plurality of selection intermediaries which are services that affect discoverability and 
accessibility. 
However, the new measurement frameworks for media plurality still adhere to the 
conceptual framework of diversity of source and available viewpoints. It only proposes 
media ownership regulations to selection intermediaries. It has not provided any legal 
measures to encourage diverse contents exposed to people through these services. The 
                                                          
58 Ofcom, ‘Measuring media plurality’ (Ofcom, 19 June 2012) 25 para 5.42. 
59 Ibid, p.12 para 4.4 
60 Ibid, p.24 para 5.36 
61 Ofcom, ‘Measurement framework for media plurality’ (Ofcom, 5 November 2015); Department of 
Culture and Sport, ‘Media Ownership and Plurality Consultation Report’ (Government response to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications Report into Media Plurality, 6 August 2014) 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, 15. 
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issue of exposure diversity has not been discussed: the activities of selection 
intermediaries which are able to distort viewpoints exposed to people are left to be 
unregulated. Therefore, the UK media reform proposal regarding selection intermediaries 
does not provide any legal measures that encourage people to consume various 
viewpoints on the Internet. It also cannot truly control the influence of selection 
intermediaries over the way diverse content exposed to people is being shaped. 
c. Analysing why the current media plurality rules are not effective and 
suitable to apply to selection intermediaries 
The inapplicability of the existing regulations to selection intermediaries derives 
from three reasons. First, the current regulations have focused on the different types of 
services related to the production of content, in particular newspapers, television and 
radio64, rather than the means to find content as search engines and social media. For 
instance, television broadcasting and an on-demand services (or between liner and non-
liner services) in the AVMSD65 can be considered as the services providing content.66 An 
on-demand service in the AVMSD mirrors the usual pattern of a television service.67 
Also, the extent of regulation to video-sharing platforms comes from the aspect of 
services which compete or challenge traditional media players (who have to adapt to the 
ongoing transformation in order to secure their market positions). The concept of 
‘programme’ is a centrality and a key element in determining the scope of the AVMSD. 
Therefore, the existing media plurality rules are designed to apply to traditional media.  
Due to technology convergence, media production services which were once easy 
to identify as newspapers, television and radio are now more complicated in defining. 
Furthermore, the distinguishing between these media production services is less of the 
plurality concern. Instead, the means by which people find content become an important 
factor to achieve exposure diversity. However, the existing laws have not yet focused on 
selection intermediaries which are the means to find content. Therefore, the current laws, 
                                                          
64 E.g. Part 3 Chapter 2 Regulatory Structure for Independent Television Services and Chapter 3 Regulatory 
Structure for Independent Radio Services of CA 2003. 
65 Article 1 section 1(e) and (g) of AVMSD.  
66 Tony Ballard, ‘Broadcasting’ in David Goldberg, Gavin Sutter and Ian Walden (eds), Media Law and 
Practice (OUP 2009) 331. 
67 Recital (24) of AVMSD: ‘It is characteristic of on-demand audiovisual media services that they are 
‘television-like’, i.e. that they compete for the same audience as television broadcasts, and the nature and 
the means of access to the service …the concept of ‘program’ should be interpreted in a dynamic way 
taking into account developments in television broadcasting.’ 
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in particular the AVMSD and the UK Communications Act 2003, are not effective to 
regulate the operation of selection intermediaries in order to encourage people to consume 
diverse content.68 
The second reason is that the existing regulations reflect the nature and the use of 
the conventional networks which can be defined in term of one-to-many communication 
services.69 For instance, the design of the European cultural quota based on the notion 
that people have no ability to choose content other than content only broadcasted by a 
few broadcasters. Also, the rules on short news reporting and the events list mechanism 
reflect the picture of broadcasters’ exclusive rights to broadcast major important events 
to a large amount of people. All of these rules are based on the standard model of one-
way distribution of content by broadcasting services to the audiences.70 Therefore, the 
existing media plurality rules do not keep pace with the new forms of the interactive 
communication on the Internet. As a result, the current provisions cannot be consistent 
with the role of selection intermediaries as the centre of the interactive information 
dissemination system. 
Lastly, the legal perspective manifested in the present regulations has based on the 
distinction between media providers and telecommunication services.71 While the former 
service has the editorial control over their production of media content72, the latter service 
has to distribute content on the principle of ‘neutral transmission’. The distinction is 
crucial since the different types of services lead to the different types of influences over 
media plurality. As a consequence, distinct regulatory tools have been developed to 
regulate these different services. In particular, telecommunication sectors are regulated 
by the Universal Service Directive and the Access Directive, e.g. the must carry rule, in 
order to neutrally disseminate content to the audience. On the other hand, media providers 
                                                          
68 Selection intermediaries are regulated primarily by the Internet law, e.g. Directive 2000/31/EC on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
[2000] OJ L 178/1. Under certain conditions, selection intermediaries are exempted from liability for the 
content they transmit but none of these laws do cover media plurality issues. 
69 E.g. Section 241 Television multiplex services, section 258 Radio multiplex services and section 260 
Digital sound services for inclusion in non-radio multiplexes of CA 2003. 
70 Tony Ballard, ‘Broadcasting’ in David Goldberg, Gavin Sutter and Ian Walden (eds), Media Law and 
Practice (OUP 2009) 331. 
71 E.g. Section 32(2) of CA 2003: ‘In this Act “electronic communications service” means …, except in so 
far as it is a content service” and (7)(b) “a content service means ... the exercise of editorial control over 
the contents…’ 
72 Recital (25) of AVMSD: ‘The concept of editorial responsibility is essential for defining the role of the 
media service provider and therefore for the definition of audiovisual media services’. 
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such as broadcasters and on-demand service providers are regulated under media law, e.g. 
the AVMSD, in order to produce variety of content to the public. Even though the concept 
of ‘editorial responsibility’ seems to be declining by extending the scope of the Directive 
to video-sharing platforms, the Directive still focus on the services which are comparable 
to the form and content of television broadcasting. The European Commission considers 
that the content stored on video-sharing platforms is not under the editorial responsibility 
of the video-sharing platforms provider: but at the same time the Commission 
acknowledges that video-sharing platforms is not merely the result of automatic means 
or algorithms (but includes human intervention). 
However, the distinct regulation of media providers and telecommunication 
services does not regard the power of a new Internet service i.e. selection intermediaries. 
The operation of selection intermediaries neither has editorial control under the definition 
of AVMSD as a traditional media nor is a neutral transmission as telecommunication 
services. Selection intermediaries combine both the function of connecting users to access 
media content and the function of exercising discretion to suggest certain content for the 
interest of the audience. They, therefore, are distinct from media companies and 
telecommunication services. With the unique nature of operation, these intermediaries 
raise a new concern about media plurality which does not appear in the case of media 
providers or telecommunication services. The concern about selection intermediaries is 
on the exploitation of their power to exclude some content from people attention. In other 
words, selection intermediaries can control the level of diverse content exposed to the 
audiences. Thus, the existing regulations are not capable of dealing with the power of 
these new selection intermediaries as they are distinct from other media and 
communication services.73 
 
To conclude, the current media laws and policies to regulate selection 
intermediaries and encourage exposure diversity are still in their infancy. The CoE, for 
example, mentions concerns regarding the power of these intermediaries as the bottleneck 
affecting information flow in many documents. However, the CoE has not illustrated any 
more far-reaching conclusions about a possible regulation for these intermediaries to 
                                                          
73 E.g. Recital (22) of AVMSD: ‘… the definition of an audiovisual media service should cover mass media 
… but … search engines should also be excluded from the scope of this Directive.’ 
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promote exposure diversity. Moreover, except the policy recommendation about media 
literacy, the European Commission has not recommended any further roles of selection 
intermediaries in proactively assisting the audiences to expose to diversity of media 
content. Therefore, further discussion is needed to find the measures to contribute these 
intermediaries for the promotion of exposure diversity. 
Media laws, however, are not the only legal instruments to encourage media 
plurality. Competition law can also be adopted to promote media plurality. The next part, 
then, will analyse the application of competition law to regulate selection intermediaries 
in order to achieve exposure diversity.  
 
Part II: The limitation of competition law to achieve exposure diversity 
As discussed in Part I, there are no existing specific media laws and regulations to 
deal with the power of selection intermediaries influencing exposure diversity. This Part, 
therefore, examines whether competition law can regulate selection intermediaries to 
achieve diverse media content exposed to people. This part is divided into three sections: 
first, it will give an overview of the distinction between the objectives and matters of 
concerns of competition law and those of exposure diversity; then, the second section will 
illustrate the limitation of the application of competition law in the context of new 
economy of online platform and regulation of selection intermediaries; the last section 
will discuss whether the remedy of competition law can assist to achieve exposure 
diversity by analogizing the remedy proposed in the Google Shopping case as an example. 
The conclusion of this part is that competition law is neither sufficient to restrain selection 
intermediaries’ abuse of power nor necessarily always supports diversity of exposure. 
1. The difference between competition law and exposure diversity 
Competition law can be used to encourage media plurality, especially in the 
dimension of diversity of ownership. Facilitating a competitive market can be considered 
as a means for achieving media plurality because competitive markets will cause diversity 
of sources available in the public, or diversity on the supply side. However, competition 
law in itself is not purposely created to protect media plurality so it is neither efficient nor 
always protects every dimension of media plurality. Therefore, media plurality requires 
other approaches to achieve exposure diversity. This section will examine how the goals 
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of competition law are distinct from the concerns about exposure diversity. It also 
discusses the limitation of the application of competition law on selection intermediaries 
regarding exposure diversity. 
The primary concern is that the goals of competition law and exposure diversity are 
different. Competition law aims to ensure efficient competitive markets and (which leads 
to) consumer welfare. In the aspects of competition law, consumer welfare relates to 
price, service, quality and choice.74 The level of consumer welfare can be determined by 
the efficiency of resources being allocated to satisfy consumer’s desires and the efficiency 
of resources being used by particular companies.75 On the other hand, exposure diversity 
focuses on the diversity of viewpoints people choose and the influence of selection 
intermediaries on the distortion of people’s perception of the world.76 Exposure diversity 
relates to the right to receive information and democratic concerns77; in contrast, 
competition law relates to the individuals’ economic freedom and the consumers’ right to 
economic self-determination.78 Competition law, therefore, prevents anti-competitive 
behaviour of companies which have market power.  It does not encourage diverse sources 
or content actually consumed by people; instead, it ignores other social interests, such as 
freedom to receive information and democratic values, so long as market mechanism is 
well-functioning. 
a. Market power and media power 
Competition law is concerned about the market power of the companies whilst 
exposure diversity is concerned about the media power of selection intermediaries on the 
people’s public sphere. These two powers are not the same thing. In particular, from the 
exposure diversity dimension, every search engine and social media has the power to 
influence diversity of viewpoints presented to people79 (though the big ones such as 
Google and Facebook tend to have more influence). The position of selection 
intermediaries as the gatekeeper of information flow on the Internet determines the media 
                                                          
74 Eugène Buttigieg, Competition Law (Kluwer 2009) 6-8. 
75 Ibid. p. 7. 
76 Philip Napoli, ‘Deconstructing the Diversity Principle’ (1999) 49(4) J.Com 7. 
77 Natali Helberger, ‘Exposure diversity as a policy goal’ (2012) 4(1) J.M.L 65. 
78 Eugène Buttigieg, Competition Law (Kluwer 2009) 5-6. 
79 Natali Helberger, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw and Rob van der Noll, ‘Regulating the new 
information intermediaries as gatekeepers of information diversity’ (2015) 17(6) info 50, 52. 
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power of selection intermediaries in itself.80 The number of people using search engines 
and social media as the outlets to consume media content can also express the degree of 
the influence which selection intermediaries have over the public and a person. Therefore, 
any approaches which are created to encourage exposure diversity are applied to every 
selection intermediary, not merely to big intermediaries such as Google and Facebook.  
In contrast, not every search engine and social media has market power. The 
dominant position and market power in competition law do not considered the position 
of selection intermediaries to influence people’s opinion. Market power can be defined 
as the economic power which enables firms in a dominant position to prevent the effective 
competition.81 Market power exists where firms are capable of, for example, restricting 
consumer’s choices and decreasing quality of services regardless of competitive 
constrains for a significant period of time.82  Competition law, therefore, merely regulates 
the dominant companies who exercise their market power to worsen the competition in 
the market. It does not apply to the actions of non-dominant search engines and social 
media.  
For instance, the dominant position and market power are the significant factors 
to differentiate the conclusions of the Google manipulating search results case in the US 
and the EU. As described by the European Commission, the fact that market share of 
Google’s competitors in the US is around 30 percent while in Europe Google has above 
90 percent of market share is the reason why the Commission continues investigating 
Google’s actions, even though the US Federal Trade Commission has concluded that 
there was no competition issue.83 It can also be implied that Yahoo! and Bing whose 
combined market share are less than 5 percent in Europe and less than 30 percent in the 
US, can manipulate their search results without raising any competition investigations. 
Moreover, in circumstances where the search engines or social media market is an 
effective competitive market and there are no dominant companies in the market, any 
                                                          
80 Natali Helberger, ‘Diversity by design’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 441, 442 
81 See Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal v Commission [1978] ECR 
207, para 65; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 38. 
82 European Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
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actions of selection intermediaries do not have competition issues, even though these 
actions still raise the concerns about exposure diversity.  
The concerns about the dominant position illustrate that competition law 
recognises each of search engines and social media as an independent entity since market 
power relates to the competitive relationship between each firm and their competitors. 
Exposure diversity, in contrast, regards selection intermediaries altogether as an 
important process of providing media content. Therefore, the concerns about market 
power do not always mean exposure diversity issues. 
b. The actions concerned by exposure diversity and anti-competitive conduct 
Another concern is the actions that should be regulated. To be precise, the anti-
competitive conducts under competition law differ from the operations of selection 
intermediaries which raise exposure diversity concerns. Rather than focusing on the 
competition process as in competition law, exposure diversity protects every single voice 
even if it is a minor one.84 From the perspective of exposure diversity, selection 
intermediaries should be restrained from exploiting their power to unreasonably exclude 
some content from appearing and should encourage diverse viewpoints presented to 
people.85 Therefore, all forms of the manipulations of selection intermediaries which 
cause a bias in content recommendations raise the concerns of exposure diversity.  
However, not all forms of bias in content recommendations would be considered 
as an anti-competitive conduct under competition law.86 To apply competition law, a firm 
which is in the dominant position must abuse their market power to prevent competitive 
markets.87 Anti-competitive conducts under competition law are the behaviour which 
deviates from normal competitive manners and regards as an unfair or distortion of 
competition.88 Actions which cannot be explained as having other incentives (such as 
serving consumers, improving innovation or creating efficiency) than the purpose to 
destroy competition can be considered as an abuse of market power.89 Therefore, for the 
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operations of selection intermediaries to plausibly raise competitive concerns, they have 
to cause significant impacts on anti-competitive foreclosure (not merely affect a single 
competitor but must have negative effect on the competitive process).90 Merely the fact 
that selection intermediaries manipulate their content recommendations and make some 
competitors (especially less efficient companies) being hard to survive and to 
consequently leave the market is not a concern of competition law at all.91 From the aspect 
of competition law, manipulating content recommendations can be regarded as the action 
to differentiate between selection intermediaries which is a natural by-product of 
competition; it is desirable and beneficial to consumers.92 
In particular, the systematic process of the algorithms ranking to recommend 
certain content higher than others may not relevant to competition law; because such 
process is hard to be differentiated whether it is pro-competitive or anti-competitive.93 
Therefore, bias in content recommendations which is the result of the systematic process 
can be regarded as beyond the scope of competition law. Exposure diversity, however, 
questions the designs and mechanisms of selection intermediaries’ decisions to favour 
some content (e.g. the process of indexing and ranking in search engines and the process 
of suggestion and ranking content in social media) and their editorial effects on exposure 
diversity.94 For example, there is a critique that the process of ranking by popularity will 
make marginal voices disappear.95 This process will make popular content even more 
popular and will reduce diverse viewpoints appearing for people’s attention. Competition 
law, in contrast, does not question about how selection intermediaries configure their 
algorithms to provide content recommendations ranking by popularity and leaves this 
issue to be at the decision of consumers in the market.  
Moreover, the process of manually manipulating content recommendations to 
promote or penalise certain content certainly has an impact on exposure diversity. This 
form of bias  may occur from various incentives as Ioannis and Evgenia illustrate that ‘… 
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it can relate to prejudice, inclination, partiality, or tendency affecting judgment in the 
sense that no equal chance is offered to another idea…’96 Whichever incentive it is, bias 
in content recommendations in itself can harm exposure diversity. However, the manual 
manipulations are not always considered as the anti-competitive conducts. Unless there 
is an analysis on the economic context that such bias from the manual manipulations 
reduces consumer welfare, the manual manipulations of content recommendations alone 
are not a significant factor of the competitive harm and are meaningless in the competition 
aspect.97 Therefore, competition law cannot be applied to protect exposure diversity if the 
manipulations by selection intermediaries do not foreclose competition process. 
c. Quality of content recommendations and the duty of selection 
intermediaries 
 There is also a difference between competition law and exposure diversity in the 
issue of the quality of content recommendations. In competition law, selection 
intermediaries are not required to provide the highest quality of content 
recommendations. This is acceptable in the same way as car dealers need not to sell the 
best car at the best price.98 However, in the exposure diversity aspect, people place a large 
degree of trust in the quality and neutrality of content recommendations they receive; 
nevertheless, they do not have the ability to detect the manipulation of selection 
intermediaries. Therefore, the degree of the quality of content recommendations provided 
by selection intermediaries raises exposure diversity concerns. From this view, selection 
intermediaries should have a responsibility to provide content recommendations with the 
highest quality regarding diverse viewpoints as they can. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the concerns about the quality of content recommendations in term of consumer 
welfare in competition law do not necessarily indicate the different viewpoints or 
opinions presented to people. The quality of content recommendations in the competition 
law’s perspective refers to the exact right answers of what users are looking for or what 
is relevant to users’ preferences. 
                                                          
96 Ioannis Lianos and Evgenia Motchenkova, ‘Market Dominance and Quality of Search Results in the 
Search Engine Market’ (2013) 9(2) J.C.L.E 419, 452. 
97 Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright, ‘If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What´s the Question?’ (George 
Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-37, 2011) 37. 
98 Mark Patterson, ‘Google and Search Engine Market Power’ (2013) Harv.J.L.Tech 1, 7-10. 
122 
Lastly, in the exposure diversity’s viewpoint, selection intermediaries have the 
power as traditional media and are the gatekeepers of information flow on the Internet. 
Therefore, they should have the public duty to exploit their resources to encourage people 
to consume diverse viewpoints. This duty includes dissemination of viewpoints which 
promote their competitors and which they disagree with. On the contrary, there are no 
general duties in competition law for any firms, even the dominant ones, to assist their 
competitors. Thus, selection intermediaries do not have any duties to give a free publicity 
to their competitors.99 Although there is a ‘special responsibility’100 applied to the firms 
in a dominant position, this special responsibility is not specific to aid their competitors. 
Rather, the special responsibility prohibits the dominant companies to exercise their 
conduct to impair the genuine and undistorted competition on the common market.101 The 
dominant companies will be obliged to have more responsibilities than the usual legal 
obligations which the non-dominant firms bear. They are also deprived of the right to do 
something which is not in itself abusive if conducted by the non-dominant firms.102 
However, this does not mean that the dominant firms have to share the sources of their 
advantage which may lessen the incentive to invest in the economically beneficial 
facilities. Therefore, the general duty and the special responsibility under competition law 
do not oblige any selection intermediaries to encourage exposure diversity. 
In conclusion, competition law is not always applicable to sufficiently protect 
exposure diversity. This is because of the distinction between the objectives of 
competition law and those of exposure diversity. Competition law is purposely created to 
protect competitive market and consumer welfare. It, therefore, does not always 
encourage diverse media content exposed to people. Besides, there are differences 
between the issues under the concerns of competition law and exposure diversity. While 
operations of selection intermediaries can influence the volume of diverse content 
exposed to people, most of these actions do not tend to be considered as anti-competitive 
conducts under competition law.  
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However, it does not mean that competition law is not a legal instrument which 
can be exploited to encourage exposure diversity. Competition law can also be adopted 
to prevent dominant selection intermediaries from manipulating content 
recommendations which negatively affects exposure diversity when such action can be 
analysed as an anti-competitive conduct and reduction of consumer welfare. The next 
section will analyse the efficiency of the application of competition law in the context of 
new economy of online platform, in particular dominant search engines and social media 
manipulating result recommendation. Even if competition law address exposure diversity 
concerns, it is not without a problem in applying competition law on the action of 
selection intermediaries. It is, therefore, crucial to examine, as an example, whether 
competition law is effective to regulate the action of selection intermediaries which has 
an adverse impact on exposure diversity.  
2. The application of competition law to regulate selection intermediaries 
As discussed in the previous section, competition law does not directly support 
diversity of exposure. However, it can prevent the anti-competitive conduct of dominant 
firms which reduces diverse content exposed to people. Thus, competition law can 
encourage exposure diversity in certain circumstance. This section, then, discusses the 
application of competition law to regulate selection intermediaries. The section uses the 
situation when big selection intermediaries such as Google or Facebook manipulates its 
result recommendation to favour its own affiliated services as an example to criticise. For 
instance, Google may promote content or site of its business partnership over other sites. 
It may have a contract to present certain viewpoints of news or current affair in their 
search results rather than the opposite opinions. What if Facebook conducts a policy or 
creates a condition of its platform which prefer content produced by its sponsorship. 
Facebook may prevent content generated from certain sites or social media platforms 
from being linked or shared on Facebook. These manipulations of result recommendation 
also raise concerns about exposure diversity. Therefore, it is important to analyse in detail 
how competition law can be applied to these actions; this, in turn, will demonstrate 
whether competition law can be used to regulate operations of selection intermediaries 
which negatively affect exposure diversity. 
The action of selection intermediaries in placing its own affiliated content at a 
preferential position in its result recommendation and lowering the ranking of other 
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competing content can reduce the advertising revenue of content generated websites.  
Since users tend to click on the first few entries on the search engine or social media’s 
screen, advertisers will most likely prefer to advertise on a higher ranking in result 
recommendations. Consequently, the downgraded content of other sites will be less 
attractive to advertisers and this practice eventually leads to the exclusion of these sites 
from selection intermediaries’ platforms. Therefore, the selection intermediaries’ 
manipulation of result recommendations can be considered as a violation of the 
prohibition of abuse of a dominant position to exercise anti-competitive conduct under 
Article 102 TFEU which states: 
‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market insofar as it may affect trade within Member States…’  
To apply Article 102 TFEU, there are two elements to be concerned. One is a 
dominant position in a relevant market and another element is the abusive manner which 
is harmful to competition. 
a. Dominant position in a relevant market 
The finding of dominance entails a two-stage process: starting with the definition 
of the relevant market and following by an assessment of the market power within the 
relevant market of the concerned undertaking. 
i. Relevant market 
Before determining a dominant position of Google and Facebook, the relevant 
market needs to be defined. In competition law, products which can reasonably be 
interchanged are counted as the relevant market.103 Defining the relevant market in the 
case of online platforms is not easy and straightforward. This is because the fact that the 
development of online platforms is fast-changing: online companies has expanded or 
invented a new way of its business to intersect and compete with other product market. 
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Consequently, the line-drawing of interchangeable product is blur and will make less 
sense to clarify over time.  
For search engines such as Google, the European Commission’s assessment in 
Google Shopping case provides that general search market is separated from other 
aggregators such as online merchant platforms, social media and specialised searches.104 
The high market share of Google is considered only from the narrow relevant market 
definition of general search engine market. The decision does not provide a clear 
distinction of why other information search services should be separated from general 
searches. However, it could be debatable that the relevant market of Google search engine 
should not be as narrow as a general search engine market and should broadly encompass 
any virtual search activities for information.105 
Precisely, search engines now turn to Universal Search which displays results 
not only from Web sites but also from images, videos, news, maps, and products 
(replacing Ten Blue Links which displayed ten search results). Universal Search bridges 
many information search services to compete with each other by allowing a user to search 
for specific content such as books through a general search which negates the need to use 
specialised searches or online merchant search services. Also, Google organic search 
engines faces an aggressive competition for audience’s attention with other finding 
information services such as specialised search engines, online merchant search services 
like Amazon, social media like Facebook and Twitter, and other tools.106 These services 
are overlapping and competing with each other to provide search navigation for people 
and people can substitute these services for Google search engines in some circumstances. 
In case of the scope of the relevant market including other services, the market share of 
Google in the relevant market will decrease and it may not have a dominant position.  
For social media such as Facebook, it is difficult to distinguish Facebook and 
other different types of social media to define relevant market. Social media which have 
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the features or functions similar to Facebook such as Myspace, Google +, Tumblr are 
clearly included in the relevant market. However, Facebook can be considered to compete 
with microblogging such as Twitter, content communities such as Flickr and YouTube 
and social curation such as BuzzFeed and Reddit. These sites are enabling the sharing of 
texts, pictures, videos, audio files, and applications which are overlapping and competing 
with Facebook. In practice, social media have many forms and some of them may overlap 
with each other: people can substitute these social media services with Facebook in some 
circumstances. Therefore, it causes practical problems if regulators try to differentiate the 
relevant market of each online platform. Due to the convergence of platform and 
technology, many online platforms combine various services and can reasonably be 
interchanged.  
To summarise, there is an uncertainty whether Google is a dominant search 
engine and Facebook is a dominant social media. This is because it is difficult to indicate 
which market the European Commission will consider being under the scope of the 
relevant market. In other words, it is difficult to indicate a clear line or scope of the 
relevant market due to the fast-changing development of platforms. By changing the 
scope of the relevant market, Facebook and Google may not have a dominant position 
under competition law and Article 102 may not be applied to their manipulation of result 
recommendation to favour its own services. 
ii. Dominant position 
Even if the relevant market can be defined, a dominant position or market power 
itself still needs to be identified. According to Google Shopping case, the decision 
concludes that Google is dominant in general search markets: the assessment of 
dominance is based on the fact that Google’s general search engine has held exceeding 
90 percent of market shares in most EU countries.107 However, the fact that Google has a 
large market share does not always mean that it has a dominant position.108 Market share 
alone, though is an important factor, is not sufficient to determine a dominant position.109 
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The assessment of market power is whether the constraint from the threat of rival 
competition exists. This needs to be considered in conjunction with many competitive 
factors.110 
Particularly, the characteristics of the search engine market and social media 
market in the new economy market may address an uncertainty and a problem of applying 
Article 102.111 The assessment of a dominant position in a relevant market of Google and 
Facebook is not easy and straightforward even in the case where the two selection 
intermediaries have a large market share in a general search engine market and social 
media market.112 The challenges posed by the fast-paced markets may make Google and 
Facebook a leading competitor but not a dominant player with market power. The five 
characteristics of the digital sector and the difficulties they cause on EU Competition law 
will be examined as follows: 
The first characteristic of a new economy market to be considered is ‘the 
intensive competition on innovation developments’. Continuously investing in the 
improvement of existing applications and refining existing platforms are crucial for the 
input of production and cost reduction. Therefore, to survive in the search engine and 
social media market, Google and Facebook have to provide a certain level of innovation 
and needs to keep improving constantly to compete with other operators.113 For instance, 
by considering that consumers use digital platforms and applications for their own 
advantage, the competitive products in search engine market is the quality of search 
results114; it is not difficult (comparing to physical products) for competitors to produce 
better search results to suit the demand of users.115 Consequently, although Google are 
now the leading search engine operator, it must preserve its higher innovation rates and 
have to provide a better quality of its search results than competitors to maintain its market 
leadership and keep users’ attraction on its service.   
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This means that if Google’s innovation or the quality of search results declines, 
Google will lose its users to other search engine operators.116 Google, therefore, does not 
have market power to act independently from its competitors. This characteristic of a new 
economy which is driven by the strong innovative competition makes it difficult to define 
dominant position of general search engine market and social media market. 
The second characteristic of a new economy market is ‘high fixed cost but low 
marginal cost’. Digital platforms usually have high sunk cost because the development of 
novel and original products requires enormous investments; but once the products are 
made, the developing costs of production are often low marginal costs. This characteristic 
compensates companies for the large capital investment and business risk by allowing 
them to charge above the marginal costs.117 Therefore, for a dynamic competition to exist 
in digital market, it has a rational expectation for a significant market power to persist for 
a reasonable amount of time.  
This characteristic of the digital platform market tends to cause a highly-
concentrated market which supports the first movers to have the advantage and market 
power.118 However, by considering the factual evidence of the past and present states of 
the online platform market, it shows that the high sunk cost does not create a barrier which 
allows the leading firms operators to have a dominant position. For example, Altavista 
and Yahoo! were once the leading search engine operators at the time when Google enters 
the market. Google did not only succeed in entering the market but also displaced its 
competitors. Therefore, this dynamic nature of the search engine market indicates that 
Google which is now the leading search engine operator in Europe is not insulated from 
the competitive threat.  
The third and fourth characteristics of a new economy market are ‘network 
effect’ and ‘two-sided market’. Network effect arises where the value of a product to its 
customer grows with the number of other users of the product. In two-sided platforms, 
network effect can be seen where a rise in the number of consumers increases the 
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attractiveness of the platform developers and vice-versa.119 The major characteristic of 
the search engine market and social media market are the two-sided market which creates 
a network effect. For example, the value of social media for users depends on an increase 
of other users using that social media. This so-called direct network effect relates to the 
number of users in certain service. The more number of users, the greater utility those 
users receive directly.120 They, therefore, create a barrier to entry and tend to reinforce 
leading company to become dominant players.  
However, empirical studies oppose the literary assumption on network effect 
that adding more customers always makes a network more desirable no matter how large 
the network is already.121 They show that the average Facebook user actively interacts 
with no more than a handful of people. The average social networking user is unable to 
maintain more than 150 connections at any particular time. Social media users are likely 
to place a particularly high value on a small subgroup of people. Therefore, the value of 
adding more connections beyond the core group is much lower.122 These concerns are 
reflected in the commentary that Facebook is becoming too big and the increase of their 
size may not determine market power. 
‘Switching cost’ is the fifth characteristic of the new economy market which is 
a factor to assess market power and identify a dominant position in the market. If people 
can easily switch from using one service to another without losing anything e.g. money 
and time to process, it tends to be that there is an intensive competition in the market. For 
example, in the social media market, the switch cost is a near-zero cost. People are ‘just 
one click away’ to other social media without incurring any penalties if they are unhappy 
with the services or community from their current social media platform.123 In particular, 
they just type in a URL and download or install any software or sign up for an account. 
Although it can be argued that the cost for switching service is high due to network effects 
(for users to lose their community), users now utilise more than one social media in 
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parallel (so-called ‘multi-home’124) with the same community. Therefore, the ease to 
switch service providers constrains Facebook from exercising market power.125 
In conclusion, there is an uncertainty whether Google and Facebook are the 
dominant undertaking in search engine and social media market. This is because the 
complication of the characteristics of the new economy market. Although Google has 
near monopoly of the market share in the general search engine market and Facebook has 
a large market share in social media market, various characteristics of the new economy 
market needed to be considered. In order to determine market power, the factors which 
have to take into account are such as the dynamic change in the digital platform market, 
the intensive competition of technological developments, the low switch cost, and the 
indirect network effect. Therefore, Google and Facebook may not have a dominant 
position under competition law and Article 102 may not be applied to these selection 
intermediaries for their manipulation of their result recommendation to favour its own 
services. 
b. The anti-competitive conduct 
Even if the relevant market can be defined and market power of selection 
intermediaries can be specified, a dominant position in the market in itself is not an 
offence under Article 102 which raises competitive concerns. To apply Article 102 to the 
selection intermediaries’ manipulation of search results, a dominant position in the market 
must be accompanied with the abuse of market power to prevent competition. The action 
of Google and Facebook will be an abuse of market power on the condition that such bias 
‘must be sufficient in magnitude to exclude rival search engines [or social media] from 
achieving efficient scale’.126 This section, then, considers whether the manipulation of 
result recommendation to favour their own content over other rival content can be 
regarded as an anti-competitive conduct. 
There are concerns that the action of selection intermediaries in placing its own 
affiliated content at a more preferential position in its result recommendation and 
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lowering the ranking of the other competing content will lead to the exclusion of 
competitors and have a significant effect on the competitive market.127 Since users tend 
to click predominantly on the first few entries on the search engine or social media’s 
screen, advertisers will most likely prefer to advertise on a higher ranking in result 
recommendation. Consequently, the downgrading content of other content generated sites 
will be reduced the revenue from the advertising and this practice eventually leads to the 
exclusion of these sites from selection intermediaries’ platform. 
However, there are counter arguments that the mere fact that Google or Facebook 
favours its own content cannot be implied as an anti-competitive conduct under Article 
102.128 The conduct of Google or Facebook in manipulating result recommendations can 
be considered as an efficient competitive strategy of these selection intermediaries in 
order to be different from their competitors; such conduct benefits consumers rather than 
an abuse of market power.129 For example, Google may promote certain viewpoints of 
current affair or content of its business partnership over others in its search results. 
Facebook may conduct a policy of their platform which prefer certain content such as 
prioritising content produced by its sponsorship and preventing content generated from 
other social media platforms to be shared on Facebook. To be noteworthy, these actions 
may very well end up being a bad strategy from the consumer’s viewpoints and users may 
prefer a different platform. Consequently, an alternative search engine or social media 
can be a competitive product substituted for Google and Facebook. Punishing selection 
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intermediaries for favouring certain content may reject the competitive process where 
customers are free to choose from various search and social media platforms. 
Also, it is questionable whether these conducts are not abusive but instead a 
disruptive innovation resulting in the introduction of new products. One of the 
characteristics of a new economy market is disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation 
refers to new technologies that displace existing markets: it also referred to as ‘dynamic 
competition’ or ‘competition for the market’.130 While price has traditionally been the 
main competition for conventional competition, in dynamic competition such as in the 
online business, innovation becomes a relevant parameter for competition.131 Especially 
where users get access with zero prices to online services such as search engines and 
social networks, their choice is based on quality and the level of innovation. Innovation 
can result in the improvement of existing products or in new business models that displace 
the earlier and create a new market. 
The success of Google and Facebook in the new digital economy comes from their 
pioneer in the design of complex and innovative algorithms. In particular, the competitive 
advantage from Google’s complex algorithms design is the creation of new markets 
which improve customer’s experience and satisfaction.132 Competition law focuses on the 
action of consumer harm and quality-related product degradation, not a harm to only a 
group of competitors. The prevention of certain business and the punishment for 
introducing innovative products conflicts with the key objectives of competition law. As 
Atkinson comments for Google Shopping case: 
‘Today’s ruling is bad for consumers and bad for innovation. … The EU’s actions 
have created a cloud of uncertainty that will make large tech companies overly cautious 
about making changes to the user experience and service offerings that would beneﬁt 
consumers.’ 133 
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Therefore, to impose any punishment under competition law, it must be clear that 
there is significant impact to anticompetitive foreclose or the harm caused to the 
competitive process, not just to a single or group of competitors.134 As a result, the 
European Commission and the court may hesitate to identify the manipulation of result 
recommendations to favour certain content as an anti-competitive conduct and may be 
reluctant to apply Article 102 to Google and Facebook. 
It can be considered that Google and Facebook, which holds the large amount of 
market share in organic search engine market and social media market in Europe, has 
more responsibility than its competitors to refrain from doing some conducts concerning 
competition issues.135 As the ECJ stated, a firm in a dominant position has a ‘special 
responsibility’136 and this special duty becomes even greater if a firm is in a super-
dominant position.137 However, this special responsibility does not prevent Google and 
Facebook from protecting its own interests when it competes with competitors. In 
particular, Google merely has the special responsibility to refrain from the ‘methods 
different from those which condition normal competition’138, known as ‘compete on the 
merit’. Therefore, the special responsibility of Google does not include the abstention 
from favouring their services in search results. 
 
In conclusion, the manipulation of result recommendation to favour certain 
content is doubtfully considered as anti-competitive conducts under competition law. 
Therefore, there is a limitation of the application of Article 102 in order to regulate the 
Google and Facebook’s manipulation of result recommendations. Given the scale and 
variety of the problems in applying competition law on a new economy market such as 
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Google and Facebook, the illustration arises that competition law is not an appropriate 
tool to deal with the abusive power in online platform. 
The analysis of the example situation when big selection intermediaries 
prioritising their own affiliated content illustrates that competition law cannot effectively 
be applied to control the actions of selection intermediaries which adversely affect 
exposure diversity. Considering the characteristics of digital markets that put competition 
enforcement into difficulties when assessing uncompetitive conduct, a regulatory in other 
areas of law is probably more appropriate than reliance only on competition law.  
Also, it is worth emphasising that the limitation of competition law in promoting 
exposure diversity comes from the distinction between the objectives and concerns of 
competition law and those of exposure diversity. While almost every action of selection 
intermediaries can influence the volume of diverse contents exposed to people, all of these 
actions do not tend to be considered as an abuse of market power. Therefore, competition 
law is not appropriate and suitable to regulate selection intermediaries to influence 
diversity of viewpoints exposed to citizen. 
3.  The remedy of competition law 
As discussed in the previous section, Article 102 is not effective to regulate 
selection intermediaries to achieve exposure diversity. However, it is worthy to examine 
whether the remedy in competition law can be applied to encourage diversity of exposure. 
As an example, this section will draw an analogy from the remedy proposed in the Google 
Shopping case. Even though the Google Shopping case is specifically concerning 
competition law, the action of Google in this case can also be drawn an analogy to the 
effects of diverse content exposed to people. It is, therefore, crucial to examine the remedy 
imposed in this case whether competition law (i.e. Article 102 TFEU) can be used to 
prevent operations of search engines which negatively affect exposure diversity. 
The relevant abusive conduct stated in the Google Shopping case is that (by using 
Universal Search) Google displays the picture and information of individual product 
advertisements (which are shared the database from Google Shopping) at the top of 
organic search results (known as Shopping Unit). The Commission imposes a large fine 
(2.42 billion euros) on Google and requires Google to cease the infringement. However, 
the decision does not impose a speciﬁc remedy but leaves it up to Google to choose a 
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remedy that will effectively bring the alleged abuse to an end.139 It only provides that any 
measure chosen must give an equal treatment and ensure that rival services and Google’s 
service are treated no less favourably.  
The remedy imposed on Google in Google Shopping case is problematic such as 
when it is analogous to News Unit. When users search for news, Google also displays 
search result in the form of Universal Search called News Unit. Therefore when applying 
the imposed remedy on news instead of shopping sites, Google is prohibited to display a 
news list from Google News database at the top of the general search results (although 
the news list is linked to news publishers’ sites, not to the Google News page). However, 
the requirement to cease the abusive conduct by the Commission is not clear and does not 
guarantee whether the Google response will sufficiently promote exposure diversity. 
Particularly, Google may choose to cease showing a News Unit at the top of search results 
which negatively decreases a chance of diverse content noticeably presented to people. 
Notably, the provision of diverse content providers may not be considered as the 
competition requirement to ‘treat equally’. 
On the 27th of September 2017, Google implemented its chosen remedy by 
introducing an arms-length auction which rival comparison shopping services and Google 
Shopping bid (on equal terms) to appear on Shopping Unit displayed at the top of the 
general search results pages. Also, Google Shopping now operates as a separate business 
from Shopping Unit and needs to be proﬁtable in its own right.140 By analogy to news, it 
means that Google separate the links and database between Google News and news listed 
displayed at the top of the general search results. Also, it provides a chance to include 
rival news aggregators and its Google news in News Unit, on equal terms. This conduct 
may increase a chance for a variety of news aggregators to appear and to be noticed by 
people. However, this remedy does not expand the diversity of the provision of original 
news sources. The number of original news publishers, furthermore, will be diminished 
from displaying in News Unit since they have to compete with news aggregators. 
Consequently, the quality of diverse content exposed to people decreases. Therefore, the 
remedy in competition may not be applicable to achieve exposure diversity. 
                                                          
139 European Commission, ‘Decision Case AT.39740 - Google Search (Shopping)’, Article 3. 
140 MLex Insight, ‘Google’s new shopping box aims to comply with EU antitrust order’ (27 September 
2017) <http://www.mlex.com/ GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=923302&siteid=190&rdir=1>. 
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Although the Commission’s remedy is not effective to achieve exposure diversity, 
there is a commitment proposed by Google under Article 9 of the EU Antitrust Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 which worth mentioning. Before the start of the formal investigation 
process, the Commission had negotiated a settlement with Google to bring the 
investigation to an end.141 Google offered several commitments in April 2013 to meet the 
identified concerns. However, the Commission considers that the Google’s commitment 
proposals are insufficient to address its competition concerns. Consequently, the 
Commission has sent a Statement of Objections to Google. Although the proposed 
commitments concern the issues relating to competition law, it is worth examining 
whether the approaches proposed by Google can be used to promote exposure diversity. 
Google proposed the commitment to the European Commission that: 
(i) Google will label its own specialised search services in order to distinguish 
them from natural web search results and will separate its own specialised search services 
from others by providing clear graphical features. 
(ii) Google will display links to three rival specialised search services close to 
its own services and in a format which is visually comparable to that of links to its own 
services. For instance, if the Google links have images, the rival links will have images 
as well.142 
For the first approach, the distinguished label informs people to differentiate the 
web sites belonging to Google from other web sites. People, therefore, will find it is easier 
to identify different sources they consume. Moreover, where applicable, the label will 
also inform users of where people can find links to alternative web sites. This will also 
encourage people to compare various sources appeared in search results. Therefore, the 
label approach assists people to be more aware of the sources they choose and who own 
the outlets. If the label approach extends to differentiate between normal websites (not 
only Google services), it can encourage people to be more concerned about diverse 
sources they consume. 
                                                          
141 European Commission, ‘Statement of VP Almunia on the Google antitrust investigation’ 
(SPEECH/12/372, 21 May 2012). 
142 Google, ‘Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others’ (3 April 2013) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf> 
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For the approach of providing links of rival search services near to links of its own 
services, this approach clearly assists other websites to be significantly more visible. 
Besides, rival sites have the possibility to display their logo and text associated to its link 
to better inform the people of its content. Thus, it will aid people to be clearly aware of 
the presence of other sources. This will give people a real choice between different 
options and will benefit them to choose diversely and compare content wisely. This 
approach, therefore, will be able to encourage diverse content exposed to people. 
In conclusion, although the proposed commitment by Google concerns the issues 
relating to competition law, it can be considered as possible measures to be applied to 
promote diversity of exposure. The commitment proposed by Google illustrates that 
exposure diversity can be promoted by the design of technical structure of selection 
intermediaries, e.g. screen features, functions and algorithms. It can be in the forms of 
displaying more choices to easily be noticed or informing people to be aware of the 
sources they choose. However, it should be noted that this proposal is not initiated by the 
goodwill of Google itself but by the pressure of the enforcement under competition law. 
Although competition law is not a sufficient instrument to encourage exposure diversity, 
the investigation process of competition law can force Google to provide the 
improvement of its operation which has a positive effect on exposure diversity. Therefore, 
the commitment proposed by Google is an example that selection intermediaries can 
assist people to be exposed to more diverse content; and this has to be done by the legal 
obligation. The next part, therefore, examines the possible measures which should be 
imposed on selection intermediaries in order to have an active role to encourage exposure 
diversity. 
 
To summarise, this chapter analyses the limitations of the application of the 
existing specific media laws and competition law to regulate selection intermediaries in 
order to achieve exposure diversity. It illustrates that the current existing laws are not 
effective and suitable to regulate selection intermediaries to achieve diversity of 
viewpoints exposed to citizen. 
The current existing media regulation, particularly the AVMSD, and the current 
media policies are still on the design of traditional media structure which is a TV-like 
service. It also traditionally focuses on diversity of sources and diversity of content, rather 
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than on diversity of exposure. The measure to promote people exposing to diverse content 
is still an issue that has rarely been considered. Competition law is also unable to be 
applied to protect diversity of viewpoints exposed to people. This is because of the 
distinction between the goals of competition law and exposure diversity. Also, 
competition law faces various problems in the application on a new economy market so 
it has limitation to regulate selection intermediaries. 
To encourage exposure diversity, this thesis proposes that media law can take a 
positive role to create the conditions which encourage people to actually exploit selection 
intermediaries in order to effectively expose themselves to diverse content. In particular, 
there should be obligations imposed on selection intermediaries to have an active role and 
duty to assist people to expose themselves to more diverse content. These active duties 
can be achieved by legal instruments. While these instruments have been adopted in other 
fields of law, they have not been applied to safeguard diversity of exposure in the context 
of selection intermediaries. How these possible legal instruments will be applied to 








Creating a new regulatory regime: the imposition on selection intermediaries to 
promote exposure diversity 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the existing media laws and competition laws, are not 
adequate and appropriate to regulate selection intermediaries to encourage exposure 
diversity. Although it is obvious that the government cannot force people to consume 
particular content from selection intermediaries, it does not mean that the government 
cannot play an active role in promoting and facilitating exposure diversity. Therefore, this 
chapter will discuss appropriate approaches apart from media law and competition law to 
govern selection intermediaries in order to encourage people to consume more diverse 
content.  
It should, however, be noted that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer what 
level of exposure diversity should be achieved. This is because this thesis is based on the 
perspective that the government should not determine the optimal amount of diverse 
content people should consume. Instead, the thesis suggests that media law should assist 
people to be more aware of the choices they select from these intermediaries and should 
create requirements which selection intermediaries will operate in order to encourage 
people to access diverse choices.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the media landscape has significantly changed in three 
ways: access to information through links, increasing influence of selection 
intermediaries’ technical structures, and empowerment but skills deficiency of audience. 
These factors prevent people from being exposed to diverse content. To achieve exposure 
diversity, this chapter will, therefore, propose possible approaches to deal with these 
constraints by exploring three relevant measures to regulate selection intermediaries.  
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part considers the role of selection 
intermediaries in provide access through links. Since selection intermediaries have certain 
characteristics combining those of telecommunication service providers and media 
entities, the concepts of net neutrality and impartiality will be analysed. As the influence 
of technical structures of selection intermediaries is becoming crucial, the second part 
then discusses the concept of ‘diversity by design’ that is, selection intermediaries could 
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design the algorithms, functions and screen features of their services so as to encourage 
people to consume diverse content. It is noteworthy that the first measure of net neutrality 
and impartiality and the second approach of diversity by design complement each other. 
The last part of this chapter will analyse the approach of media literacy to propose that 
selection intermediaries should have an obligation to assist the improvement of people’s 
skills and knowledge to access to more diverse content.  
 
Part I: The Role of Selection Intermediaries in Providing Access to Information 
In the current media landscape, people access information through links provided 
by selection intermediaries (as criticised in Chapter 1). Provision of links by selection 
intermediaries however involves bias due to its operation and nature such as result 
recommendations display.  Information accessibility influenced by selection 
intermediaries’ bias has a significant effect on exposure diversity. This part therefore 
discusses the role of selection intermediaries in providing links for people to access to 
available information. It suggests that exposure diversity can be guaranteed by imposing 
certain obligations on selection intermediaries to provide people with actual ability to 
access diverse information on the Internet.  
This part will first explore the problem of the bias in providing information of 
selection intermediaries; it will then discuss controversial perspectives regarding the role 
of selection intermediaries in providing access to information. Since selection 
intermediaries have certain characteristics, combining those of telecommunication 
service providers and media entities, the application of net neutrality and impartiality on 
selection intermediaries in relation to exposure diversity will be analysed respectively in 
the third and fourth sections. 
1. The problem of information accessibility and bias of selection intermediaries 
One of the elements to achieve exposure diversity is the provision of access to 
sufﬁcient information. The more information people can access in their common life, the 
greater possibility for them to face alternative viewpoints and to consume greater variety 
of content. Therefore, constraints of information accessibility can obviously affect the 
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diversity of content people are exposed to.1 This also raises an issue of access control to 
available content by selection intermediaries.  
The operations of selection intermediaries are not neutral; rather they impose 
criteria of discrimination to degrade some content from people’s attention. Such 
manipulation of recommended results, which is usually referred to as ‘bias’, covers a 
broad range of different forms.2 As can be seen in Figure 1 below, bias of a selection 
intermediary can occur in any processes; it can be influenced by many factors, and it has 
various actions such as filtering, prioritisation, classification, and blocking.3 It is worthy 
of concern that the process of providing information should not be considered detrimental 
as it is a normal operation to serve its purpose. If the law specifically forces certain 
process, it would interrupt the innovation of technology. Also, to get rid of all bias is not 
sensible and practical. Therefore, to guarantee access to diverse content, this thesis will 
propose that a certain responsibility should be imposed on selection intermediaries in 
general to prevent arbitrary and unacceptable bias. 
                                                          
1 Eszter Hargittai, ‘The Digital Divide and What to Do About It’ in Derek Jones (ed), New Economy 
Handbook (Academic Press 2003) 821, 839. 
2 For discussion about bias see e.g. Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright, ‘If Search Neutrality is the Answer, 
What´s the Question?’ (George Mason Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-37, 4-14, 7 April 2011); 
Benjamin Edelman, ‘Bias in Search Results?’ (2011) 7 Indian Journal of Law and Technology 16, 21-24; 
James Webster, ‘User information regimes’ (2010) 104(2) Nw.U.L.Rev 593, 601-608. 
3 See Nicholas Diakopoulos, ‘Algorithmic Accountability’ (2015) 3(3) Digital Journalism 398, 400-402. 
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Figure 1: Bias in selection intermediaries4 
The manipulation of recommendation results is not merely about algorithms but 
includes manual human interventions.5 It will either be a completely specific 
                                                          
4 Engin Bozdag, ‘Bias in algorithmic ﬁltering and personalization’ (2013) 15(3) Ethics and Information 
Technology 209, 215. 
5 For example, human may block, censor or double-check results from algorithms. Humans may also affect 
at the design stage of the algorithms, i.e. which factors to include in the algorithm, and how to weigh them. 
See Chapter 2. 
143 
manipulation or a general bias; and it may involve intentional or indirectly prioritisation 
of certain types of information over others.6 Bias is also caused by many reasons: to 
satisfy users, for the interest of third parties, and to serve their own self-interest.7 For 
instance, a popularity algorithm gives more weight to information coming from popular 
websites to serve the topics most people are interested in. Selection intermediaries can 
also positively or negatively shape their results in response to: an exchange for payment 
of advertising, a threat of a competitive challenge, or a disapproval of a page/website’s 
policies. 
The bias of selection intermediaries may adversely reduce the flow of information 
and undermine the accessibility of information and exposure diversity. In this regard, the 
European Commission has expressed concern about the manipulation power and the 
bottleneck control that selection intermediaries can exploit.8  Also, the CoE has 
underlined ‘the importance of free or affordable access to content and services in view of 
the convergence of the media and new communication service sectors’.9 Therefore, the 
actual ability to access information without any unreasonable distortions of selection 
intermediaries is profoundly concerning. 
To encourage exposure diversity, selection intermediaries must have certain 
responsibility to refrain from producing unreasonable discrimination of content. Since 
selection intermediaries have certain characteristics combining those of 
telecommunication service providers and media entities, it is therefore important to 
investigate the role of selection intermediaries in order to determine appropriate 
responsibility for selection intermediaries in terms of exposure diversity. The next 
                                                          
6 E.g. The punishment of search engine optimization. Facebook treats video and pictures as more important 
than links and status updates (Dan Taylor, ‘Everything you need to know about Facebook’s Edgerank’ (The 
Next Web, 9 May 2011) <https://thenextweb.com/socialmedia/2011/05/09/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-facebooks-edgerank/)>. 
7 E.g. Google promotes content from its social networking platform Google Plus into Google search results 
(Simon Brace, ‘Google search plus your world- bad for the Internet?’ (2012) 
<https://www.realadventure.co.uk/crm-life/google-search-plus-your-world-bad-for-the-internet/>). 
Facebook is criticised for favouring the products of its partners (Jennifer Fong, ‘Facebook’s bias against 
3rd party apps’ (1 November 2011) <http://www.jenfongspeaks.com/facebooks-bias-against-3rd-party-
apps/>). 
8 European Commission, ‘Media Pluralism in the Member States of the European Union’ 32. 
9 Recommendation Rec(2007) 1 on promoting freedom of expression and information in the new 
information and communications environment; CoE, ‘Declaration on freedom of communication on the 
Internet’ (CoE, 28 May 2003); See also UNESCO, ‘Convention on the protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions’ (UNESCO, 20 October 2005) Article 2 No 7. 
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section, then, explores the controversial perspectives about the characters of selection 
intermediaries. 
2. The controversial perspectives of the characters of selection intermediaries 
This section analyses the controversial issue about the characteristics of selection 
intermediaries. Although discussions to date have mostly focused on search engines and 
various platforms (e.g. social network, app store and online market platform) relating to 
the context of free speech and competition law, the arguments can be specifically adapted 
to selection intermediaries in the context of exposure diversity. There are two main 
different perspectives of how these intermediaries should be treated. First, the ‘conduit 
communication’ perspective recognises selection intermediaries as a passive gatekeeper 
under telecommunication law. As a result, selection intermediaries should be neutral. 
Another, the ‘editor perspective’, regards these intermediaries as media companies which 
should not be regulated and views a bias in result recommendations as acceptable. This 
section then criticises that both perspectives have some aspects that benefit the 
encouragement of exposure diversity. 
a. Selection intermediaries as conduit communicators 
The ‘conduit communicators’ perspective can be easily illustrated by drawing an 
analogy between selection intermediaries and common carriers.10 The function of new 
intermediaries is the main map of the network of information.11 Pasquale describes these 
new intermediaries as an essential cultural and political gatekeeper.12 As he describes: 
‘Internet intermediaries govern online life. Internet service providers (ISPs) and 
search engines are particularly central to the web's ecology. Users rely on search services 
to map the web for them and use ISPs to connect to one another.’13 
                                                          
10 A ‘common carrier’ is a company whose main business is transporting things on behalf of people. The 
term may also refer to telecommunication service providers and public utilities. A common carrier provides 
services to the general public without discrimination.   
11 Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Shaping the Web’, (2000) 16 The Information Society 169, 17 
12 Frank Pasquale, ‘Dominant Search Engines’ in Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus (eds), The Next Digital 
Decade (TechFreedom 2010) 401, 402. 
13 Frank Pasquale, ‘Beyond innovation and competition’ (2010) 104(1) Nw.U.L.Rev 105, 105-106; See 
also Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, ‘Federal Search Commission?’, (2008) 93 Cornell Law Review 
1149, 1206–1209. 
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Also, Levine comments that ‘social networks are a critical layer of infrastructure 
for a wide variety of applications and content’ and ‘they are the 21st century version of 
AT&T, of RCA, of the Motion Picture Patents Company’.14 Thus, advocates of this 
opinion recognised these selection intermediaries as a kind of communication 
infrastructure delivering traffic to content providers.15 
With this perspective, scholars focus on what intermediaries can do. They are 
concerned about the power of these selection intermediaries to skew the viewpoints of 
people by discriminating against certain groups and favouring others.16 Content providers 
utterly depend on these intermediaries to choose what make visible or invisible in the 
public sphere. Therefore, according to the ‘conduit communication’ perspective, selection 
intermediaries should be prevented from exploiting their power to obstruct the expression 
of content providers.17 A simple analogy is that an ideal map of the network of 
information should be accuracy and objectivity. They should be regulated to effectively 
assist speakers in connecting to audiences.  
According to this perspective, to regulate selection intermediaries, non-
discriminatory principles of telecommunications law, such as common carrier roles of 
telephone and network neutrality, should extend to these intermediaries. Although the 
advocates of the ‘conduit communication’ perspective all agree that non-discriminatory 
principles should be applied, it is not clear how the operation of selection intermediaries 
is non-discriminatory. There are many opinions on the interpretation of non-
discriminatory principles to selection intermediaries. Some scholars argue that selection 
intermediaries should be treated similarly to telecommunications entities, that is, regarded 
as a common carrier carrying the speech of others on an objective basis.18  
                                                          
14 Jake Levine, ‘It’s Time for Social Network Neutrality’ (Business Insider, 18 July 2011) 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/its-time-for-a-social-network-neutrality-2011-7>. 
15 Adam Raff and Shivaun Raff, ‘Penalties, Self-Preferencing, and Panda’ (Foundem, 31 August 2011) < 
http://www.foundem.co.uk/Google_Conflict_of_Interest.pdf>. 
16 See Allan K. ‘17, ‘neutrality isn’t about objectivity’ (MITAdmissions, 20 May 2016) 
<http://mitadmissions.org/blogs/entry/neutrality-isnt-about-objectivity-its-about-who-has-the-power>; 
Benjamin Edelman, ‘Bias in Search Results?’, (2011) 7 The Indian Journal of Law and Technology 16, 32; 
BEUC, ‘Fair Internet Search’ (BEUC, 8 March 2013) 5 < http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2013-00211-
01-e.pdf >  
17 See Frank Pasquale, ‘Platform Neutrality’ (2016) 17 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 487. 
18 See Wei Gao and Yao Yang, ‘An updated common carrier approach to regulate platform service 
providers’ (2015) 31(3) Computer Law and Security Review 412; Jake Levine, ‘It’s Time for Social 
Network Neutrality’ (Business Insider, 18 July 2011) <http://www.businessinsider.com/its-time-for-a-
social-network-neutrality-2011-7>.  
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Nevertheless, the characteristics of selection intermediaries are distinguished 
from those of   telecommunication network providers. An Internet service provider is an 
indispensable tool to access information online so it cannot be replaced in any 
circumstance. It exists to connect users to the network and can treat everyone similarly 
on a non-discriminatory basis. With this role of an Internet service provider, it is 
reasonable to restrict the action of this service provider in order to encourage free speech 
of content providers to reach the audience. If the Internet service provider can block or 
choose which content can flow through its service, it will be harmful to diversity of 
content the audience is exposed to. This characteristic of telecommunication service 
provider is different from selection intermediaries. Selection intermediaries do not just 
facilitate accessibility to information available on the Internet. They also decide and select 
content providers to match users’ preferences. Due to its nature and purpose, selection 
intermediaries cannot provide equal access to everything on the Web. Because of its 
hierarchical structure, a selection intermediary has to list some content on the top of its 
page or result recommendation while some other content will have to be on the bottom or 
even on the next pages. Therefore, applying the objective role of telecommunication 
providers to selection intermediaries can be considered as an excessive restriction of these 
intermediaries.19  
The natural characteristic of selection intermediaries as delineated above is 
valuable for Internet users to find content in the vast online environment. Exposure 
diversity does not mean that people face overwhelming, chaotic, viewing choices; rather 
it means that people must have the ability to choose a diverse range of information. This 
ability is assisted by the operation of selection intermediaries. Therefore, the operation of 
selection intermediaries to select which content to be displayed does not always threaten 
exposure diversity; instead it can be an instrument to achieve the diversity goal. Forcing 
selection intermediaries to operate objectively as telecommunications entities may not be 
practical and may not have a positive effect on the encouragement of exposure diversity. 
By addressing these differences between selection intermediaries and broadband 
network providers, it is evident that the principles of non-discrimination applied to 
                                                          
19 See Dean Bubley, ‘So-called “Platform Neutrality” is nothing to do with Net Neutrality’ (Linkedin, 17 
July 2014) <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140717131104-610434-so-called-platform-neutrality-is-
nothing-to-do-with-net-neutrality>; Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, ‘French and German Ministers Should Not 
Confuse Platform Neutrality with Net Neutrality’ (CDT, 18 December 2014) <https://cdt.org/blog/french-
and-german-ministers-should-not-confuse-platform-neutrality-with-net-neutrality/>. 
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telecommunication network providers cannot be directly imposed on selection 
intermediaries; they can reasonably be applied to selection intermediaries to some extent. 
Some scholars suggest that certain aspects of the non-discrimination principles can be 
applied to selection intermediaries. Pasquale proposes that the universal service principle 
of net neutrality (which prevents Internet service providers to block legal content and 
applications) can be applied to selection intermediaries by prohibiting the ‘denial of 
access to copyrighted works once they are indexed’.20 Besides, he suggests that: 
‘search engines’ concern about the applications and content disadvantaged by 
carrier fast-tracking should lead them to provide annotation remedies to indexed sites 
whose marks have been unfairly occluded by the search process.’21 
Chandler also applies net neutrality on selection intermediaries by suggesting that 
‘search engines should not remove websites from their indices unless required by law to 
do so’.22 Besides, search engines should not manipulate individual search results except 
to address instances of suspected abuse of the system.23 Significantly, paid advertisements 
and organic search results have to be made distinctively. 
Pasquale and Chandler do not treat selection intermediaries to be as objective as 
telecommunications entities but apply some non-discriminatory principles i.e. net 
neutrality to harmonise with the nature of selection intermediaries. This way of 
interpreting net neutrality principles for selection intermediaries is practical and benefits 
exposure diversity. Imposing some degree of objectivity on selection intermediaries such 
as preventing unreasonable blocking will encourage accessibility to variety of content 
providers. As a result, exposure diversity is protected from unreasonable bias and from 
abusive manipulation of result recommendations by selection intermediaries. The 
application of ‘net neutrality’ to selection intermediaries will be further discussed in 
section 3. 
b. Selection Intermediaries are media entities with editorial control 
                                                          
20 Frank Pasquale, ‘Internet Nondiscrimination Principles’ (2008) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 
263, 289. 
21 Ibid, 299; See also Frank Pasquale, ‘Asterisk Revisited’, (2008) 3(1) Journal of Business and Technology 
Law 61. 
22 Jennifer Chandler, ‘A Right to Reach an Audience’ (2007) 35(3) Hofstra Law Review 1095, 1117. 
23 Ibid. 
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While the ‘conduit communicator’ perspective focuses on the influence of 
selection intermediaries, scholars of the ‘editorial perspective’ are concerned about the 
right of these intermediaries. Advocates of this ‘editorial perspective’ accept the 
subjective nature of selection intermediaries; they consider the provision of result 
recommendations as the opinion of these selection intermediaries.24 Instead of preferring 
non-discriminatory principles (i.e. net neutrality) like the ‘conduit communicator’ 
perspective does, the ‘editorial perspective’ embraces bias. As Eric Goldman presents:  
‘From my perspective, search engine bias is the unavoidable consequence of 
search engines exercising editorial control over their databases. … search engines simply 
cannot passively and neutrally redistribute third party content…’ and  
‘Search engine bias sounds scary, but . . . such bias is both necessary and 
desirable.’25 
Also, Tufekci comments that everyone should drop the pretence that selection 
intermediaries are neutral: ‘Facebook is biased. That’s true… That’s how its algorithm 
works, and how it determines what more than a billion people see every day’ and 
‘algorithms used in such subjective decision making can never be truly neutral, objective 
or scientific’. 26 
This ‘editorial perspective’ recognises that bias is a valuable and advantageous 
point of selection intermediaries. Grimmelmann states that people prefer to depend on 
editorial judgment when they use these services.27 Bias is inherent in these selection 
intermediaries: the process must systematically give priority to certain types of content 
over others. If these intermediaries do not exercise editorial control, their system will 
quickly and inevitably be anarchic and worthless to users.28 Thus, requiring selection 
                                                          
24 Marvin Ammori and Luke Pelican, ‘Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias’ (2012) 15 Journal 
of Internet Law 1. 
25 Eric Goldman, ‘Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism’ (2006) 8 Yale Journal 
of Law and Technology 111, 112, 118; See also Mike Masnick, ‘A Recommendation Is Not the Same as 
Corruption’ (Techdirt, 21 June 2010) <http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100621/0355239887.shtml>.; 
Christopher Yoo, ‘Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience’, (2010) 78 
George Washington Law Review 697, 708. 
26 Zeynep Tufekci, ‘The Real Bias Built in at Facebook’ (The New York Times, 19 May 2016) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/opinion/ the-real-bias-built-in-at-facebook.html>. 
27 James Grimmelmann, ‘Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality’, in Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus 
(eds) The Next Digital Decade (TechFreedom 2010) 435, 442-443. 
28 Jeffrey Jarosch, ‘Novel Neutrality Claims against Internet Platforms’ (2011) 59 Cleveland State Law 
Review 537, 585-587. 
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intermediaries to apply non-discrimination principles is both impossible and 
undesirable.29 
Besides, the speech of selection intermediaries is at the heart of the ‘editorial 
perspective’, not the accessibility of the public to content providers. Selection 
intermediaries are regarded as speakers themselves by analogy with media companies. 
As Volokh and Falk illustrate: 
‘… Search exercise editorial judgment about what constitutes useful information 
and convey that information—which is to say, they speak—to their users. In this respect, 
they are analogous to newspapers and book publishers that convey a wide range of 
information from news stories and selected columns by outside contributors ...’30 
Also, Bilton comments that: 
‘There’s also the question of how much responsibility Facebook has …. In that 
respect, the biases of human editors might be a feature, not a bug. News organizations 
regularly make similar editorial judgments. As Facebook becomes an increasingly central 
news source for its users, there’s a lot more pressure for it to act like a legitimate one.’31 
The scholars of this view illustrate that the process of providing result 
recommendations (which involves selecting and ranking results then choosing a short title 
and excerpt of referred pages) necessitates editorial judgement like newspapers’ 
judgement about which content is worth to run and where to place it within a newspaper. 
Though there are some differences, they all have the same core of editorial control 
function, which is the decision to exclude irrelevance out of thousands of possible items.32 
These selection intermediaries, therefore, should be protected by freedom of speech. They 
should be free to present any viewpoints and should not be forced to link to any content 
                                                          
29 Ibid, 443; see also Marvin Ammori, ‘Failed Analogies’ in Aitor Ortiz (ed.), Internet Competition and 
Regulation of Online Platforms (CPI 2016) 52. 
30 Eugene Volokh and Donald M. Falk, ‘Google First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search 
Results’ (2012) 8 Journal of Law Economic and Policy 883, 899. 
31 Ricardo Bilton, ‘Facebook’s trending stories leak shows that it isn’t too different from average news 
orgs’ (NiemanLab, 9 May 2016) <http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/05/facebooks-trending-stories-leak-
shows-that-it-isnt-too-different-from-average-news-orgs-flawed-human-a-little-biased/>. 
32 Eric Goldman, ‘Revisiting Search Engine Bias’, (2011) 38 William Mitchell Law Review 96, 106; Bruce 
Brown and Alan Davidson, ‘Is Google Like Gas or Like Steel?’ (The New York Times, 4 January 2013) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/opinion/is-google-like-gas-or-like-steel.html?_r=0>. 
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they do not wish to. Interferences from a government to impose an obligation like 
telecommunication sector would be undesirable.33  
The advocates of the ‘editorial perspective’ all agree that non-discriminatory 
principles (i.e. net neutrality) should not be applied to selection intermediaries. However, 
there are many opinions regarding the degree of interference by the government. Some 
scholars suggest that selection intermediaries should proceed without regulatory 
intervention, while others contend that selection intermediaries can and should be 
regulated.  
Goldman has been the most outspoken proponent of the view that selection 
intermediaries should be free from regulatory distortion. He suggests that free market and 
technological revolution are all that are necessary to limit an excess of bias.34 
Nevertheless, there is a flaw in this perspective. As discussed in Chapter 3, market power 
alone is not effective to protect and encourage media plurality and regulation is needed 
to achieve this goal. In addition, this opinion ignores the role of selection intermediaries 
in navigating the online information environment. The function of these intermediaries is 
not limited to selecting and excluding certain information like newspapers; it also extends 
to providing access to information. It is true that bias is unavoidable and necessary 
however it is not always desirable. Selection intermediaries’ bias will only be preferred 
if they provide what people seek with diverse perspectives, not any results which selection 
intermediaries prefer. Overlooking this fact and allowing selection intermediaries to 
exploit their freedom to restrict online accessibility would seriously harm exposure 
diversity. 
Some scholars accept that selection intermediaries can be regulated but leave open 
question as to what extent and how they should be regulated. 35 As discussed in Chapter 
2, although selection intermediaries can claim the protection of free speech, they can be 
restricted in order to protect democracy and free speech of people. It should be noted that 
                                                          
33 See Ryan Heath, ‘The Wrong Suspect’ (DISCO, 16 March 2015) <http://www.project-
disco.org/competition/031615-wrong-suspect-debate-platform-neutrality-finds-little-evidence-consumer-
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Competition and Regulation of Online Platforms (CPI 2016) 59. 
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35 See e.g. Marvin Ammori, ‘Failed Analogies’ in Aitor Ortiz (ed.), Internet Competition and Regulation 
of Online Platforms (CPI 2016) 52.; Andrea Renda, ‘Antitrust Regulation and the Neutrality Trap’ in 
Aitor Ortiz (ed.), Internet Competition and Regulation of Online Platforms (CPI 2016) 59. 
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the exercise of editorial control by traditional media also has legal responsibility. For 
instance, broadcasters cannot arbitrarily publish information they want or discard some 
content. They are under the principles such as impartiality, plurality and accuracy. If the 
operation of selection intermediaries is regarded as having editorial control like 
traditional media; selection intermediaries should have to perform tasks impartiality such 
as assisting an audience to connect to content providers instead of blocking users’ access 
to information. Imposing some degree of responsibility on selection intermediaries will 
encourage accessibility to variety of content providers. The application of impartiality on 
selection intermediaries will be further discussed in section 4. 
To summarise, both the ‘conduit communication’ perspective and the ‘editor 
perspective’ have some aspects that benefit the encouragement of exposure diversity. The 
‘conduit communication’ perspective prefers that the concept of net neutrality should be 
applied to selection intermediaries in some degree. The ‘editor perspective’ allows 
intermediaries to have bias as it is in the nature of their operation; however, selection 
intermediaries can be regulated in some extent for the benefits of society. As media 
entities, selection intermediaries should have an impartiality obligation. To encourage 
exposure diversity, net neutrality and impartiality should therefore be applied to selection 
intermediaries. The principles of net neutrality and impartiality will be discussed in the 
following section. 
3. Net neutrality and exposure diversity 
This section examines the concept of net neutrality. It also analyses the application 
of this concept on selection intermediaries in order to support exposure diversity. It will 
illustrate that net neutrality ensures diverse content to not be excluded or not to lose its 
opportunity to be exposed to people. Its limitation, however, is that it does not directly 
increase the amount of diverse viewpoints. 
a. The concept of net neutrality 
Net neutrality is a principle of non-discrimination for network operators that allow 
all types of content to be transmitted on the network with the same service quality. It 
ensures that Internet content providers are granted access to the Internet without favouring 
or prioritising some content at the expense of other content by network operators. This 
term was defined by Tim Wu in 2003: 
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‘Network neutrality is best defined as a network design principle. The idea is that 
a maximally useful public information network aspires to treat all content, sites, and 
platforms equally. This allows the network to carry every form of information and support 
every kind of application.’36 
Also, according to Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, the definition of net neutrality 
should be understood as: 
‘Providers of internet access services shall treat all traffic equally, when providing 
internet access services, without discrimination, restriction or interference, and 
irrespective of the sender and receiver, the content accessed or distributed, the 
applications or services used or provided, or the terminal equipment used’37 
Net neutrality is based on the foundational architecture of the Internet: the end to 
end principle. The end to end principle recommends that the network remains a ‘dumb 
pipe’ to simply route data traffic from one end-point to another.38 A network which 
follows this principle does not discriminate any data passing through it, irrespective of 
what kind of data is transmitted.  Each data flow must be treated equally and transported 
on a first-come-first-served basis.39 In other words, the action to tamper with data flow 
(either by blocking them altogether, prioritising some traffic over others, or degrading the 
quality of transmission) would be against the net neutrality principle. 
Although net neutrality is a fundamental principle of the Internet, its scope and 
details are not universally or definitely accepted. The topic of net neutrality covers a wide 
range of viewpoints. Also, there are debates among stakeholders and by no means in 
agreement with each other on many issues.40 For instance, in the US, the FCC in 2011 
established three basic open Internet rules which are: transparency, no blocking and no 
                                                          
36 Tim Wu, ‘Network neutrality FAQ’ <http://timwu.org/network_neutrality.htm>; See also Tim Wu, 
‘Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination’ (2003) 2(1) Journal on Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 141, 145.  
37 Articles3 (3) of the Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 laying down measures concerning open internet access.  
38 See Jerome Saltzer et al., ‘End-to-end arguments in system design’ (1984) 2(4) ACM Transactions on 
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39 Bill Herman and Minjeong Kim, ‘The Internet defends itself: the network neutrality debate on the web’ 
(2014) 30(1) The Information Society 31, 31. 
40 See Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law (3rd ed, OUP 2016) 26-36; Darren Read, ‘Net 
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Nico van Eijk, ‘Net neutrality and audiovisual services’ in Monroe E. Price et al. (eds.), Routledge 
Handbook of Media Law (Routledge 2013) 523. 
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unreasonable discrimination.41 However, in 2015, the FCC set out new four rules to 
protect net neutrality which are: no blocking, no throttling, no paid prioritisation, and no 
unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage standard for Internet conduct.42 
In Europe, the view taken by the CoE in 2010 suggests that ‘…exceptions to [net 
neutrality] should be considered with great circumspection and need to be justified by 
overriding public interests’.43 However, in the same year, Ofcom defined ‘the purest 
version of net neutrality’ as ‘there should be no prioritisation of any type of traffic by 
network operators’.44  
Moreover, increasing commercialization and technological developments have 
stirred up a heated debate among both the public and policymakers. In particular, there 
are claims that Internet traffic growth is unmanageable by routine network practices; 
therefore, traffic management and some prioritisation are required in order to provide 
adequate performance and reliability.45 For example, streaming video and voice calls 
require the transmission priority and minimal delays than the lower bandwidth services 
such as email. Accordingly, in 2015, the regulation concerning open Internet access 
allows reasonable traffic management measures and providers of electronic 
communications to differentiate their offered services which are optimised for a specific 
content.46 In contrast, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India ruled that Facebook's 
Free Basics (which provides people access to some Internet services on their mobile 
phones where Internet access is less affordable) are against net neutrality.47 
As previously delineated, the scope and details of net neutrality are complicated 
and controversial. For the purpose of this section, the notion of net neutrality as defined 
by Marsden will be used as the basis for discussion. He divides net neutrality into two 
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42 FCC, ‘Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order’ (FCC 15-24, 26 February 2015), 
284-285. 
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broad elements: positive net neutrality and negative net neutrality.48 The former refers to 
offering of faster access to consumers and guaranteed service, while the latter regards 
blocking, degrading or throttling of content beyond normal traffic management. 
Positive net neutrality relates to practices of network operators being allowed to 
charge higher prices for higher quality of service (QOS). The provision of an enhanced 
QOS should be offered on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to all customers. 
The positive net neutrality is regulated by many articles in the EU Directives and 
Regulation. For instance, reasonable traffic management must be non-discriminatory, 
proportionate, and not based on commercial considerations but on objectively different 
technical requirements.49 Also, the network operator has to apply equivalent conditions 
and provide services to other undertakings under the same conditions and quality as it 
provides for its own services, its subsidiaries or partners.50 The national regulatory 
authorities can impose obligations on the undertakings identified as having significant 
market power to not charge excessive prices.51 
Negative net neutrality concerns a user’s access to Internet content. It describes 
that Internet users should be provided with a minimum level of service which offers open 
Internet access. Network operators also cannot restrict the data flowing through their 
networks in a way that specific application is favoured. For example, the national 
regulatory authorities have to ensure that there is no distortion or restriction of 
competition in the transmission of content.52 Also, they have a duty to promote the ability 
of users to access, use and distribute any lawful content or services of their choice.53 In 
order to prevent degradation of service and slowing of traffic over networks, the national 
regulatory authorities can set minimum QOS requirements.54 
b. The application of net neutrality to selection intermediaries 
                                                          
48 Christopher Marsden, Net neutrality (Bloomsbury Academic 2010) 29. 
49 Articles3 of the Regulation (EU) 2015/2120  
50 Article 10 of the Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities (Access Directive). 
51 Article 17 of the Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive). 
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53 Article 8(4)(g) of the Framework Directive. 
54 Article 22(3) of the Universal Service Directive. 
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Selection intermediaries are gatekeepers and share common features with network 
operators. In order to guarantee exposure diversity, it is appropriate to consider the 
extension of net neutrality to selection intermediaries. It should be noted that the degree 
of neutrality required from selection intermediaries cannot be equal to that required from 
network operators: some necessary adjustments are needed. Based on the notion of net 
neutrality derived from Marsden as previously discussed, the following principles will be 
analysed: (i) no-blocking, (ii) reasonable management, and (iii) free access and no paid 
prioritisation. According to Marsden, ‘no-blocking’ and ‘reasonable management’ can be 
considered as negative net neutrality; while the last principle, ‘free access and no paid 
prioritisation’, is considered as positive net neutrality. By applying these three principles, 
selection intermediaries will provide accessibility to every form of information without 
unreasonable discrimination, restriction or interference. 
i. No-blocking 
The most obvious exposure diversity problem regarding selection 
intermediaries’ bias is censorship or blocking of access to particular content. This is 
because access to information is essential to break one’s personal filter bubble and to 
participate in other public spheres. The CoE underlines that filtering and de-indexation 
by search engines adversely risk reducing diversity of information.55 Also, the Steering 
Committee on Media and Information Society pointed out that search engines ‘should not 
conduct any ex-ante filtering or blocking activity unless mandated by a court order or by 
a competent authority’.56  This is similar to the threat of the ability of network operators 
to block certain speakers, e.g. competing services. This restriction of content access offers 
a serious challenge to net neutrality. 
In the context of selection intermediaries, the prohibition of blocking means that 
users should be able to access and distribute any lawful content in selection 
intermediaries’ platforms. Regarding the promotion of exposure diversity, the principle 
of no-blocking can be considered from two sides of the same coin: firstly, content 
providers are entitled to be integrated into the database of selection intermediaries; and 
secondly, end-users are entitled to access any links to a variety of content. 
                                                          
55 Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)3 on the protection of human rights with regard to search engines. 
56 CoE, ‘Explanatory Memorandum CM(2014)31 on CM/Rec(2014)6 on a guide to human rights for 
Internet users’ (CoE, 16 April 2014) para 51. 
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Regarding the first aspect of no-blocking, the links to the content must first be 
included into the database of selection intermediaries in order to be found online. For 
search engines, content providers must be crawled, indexed and included in search engine 
indices. For social media, it means that people as content providers can create an account 
and operate online activities (e.g. post, tweet, retweet, share or be shared) on the platform. 
Also, content providers should freely link content from elsewhere or have their own 
content linked on selection intermediaries’ platforms. Therefore, blocking is not only 
about censorship of certain site but includes obstruction of transmission of any social 
online activities. The owner of selection intermediaries should not claim the (business or 
property) right to deny these activities. 
As to the end-users’ aspect of no-blocking, audience may not be able to access 
to links even though it is stored in the databases of selection intermediaries. Thus, they 
should be entitled to access to any content available on selection intermediaries regardless 
of technical features or devices they used. This also includes the protection from 
temporary inaccessibility. It should be noted that due to the hierarchical structure of 
selection intermediaries, it would be impossible to force selection intermediaries to 
display every relevant result on the top result recommendations. Some content will have 
to be at the top of the list and others at the bottom. It is, therefore, essential to 
understanding that the application of net neutrality to selection intermediaries can never 
grant a right for content providers to claim their place on the first page of results. 
Although the Internet should be freely open, it is undeniable that some content 
have to be banished from online platforms. Selection intermediaries can prevent any 
abusive conducts on the system such as spamdexing, malware, search engine 
optimisation, or harmful sites. Besides, censorship of illegal content such as pornography, 
drug, copyright-infringing materials, and child abuse images is allowed.  
However, censorship or blocking of content must be based on legal obligation 
and specific published rules. It should not be arbitrary or subjective on a particular 
complaint. For example, there are complaints that Facebook censors pages reflecting a 
conservative point of view: Dunetz claims that Facebook’s operation does not post 
specific rules and is entirely subjective to particular employee who makes the 
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ruling.57 This way of blocking is not acceptable. Moreover, a legitimate blocking must 
contain a clear reason with a reference to specific regulation. In Facebook’s case, it 
provides ambiguous reasons for content removals such as: ‘we removed this from 
Facebook because it violates our Community Standards’58, ‘suspicious activity’59 and 
‘unsafe’. In comparison, Google search engine has posted a notice of a removed website 
with statements such as: ‘in response to a complaint we received under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, we have removed one result(s) from this page. If you wish, 
you may read the D.M.C.A. complaint for these removed results’.60 It is obvious that this 
practice of Google is more desirable to prevent unreasonable discrimination. 
ii. Reasonable management 
Apart from concerns over blocking, exposure diversity may also be harmed if 
content is degraded an opportunity to appear on a result recommendation or deprived of 
an opportunity to be on the top of a result recommendation. As the CoE noted with 
concern, search bias may adversely affect end-users by reducing the diversity of 
information source.61 This is similar to access tiering which refers to a practice of network 
operators differentiating levels of service quality so that certain packets receive 
preferential delivery over others. Therefore, the European Parliament comments that 
regulatory measures should be taken in order to safeguard the diversity of opinions if a 
platform provider exploits their position to favour or discriminate against particular 
content.62 
According to the principle of net neutrality, non-discrimination means the 
absence of an unreasonable discrimination in transmitting network traffic. In other words, 
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reasonable network management is permitted and should not constitute discrimination. 
By applying the principle of net neutrality to selection intermediaries, the key question is 
what can be considered as reasonable management.  
Regarding reasonable traffic management, Article 3 of the EU Regulation 
2015/2120 states that: 
‘Providers of internet access services shall treat all traffic equally, when 
providing internet access services, without discrimination, restriction or interference, and 
irrespective of the sender and receiver, the content accessed or distributed, the 
applications or services used or provided, or the terminal equipment used. 
The first subparagraph shall not prevent providers of internet access services 
from implementing reasonable traffic management measures. In order to be deemed to be 
reasonable, such measures shall be transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate, 
and shall not be based on commercial considerations but on objectively different technical 
quality of service requirements of specific categories of traffic. Such measures shall not 
monitor the specific content and shall not be maintained for longer than necessary.’ 
Reasonable management means that internet access providers cannot select 
which content and services are available, the so-called equal treatment. This does not 
mean that all users will experience exactly the same performance. The traffic is 
considered to be treated equally as long as any treatment of traffic is done independently 
of applications and users. For instance, there can be no prioritisation of traffic in the 
internet access service; equal treatment allows reasonable day-to-day traffic management 
according to objectively justified technical requirements; and must be independent of any 
commercial considerations.63 Under the Regulation, blocking, throttling and 
discrimination of internet traffic by internet service providers is not allowed in the EU. 
Practices which do not comply with these rules are not regarded as reasonable traffic 
management. 64 
A related doctrine is ‘due prominence’ in Ofcom’s code of practice on EPG. The 
code imposes that EPG providers ensure that their agreement with broadcasters is made 
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. EPG providers must ensure that viewers 
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are able to access all programmes and channels included in the EPG service on the same 
basis. They must also comply with an objectively justifiable method of allocating listings. 
They are prohibited from giving undue prominence in any listing or display to a channel 
to which they are connected, except where required in the light of the appropriate 
prominence provisions. Besides, they must refrain from imposing any condition in an 
agreement with a channel provider specifying exclusivity to one EPG for any service or 
feature. This can also be seen as a reasonable management. 
In regard to exposure diversity, discrimination should be considered as 
reasonable when it is beneficial for users to consume diverse content. Unreasonable 
discrimination can be an operation based on bias towards a political, financial or social 
benefit serving the interests of owners of selection intermediaries. For example, enlisting 
certain types of content systematically for normal operation of the service is legitimate. 
Also, favouring marginal viewpoints for the purpose of exposing diverse opinions to the 
audience can be justified. The guideline for the application of reasonable management is 
exemplified by the CoE’s recommendation: 
‘As an exemption to the network neutrality principle, preferential treatment of 
traffic … should be allowed only if sufficient safeguards for users’ ability to access, use 
and impart information are in place. In particular, preferential treatment of traffic should 
not diminish or affect the affordability, performance or quality of users’ access to the 
Internet. Internet users should have a real opportunity to choose an Internet connection 
without preferential treatment of traffic. They must also be informed about the impact 
that such treatment might have on their ability to access, use and impart information, 
diverse and pluralistic content that is publicly available…’65 
In contrast, providing result recommendations by favouring its affiliated content 
to appear on the top results or downgrading competitive content is an unreasonable 
discrimination. Manipulations of result recommendations to attract more clients for 
advertising or to obtain financial advantages from content providers are against the 
principle of net neutrality. Also, detriment of opposite or conflicting viewpoints by 
making them less appear to people’s attention is unacceptable. Notably, it does not mean 
that selection intermediaries cannot provide their favoured content in recommendation 
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results. It can do so as long as it does not harm the degree of diverse content exposed to 
people. Besides, this reasonable management principle can be effective by ensuring 
transparency of selection intermediaries’ operations i.e. by providing users with 
information about possible manipulations of result recommendations in order to ensure 
people that any manipulation is reasonable. As the CoE states that ‘…provide users with 
clear, complete and publicly available information with regard to any traffic management 
practices which might affect users’ access to and distribution of content…’.66 
 
iii. Free access and no paid prioritisation 
The final application of the principle of net neutrality on selection intermediaries 
is the operation of result recommendation with no charge. It means that, apart from 
advertising, content providers should not be charged for any process of providing normal 
result recommendation from selection intermediaries. Also, a charge to increase a chance 
of certain content to be placed on the top of result recommendation or to be exposed to 
people is unjustified. Price charging is prohibited if it is offered differently for specific 
content; and it is prohibited even in the case that selection intermediaries equally apply 
the charge to every content providers on the same rate.  
For example, Google’s search engines cannot charge any fee from a certain site 
for getting a higher chance of being visible (regarding search query) on the first page of 
organic search results.67 The editors of a (popular) page on Facebook should not be 
charged for using the space on Facebook platform, for appearing in other news feeds, or 
for being a suggested page in other function. Youtube should be restricted from charging 
specific types of content providers (e.g. popular user-generated content) for posting their 
clips or for their clips to be recommended. 
Around the end of 2017, Facebook made a major change in its News Feed. It now 
prioritises posts shared and discussed among friends and family over posts from 
publishers and brands.68 However, if publishers pay some money to Facebook, their posts 
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will still be prioritised to appear on the News Feed as normal. Instead of separating 
publishers’ posts from advertisements, Facebook allows content providers to pay some 
revenue for their content to be seen by the public. As a result of this conduct, paid media 
has the ability to reach greater audiences. This overhaul diminishes the chance of 
publishers’ content reaching people unless they spend more money to make sure people 
see their content. Consequently, while big media can gain significant traffic, smaller 
publishers are being undermined. Facebook announced that it made chance to its News 
Feed to ‘spark conversations and meaningful interactions between people’69 and want an 
easier way people to see posts from their friends and family. However, it is criticised that 
Facebook tried to increase its advertising revenue since the change does not affect paid 
promotions as they still appear on the news feed. 70  The policy of a platform to prioritise 
users’ posts over publishers’ or brands’ would not create a problem; however, increasing 
a chance of paid posts is certainly a type of paid prioritization. Thus, this conduct of 
Facebook should be hindered. 
Allowing charging differently for different services or charge a higher price for 
the higher QOS will cause harmful effects on exposure diversity. As the European 
Parliament states: in order to safeguard the diversity of opinions, ‘searching for and 
finding audiovisual content should not be determined by economic interests’.71 Price 
charging provides an unnecessary preference discrimination than already exists for 
wealthy speakers. It makes it easier for the big content providers to be exposed to the 
audience in comparison with the others. The result will be adversely similar to the use of 
popularity algorithms: where the winner takes it all and the others disappear from the 
attention of people. Giving a privilege to appear on the top search results for content 
providers who pay means a degradation of opportunity of those who do not pay for 
preferential treatment. Consequently, it will undermine the ability of people to participate 
as speakers which will greatly decreases the diversity of sources presented to people. 
Some may claim that selection intermediaries are justified in seeking fees because 
of the need for investment in technological innovation of platforms, then, it may be 
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necessary to reasonably discriminate among content providers and extract payment from 
them. However, fees for improved QOS should be collected from a product advertisement 
or sponsor, not from a content provider. Advertising on selection intermediaries should 
be permitted if the product advertisment is made seperately from content providers and 
appears in a clear and distinct manner for people to easily identify that such content is 
sponsored, e.g. advertising labels on Google’s paid search results. Prohibiting paid 
prioritisation is necessary to avoid potential bias in favour of rich speakers. 
In conclusion, exposure diversity can be guaranteed by applying the principle of 
net neutrality to selection intermediaries. Regarding the different nature of selection 
intermediaries and network operators, some adjustments of the principle are necessary. 
Selection intermediaries should have an obligation to operate neutrally: i.e. (i) not to block 
the transmission of content and social online activities, (ii) operate reasonable 
management to prevent commercial or other bias, and (iii) not to charge for the provision 
of content in normal result recommendations. It should be noted that net neutrality is not 
a panacea to solve every exposure diversity issues. Net neutrality has its limitation to only 
ensure that diverse content will not be excluded or deprived of the opportunity to be 
exposed to people. The principle of net neutrality does not directly impose an obligation 
on selection intermediaries to present diverse viewpoints, which is why it is necessary to 
consider the principle of impartiality in the following part. 
4. Due impartiality and exposure diversity 
Apart from net neutrality, impartiality can be considered as another principle to 
encourage exposure diversity. For people to consume diverse content, a variety of choices 
should be easily noticed in result recommendations. As previously criticised, the principle 
of net neutrality does not contribute to the promotion of diverse choices presented to 
people while the principle of impartiality can promote accessibility to sufﬁcient 
alternative information by presenting diverse viewpoints in result recommendation. This 
section, therefore, analyses the application of impartiality to selection intermediaries. 
a. The concept of due impartiality 
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The principle of impartiality lies at the heart of media and journalism practice72; 
however, its concept is complex, different to define and difficult to put into practice. The 
Ofcom Broadcasting Code provides the meaning of due impartiality that: 
‘ “Due” is an important qualification to the concept of impartiality. Impartiality 
itself means not favouring one side over another. “Due” means adequate or appropriate 
to the subject and nature of the programme. So “due impartiality” does not mean an equal 
division of time has to be given to every view, or that every argument and every facet of 
every argument has to be represented. The approach to due impartiality may vary 
according to the nature of the subject...’ 73 
Impartiality, therefore, is about providing a broad perspective and ensuring the 
existence of a range of views to be appropriately heard. It requires a journalist to actively 
seek out the evidence, to weigh up the material fact with a fair and open-mind, and to 
appropriately present the overall significance without preconceptions or bias.74 As Marsh 
states ‘impartiality…is more of a process than it is an outcome’ and ‘impartiality was 
achieved over time’.75 
Impartiality contains elements including: objectivity, balance, fairness, accuracy, 
and diversity. However, impartiality is not precisely the same as any of these elements. 
Impartiality is a term more often used in the UK whereas objectivity is a more common 
term in the US. Objectivity usually means an effort to exclude subjective judgement76 
and, thus, reporting as many as possible facts without interpreting the relationship of those 
facts or weighing the truth of found evidence. Therefore, objectivity implies passive 
journalists while impartiality involves an attempt to regard different ideas and opinions 
with evidence-based judgments. 
‘Fairness’, an element of impartiality, implies that all relevant arguments get a fair 
chance; while ‘balance’, another element of impartiality, implies allocation of equal space 
                                                          
72 It should be noted that impartiality is not a legal requirement for newspaper. The law only obliges 
broadcasting to be impartial (see Section 320 of CA 2003). 
73 Ofcom, ‘The Ofcom Broadcasting Code’ (Ofcom, April 2017) Section 5. 
74 Section 4: Impartiality, paras 4.2.2–4.2.4 of the BBC Editorial guidelines 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/impartiality/principles> 
75 Kevin Marsh, ‘Issue of impartiality in news and current affairs’ in Leon Barkho (ed.), From Theory to 
Practice (Intellect 2013) 211, 219, 221. 
76  David Cox, ‘Impartiality imperilled’ (Prospect, 30 September 2007) 
<http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/impartialityimperilled>. 
164 
to opposing views. However, impartiality is not just a simple matter of fairness and 
balance between every side of an argument.  Impartiality is not required in any simple 
mathematical sense of providing equal time to all viewpoints. A journalist should not 
unrealisticly balance between truth and untruth, or right and wrong. Giving airtime for 
unproven or scientifically unsupported claims to be exposed equally or more than those 
of the experts or academics is a misrepresentation of impartiality. Such a practice would 
also favour minority viewpoints with high emotion.77 
Media plurality co-exists with impartiality. This is because impartiality is about 
providing a breadth of views in order to reﬂect diversity and not restricting coverage to a 
narrow view of the world. As stated in the BBC Trust’s From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel 
report that impartiality is achieved by ‘bringing extra perspectives to bear, rather than 
limiting horizons or censoring opinion’.78 
Precisely, impartiality should be regarded as Marsh’s clearly defines: ‘…an 
aspiration rather than a measurable goal. That it is a collection of characteristics rather 
than a formal definition. And that it will change over time’.79  Consequently, regulators 
and practitioners have been developing various forms of the journalistic norm and 
professional editorial discipline in order to understand what impartiality could and should 
look like in practice. For example, impartiality never suggest reporters to have no 
opinions, though their main role is to present facts and arguments. They can express their 
personal view, but it should be based upon well-ascertained facts, and should not be 
coloured by their own political, religious, or social beliefs.80 Views and facts must be 
made clearly distinct and not be misrepresented. Besides, personal opinions must be 
presented with due weight over appropriate timeframes and alternative viewpoints must 
also be adequately represented.81 
In practice, many news organisations today avoid using negative language to label 
others from their own institutional viewpoint: such as ‘terrorist’, ‘ ‘Islamist, and 
‘martyr’.82 Instead, neutral terminology to describe the action itself is used: such as 
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‘suicide bombers’ and ‘hostage takers’. Recently, the increasing use of research data and 
statistics raises the problem for journalists of how their analyses and conclusions deriving 
from data are impartially presented. There are many suggestions such as: providing a link 
to the original source or reporting in ‘conversational tone’ or ‘plain-spoken way’.83 
Besides, Reuters has developed its own journalist’s standards of impartiality to apply in 
the social media world.84 To summarise, all these practices illustrate that a single 
definition of impartially cannot be derived; however, impartially is a matter of process or 
perspective to ensure the existence of a range of views without favouring one side over 
another. 
There are debates challenging the necessity of impartiality. In the UK, the 
principle of due impartiality has been under the debate whether to relax or abandon the 
impartiality framework. This is similar to the US as it is considering whether to abandon 
its broadcasting fairness doctrine. Notably, as the disciplines of objectivity break down, 
the consequences are not an increase but a diminution of diversity: 
‘When in 1987… Federal Communications Commission abolished the ‘Fairness 
Doctrine’, this certainly contributed to the process whereby talk radio became 
increasingly dominated by rabidly right-wing… paving the way for the blatantly biased 
Fox News… illiberal opinion is quite remarkably hegemonic, and majoritarian… liberal 
opinion finds itself not only woefully underrepresented…but routinely travestied, 
traduced and trashed.’85 
Among many debates about impartiality86, this thesis will illustrate two arguments 
which demonstrate that the principle of impartiality is now under pressure and even 
attacked in the digital age. The first argument is that transparency is a new form of 
impartiality by giving the audience a greater chance to check how stories are produced.87 
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As a result, it creates a reliable, trusted and credible news source in the digital age.88 
Consequently, transparency most certainly lifts the standard of impartiality. Although 
transparency is crucial, it ‘cannot, by itself, solve the problem of editorial integrity… 
[and] transparent journalists can be biased, inaccurate, or irresponsible’.89 Besides, 
shifting from impartiality to transparency is putting the burden of responsibility for 
seeking out alternatives away from the journalist to the audience. This is because 
transparency relies on the audience to actively engage rather than passively consume. 
Therefore, transparency does not reduce the importance of impartiality. 
The second argument is that impartiality was crucial in the past because of the 
scarcity and monopoly of media voices; however, it is not necessary for the digital age 
since the Internet offers even greater choice and diversity than before. The audience now 
does not rely on a single voice for news. This breadth of view that digital sources can 
provide leads to greater impartiality since there is a wide array of different views from all 
points of a debate.90 However, this claim can face a counterargument of the filter bubble 
phenomenon. The variety of views on the Internet is meaningless if people only consume 
a particular partisan media to support their views. Therefore, impartiality is still important 
because it is a means for people to consume diverse content in a single media source. In 
other words, impartiality can encourage exposure diversity in each media channel. As 
Sunderland states that ‘what has not changed is the desire of people to find reliable 
information without spin, in a concise and accessible form’.91 
To conclude, the principle of impartiality is even more important for the digital 
age as it a measure to break out of a filter bubble. By applying impartiality to selection 
intermediaries, people can be exposed to more diverse viewpoints. 
b. The application of due impartiality to selection intermediaries 
The impartiality principle could be applied to selection intermediaries to 
encourage exposure diversity. It would promote the presentation of diverse viewpoints in 
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result recommendations. There are two ways to support accessibility to alternative 
information: by providing diversity to be obviously noticed in result recommendations, 
and by preventing one side of views from overwhelming recommendation results. Since 
impartiality has various methods, this subsection will only provide three regulatory 
regimes as examples of the three specific cases which are: (i) reporting election and 
referendums, (ii) providing news and controversial issues, and (iii) accuracy and 
preventing fake news. 
i. Reporting election and referendums 
One of the most crucial aspects of an impartiality requirement is the coverage of 
election and referendums.92 The Broadcasting Code has detailed various rules on media 
entities to provide impartial output in election and referendum periods.93 For example, 
during the election or referendum period, due weight must be given to the coverage of 
larger parties or designated organisations. Also, broadcasters must consider giving 
appropriate coverage to other parties, independent candidates and other permitted 
participants with significant views and perspectives.94 All candidates (larger parties and 
independent candidates) must be offered the opportunity to take part in a report or 
discussion about their particular constituency or electoral area.95 
This is because media is a powerful means to influence the vote decision of 
people. Today, politicians exploit selection intermediaries the same way as traditional 
media to communicate with citizens.96 For instance, Obama used social media to advertise 
his campaign information during the US presidential election in 2008 and 2012. Also, in 
2016 US presidential election, Trump used Twitter to promote his policy to his supporters. 
Therefore, it is crucial for selection intermediaries to be impartial and to provide (with 
due weight and appropriate opportunity) diverse views of all participants to be exposed 
to people. 
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In 2016, there was a scandal on Facebook’s operation during the  US presidential 
election. Gizmodo alleged that Facebook’s ‘trending topics’ bar had been tweaked so that 
it did not include more conservative news. Facebook was biased against right-wing 
sources even though news stories of interest to conservative readers were organically 
trending among the site’s users.97 This suppression of conservative news on Facebook’s 
‘trending topics’ feature obviously had a negative effect on exposure diversity. It put one 
political viewpoint to the marginal and indirectly caused undue prominence of other 
views. Also, the personalisation by algorithms makes people see mostly their favourite 
candidate or campaign and ignore the opposite side. Consequently, selection 
intermediaries become the public platforms where exposure diversity to contrast political 
debates are difficult to achieve. 
Therefore, selection intermediaries should have a responsibility to be impartial 
during the election and referendum periods. They must provide appropriate opportunities 
for the reports and discussions of every candidate or campaign to obviously appear in 
result recommendations. For example, search engines should provide at least both sides 
of the coverage of large parties when people use normal terms related to the election or 
unspecific to a particular party in the search query; such as ‘US election’, ‘EU 
referendum’. This should also be applied to when people search for particular policy or 
event. When people search by including specific words such as ‘Trump’, ‘liberal’ and 
‘vote yes’, search results should also provide the opposite side of views alongside the 
original results. Also, when search results include an opinion or criticism from one view, 
the other standpoints should appropriately be displayed alongside the search result for 
comparison.  
For social media, although result recommendations are usually provided by others 
not the user’s search query, social media can provide diverse viewpoints during the 
election and referendum periods. For example, they can set algorithms or personalization 
to link various political opinions to appear in result recommendation more than usual 
although this content has a weak tie or is normally excluded from one’s screen. In case 
where people set a default to follow certain speakers, the opposite views should be 
provided alongside and should be obviously noticed. Besides, other functions of social 
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media which suggest other content should include diverse standpoints with due weight. 
Examples of how these technical functions of selection intermediaries could be 
implemented in practice are discussed in Part II regarding ‘diversity by design’. 
ii. Providing news and controversial issues 
Apart from reporting election and referendums, due impartiality must be 
preserved in case of news, major political and industrial controversy, and matters relating 
to current public policy.98 When dealing with these topics, media entities must ensure that 
any views expressed are speciﬁcally balanced by presenting opposite views.99 On the 
contrary, broadcasters are free not to comply with impartiality in an art programme or a 
review of a current exhibition of films.  
This aspect of impartiality in providing news and controversial issues can be 
applied to encourage exposure diversity. The problem of audience polarisation in news 
and controversial issues is one of the primary concerns of exposure diversity. Thus, 
selection intermediaries should have a responsibility to provide impartial result 
recommendations regarding news, major political and industrial controversy, and matters 
relating to current public policy. In other words, an appropriate range of significant views 
of these issues should be included and given due weight in result recommendations. For 
example, (similar to the application of impartiality in the case of reporting elections and 
referendums) search engines should provide an appropriate opportunity for the reports 
and discussions of both sides of the story to obviously appeared in result 
recommendations when people search for these topics. Also, when the recommendation 
of social media includes the opinion or argument related to these issues, the opposite side 
of views should be placed in a way that is appropriate for comparison. For instance, in 
2013, Facebook launched Related Articles to help people discover content beyond their 
political bubbles. After people read an article on controversial topics, Related Articles 
shown them a few other articles from different publishers about the same topic100. How 
the functions of selection intermediaries could be applied in practice will be further 
discussed in Part II regarding ‘diversity by design’. 
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Moreover, selection intermediaries should prevent one side of views from 
overwhelming in result recommendations, especially in the case of intentionally 
bombarding. In particular, BuzzFeed’s community is a social media platform which 
allows users to create and publish stories. A story published by users may be selected by 
an editor of BuzzFeed to present in home page alongside standard content. Since 
BuzzFeed has become a leading news source for the users, it can be abused. In 2013, an 
anti-abortion group used BuzzFeed’s platform to circulate controversial messages 
through social media. In response to a swelling number of community submissions, 
BuzzFeed issued new guidelines to stricter control user-generated content on its 
platform.101  
This case obviously illustrates that selection intermediaries (especially social 
media) can be exploited to promote one side’s views. When a certain story is increasingly 
repeatedly posted to a significant amount of time, it will marginalise other stories so that 
they disappear from the platform. Therefore, selection intermediaries should have a 
responsibility to ensure that their platform is not taken over by a partisan group. To 
prevent bombarding of one side of views, selection intermediaries could create algorithm 
to monitor an abnormal increase of repeated posts.102 When there is an alert of an 
abnormal increase of certain information, there are several measures that can be taken 
including notifying the audience of the situation, removing the overload information or 
blocking the person who create a bombard of such content. This is similar to impartiality 
requirements for broadcasters which prevents undue prominence of views and opinions 
of a particular person or body on controversial issues.103  
iii. Accuracy and preventing fake news 
The last significant requirement for impartiality illustrated here is media content 
being reported with accuracy. As mentioned above, impartiality is not a simple 
mathematical balance between truth and untruth or right and wrong. This is because false 
or incorrect information can cause people to misunderstand a story and can be regarded 
as favouring one side over another. Impartiality also prevents misrepresentation coloured 
by reporting own bias or belief: and it forces a journalist to investigate the truth and 
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present facts with evidence-based judgments. Therefore, where a news report is 
inaccurate, such news should be acknowledged and should be managed quickly and 
appropriately.104 Besides, views and facts must not be misrepresented.105 
Accuracy is related to exposure diversity. The conceptualizations of exposure 
diversity can be classified as ‘principled exposure’ and ‘unprincipled exposure’.106 
Principled exposure regards that some types of media content are more valuable than 
others in the advance of the public interest. For unprincipled exposure, the idea is that all 
content is neutral with none more valuable. This classification of exposure diversity leads 
to a discussion about whether there are wrong choices and whether there is a need to 
protect users against such wrong choices.107 By regarding the concept of due impartiality, 
exposure diversity does not mean all content should be treated equally (e.g. giving 
unproven or scientifically unsupported claims to be exposed equally to those of the 
experts is a misrepresentation of impartiality). The value of information is based on the 
credibility of well-ascertained fact regardless whether the content is professional or 
amateur, e.g. citizen journalist can provide evidence-based viewpoint or reliable 
information. This requires selection intermediaries to design their presentation of result 
recommendation by weighing up quality/credibility of the material fact according to the 
variety of the subject. It is critical to define whether some content is a more valuable 
choice than others; however, it is obvious that false information should not be treated or 
valued the same way as truth. In the environment of information abundance, people do 
not have the ability to distinguish between fact and fiction. If we allow false information 
to mix up with reliable information, it will degrade the exposure to quality content. 
Besides, incorrect information may adversely cause people to listen to only the big brand 
media companies and leave out marginal voices because they doubt the trustworthiness 
of the source. 
Nowadays, the world faced a serious threat of a spread of fake news on the 
Internet. For example, fake news about Donald Trump receiving an endorsement from 
Pope Francis was seen by potentially millions of people on Facebook during the final 
weeks of the US election in 2016. Without proper checks, Facebook leaves a foreign 
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power using fake accounts to push misinformation and political advertising in an attempt 
to influence the US election.108 Google’s search algorithm appeared to be systematically 
promoting false information with an extreme right-wing bias on controversial subjects 
such as climate change and homosexuality.109 Whereas this is not in the capability of an 
average person to deal with, selection intermediaries can and should be pitching in to 
assist people in discarding fake news. However, with the exception of Germany, the 
current legal liability does not impose any obligation on selection intermediaries in this 
case.110 
Therefore, selection intermediaries should have a responsibility to prevent fake 
news from mixing up in result recommendations. There are various measures that could 
be provided.111 For example, Facebook has announced options allowing users to flag fake 
news and providing a special label ‘disputed’.112 Also, Facebook will send potential fake 
stories to a partnership company who runs a fact-checking website in order to check the 
facts and provide a layer of verification on questionable sites.113 Google executives talked 
about creating a browser extension that works like a spell-checker but was a 
‘misinformation detector’114 and it will place a ‘Fact Check’ tag in its News results.115 To 
boost transparency and media literacy, Facebook launched its Journalism Project in 
January 2017 focusing on news literacy and combatting news hoaxes such as introducing 
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related links to provide additional perspectives for stories shared in the News Feed.116 
Lastly, Facebook, Google and Twitter have committed to use new ‘trust indicators’ which 
show an icon people can tap to learn more about the publications and journalists behind 
articles (e.g. ethics policy, funds, ownership structures and author histories).117 
In the UK, The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee recommends in an 
Interim Report on Fake News that ‘tech companies’ (social media and internet service 
providers such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google) should have a responsibility for 
misleading content on their sites and the Government should use the rules which set and 
enforce content standards for broadcasters (such as rules relating to accuracy and 
impartiality) as a basis for setting standards for online content. 118 In Germany, a new law 
was passed in October 2017 that promises to fine platforms up to 500,000 euros for each 
fake news story that it fails to immediately delete within 24 hours.119 However, there are 
questions on the effectiveness of these measures and there are concerns that certain fact-
checking approaches may reinforce existing beliefs causing partisan audiences.120 To 
identify precise mechanics in dealing with fake news, many issues (not only the problem 
of exposure diversity) have to be concerned. The issues that need to be considered are, 
for instance, what and when does legitimate commentary should be considered as fake 
news?; what is the impact of fake news and how fake news is perceived by people of 
different ages, social backgrounds and genders?; how citizen are aware of online 
disinformation and how do they deal with it?; are we overly concerned with fake news? 
All of these issues require knowledge from empirical research in multidisciplinary fields. 
Also, the business model of fake news and how fake news generates revenues have to be 
analysed. Lastly, recommended measures for fake news have to be balanced with freedom 
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of speech and democratic discourse. Due to the limit and scope of the thesis, the 
discussion in detail of what form should be properly taken to prevent fake news will not 
be provided here. One thing that is clear from the example mentioned above, selection 
intermediaries have the potential to deal with fake news and to encourage media literacy 
and exposure diversity by designing their technical structure in their platforms. 
 
In conclusion, selection intermediaries’ bias which has an influence on 
information accessibility has a significant effect on exposure diversity. To encourage 
exposure diversity, there should be an obligation imposed on selection intermediaries to 
prevent arbitrary or unreasonable manipulations of content. Since the characteristics of 
selection intermediaries are a combination of those of network providers and media 
companies, the principles of net neutrality and impartiality should be applied. Net 
neutrality supports exposure diversity by ensuring diverse content is not excluded or not 
to lose an opportunity to be exposed to people. Thus, selection intermediaries should have 
a responsibility to operate neutrally: i.e. (i) not to block the transmission of content and 
social online activities, (ii) operate reasonable management to prevent commercial or 
other bias, and (iii) not to charge for the provision of content in normal result 
recommendations. Also, impartiality encourages exposure diversity by promoting 
accessibility to sufﬁcient alternative information. It imposes an obligation on selection 
intermediaries to present diverse viewpoints in their result recommendations. This can be 
in the form of preventing one side of views from overwhelming result recommendations 
such as by dealing with bombarding of information and fake news. It can also be in the 
form of providing diversity to be obviously noticed in result recommendations such as 
during the period of an election and referendum, or on a controversial issue. The 
principles of net neutrality and impartiality can be supported by an implementation of the 
so-called ‘diversity by design’ for selection intermediaries to embed exposure diversity 
concerns into their algorithms, functions and screen features at the design stage. 
Therefore, ‘diversity by design’ is another measure to be imposed on selection 
intermediaries to achieved exposure diversity. The concept and possible implementation 
of ‘diversity by design’ will be analysed in the next part. 
 
Part II: Diversity by Design 
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The design of technical structures of selection intermediaries, i.e. algorithm, 
functions and screen features, influences how people can be exposed to information. Not 
only that a principle of law can encourage exposure diversity, technology can be a 
supplementary measure to help people to consume more diverse content. This Part, 
therefore, analyses the concept of ‘diversity by design’ as an obligation of selection 
intermediaries to design their technical structures to provide diverse content presented to 
audience. It starts with a discussion about the importance of technical structure of 
selection intermediaries on exposure diversity. The next section explores the idea that 
technology can assist the law to achieve a desirable goal. An example of law which use a 
design of technology to fulfil a legal objective, i.e. data protection by design, is discussed 
in the third section. Finally, the application of diversity by design to selection 
intermediaries is discussed in the last two sections.  
1. The influence of technical structure of selection intermediaries 
As discussed in Part I, exposure diversity can be adversely affected by the bias of 
selection intermediaries; one of the bias is the design of the technical structure of selection 
intermediaries. Digital technology increasingly controls the backbone of media and 
information systems. This control typically occurs deep within the software and technical 
automatic systems far from the awareness of people. These technologies routinely modify 
content presented to people by, for example, selecting what information can be trusted, 
computing what is trendy or popular, or calculating what one should know or may be 
interested in. Consequently, the technological architecture constitutes a set of constraints 
on what one can believe, as Steiner argues that: 
‘We are not always shaping the algorithms, they are shaping us. They shape our 
culture, they shape what we see, they shape what we hear, they shape how we live’121 
 The design of the technical structure of selection intermediaries may be invisible 
to people such as the algorithms underlying their service. For example, to serve what the 
majority is interested in, selection intermediaries often include popularity algorithms in 
their operation to give more weight to the information coming from popular websites. As 
a result, people tend to be exposed to popular voices while the marginal voices are forced 
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to disappear from the people’s attention.122 Personalisation algorithms select information 
based on what the users are interested in. The consequence is that recommendation results 
are different from person to person leading people to join groups conforming with their 
existing beliefs. Also, search results provided by search engines are remarkably 
influenced by link structure. As Hindman illustrates: ‘…the more [links] there are to a 
site, the more traffic [web] will receive. The pattern of links that lead to a site also largely 
determines its rank in search engine results’.123  
Furthermore, the technical structure of selection intermediaries can be visible such 
as functions and screen feature on the web pages of selection intermediaries. For example, 
the ‘Unfriend’ function on Facebook and ‘Unfollow’ function on Twitter enable people 
to view only like-minded opinions and to lock themselves into their own little world.124 
Consequently, the functions of social media may lead to fragmentation and polarisation 
of public opinion: it will cause people to discard other opinions that worth being 
considered.125 However, there are also functions in social media (such as ‘Suggest’) 
which can promote people to consume different viewpoints. Therefore, the influence of 
selection intermediaries over exposure diversity profoundly depends on how the technical 
structure is designed. 
This does not mean that the technical structure of selection intermediaries per se 
has an adverse impact on diversity of exposure. The mechanism of selection 
intermediaries can be exploited to restrict as well as to encourage diverse choices exposed 
to people. In other words, these technical structures can provide an opportunity for 
exposure diversity to be achieved. Legal provision is not the only strategy to solve 
exposure diversity problem: technology can be supporting instruments. Therefore, a 
comprehension of the functions and algorithms of selection intermediaries (and the effect 
they have on people’s behaviour) is a precondition for achieving exposure diversity. 
Impartiality of selection intermediaries (discussed in the previous Part) can be 
regarded to reduce bias on a platform by setting the default of the system in a way that 
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ensures an existence of different perspectives. At the same time, the design of 
technological architecture for the provision of a broad range of views can be seen as a 
concrete measure in applying impartiality. Therefore, selection intermediaries should be 
obliged to actively design their algorithms, functions and screen features of their web 
pages to facilitate people to consume more diverse choices. The idea of regulating 
technology to achieve the desirable goal will be discussed in the following section. 
2. The idea of using technology to achieve legal goals 
The acknowledgement that technology is not merely a tool but a necessary creation 
of social values has occurred among philosophers and sociologists since the mid-1990s.126 
Especially in the context of the Internet, it has become clear that the conventional law 
used to regulate the real world (constitutions and statutes) are inadequate to address new 
issues in the online world. Consequently, there is a growing interest in using technology 
as other forms of regulation.  As stated in Lessig’s book, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace: 
‘In cyberspace we must understand how code regulates—how the software and 
hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is. As Mitchell puts it, 
this code is cyberspace's “law.” Code is law.’ 127 
In a board sense, the term ‘code’ does not mean just program code and algorithms, 
but also the physical environments or the entire architectures which construct the Internet. 
These include the hardware, the wires, and the devices attached to wire or wireless 
Internet. However, in this thesis, code is only referred to software and algorithms whether 
it operates invisibly or creates function and screen feature of selection intermediaries. 
a. Code is law 
An influential critic of the regulation by technology is Reidenberg. He provides a 
counter-argument from the opinion that the Internet is free from regulatory intervention 
and regulator. From his view, although the new landscape of the Internet is unlike the 
                                                          
126 The study of Science, Technology and Society provides that the designs of technology are always embed 
certain values and that users construct the social meaning of technology over time.  See e.g. Jeffrey Rosen, 
The Naked Crowd (Random House Publishing Group 2004) 100 (‘Nearly all of these technologies can be 
designed in ways that strike better or worse balances between liberty and security’); Helen Nissenbaum, 
‘Accountability in a Computerized Society’ (1996) 2(1) Science and Engineering Ethics 25. 
127 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999) 6 (emphasis in original). 
178 
geography of the real world, this network architecture is created by human and thus in 
our control. Reidenberg suggests a new way of controlling the online environment by 
using network architecture: 
‘Network architecture also creates a significant type of border. System design 
imposes rules of order on an information society. Technical choices are policy decisions 
that have inherent consequences for network participants … Gateways between different 
systems or between a proprietary network like America OnLine and the Internet establish 
fundamental rules of conduct; without a gateway, interactions are effectively prohibited. 
In effect, technical standards exert substantial control over information flows. The degree 
of system interoperability thus determines the openness of the information society and 
determines whether network architectural “borders” can be crossed.’128 
 His concept is called Lex Informatica which refers to the regulation of Internet 
users by the imposition of law on the system or technological design choices.129 He, 
therefore, argues that the regulatory regimes should shift its focus from the direct 
interference by the government toward the control of technical standard and architecture. 
In other words, online activities of people can be indirectly manipulated by controlling 
the change of technological architecture. 
This idea has been further explained and developed by Lessig. From the 
traditional perspective of law, the only factor to protect social value is directly tied to 
legal regulation. From this perspective, the protection of social value is simply considered 
by the creation and change of legal code. From Lessig’s view, however, regulation comes 
not just from laws, but also from norms, from the market, and from the architecture of the 
world.130 These four modalities of regulation are distinct but are in common to constrain 
people’s behaviour. Laws control the activities of individuals by making certain activities 
illegal and addressing punishments.  Markets constrain the choice of actions people have 
through price and price-related signals. Norms make certain behaviours being subject to 
social sanctions such as criticism and ostracism. Finally, architecture constrains 
behaviour by creating physical structures as an obstacle. For example, gravity is a natural 
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architecture in the real world which forbid humans from flying. Also, locked doors, wall 
and parking bollards are man-made architectures to prevent the thieves. 
Lessig demonstrates that code is like physical architecture. On the Internet, it 
regulates online behaviour similarly to the way that physical architecture regulates 
behaviour in the real world. Code is an important regulator on the Internet because code 
designs what and how the Internet is built. In other words, the Internet simply would not 
exist without this code. Therefore, code can constrain the behaviour of people on the 
Internet as effectively as the law can.131 By quoting the word ‘code is law’, Lessig 
provides the idea that code does the work of law but in an architectural way. 
For example, when the Internet was first deployed, its architecture produced 
relative anonymity for Internet users which means that the basic protocols protect the user 
from inadvertently revealing their information. This can be considered as the protection 
of privacy. However, the development of ‘cookies’ technology enables a web server and 
the government to monitor or track individual behaviours. Therefore, the privacy of 
individuals on the Internet decreased due to a change of technology, not from law. 
Furthermore, the protection of intellectual property is determined not just by intellectual 
property law but also by using code such as digital rights management (DRM).132 
Like Reidenberg, Lessig emphasises the capability of technology as the most 
obvious development in the Internet regulation. Policy makers cannot rely on law alone. 
Instead, they require a consideration of the interaction between law and technology. As 
Lessig says: ‘code will present the greatest threat to both liberal and libertarian ideals, as 
well as their greatest promise. We can build, or architect, cyberspace to protect values 
that we believe are fundamental. Or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to 
allow those values to disappear’.133 
Edwards agrees with Lessig and further interprets this idea that code is superior 
to the law as a means of effective regulation, as she said: ‘code (often, though not always) 
trumps law’.134 Edwards argues that code is more effective at achieving the aim of the 
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regulation in whatever problems the laws attempt to regulate. For instance, in the case of 
copyright protection, DRM can effectively prevent the copyright infringement while the 
law has been almost completely ineffective in preventing digital copying. Although there 
will be the development of code to circumvent DRM, a new code will be presented and 
adopted in practice. This is similar to the case of preventing spam. Whereas there are 
many laws both EU Directives and national regulations for data protection and spam 
control, none of these laws has had a meaningful effect on preventing spam without the 
help of spam filter technology. In contrast, the anti-spam code alone can decrease the flow 
and dissemination of spam email.135 
b. Code and law 
Code alone, however, is not sufficient to achieve exposure diversity. This is due 
to the incentive for the development of code depends on the commercial interest of 
selection intermediaries, not social value. The market inevitably plays a role here as well, 
whether it is: the motivation to support their affiliated entities and defeat competitors, or 
the burden of extra cost to bear, or the preference of users to consume content. All of 
these factors may not always harmonise with (and usually conflict with) the promotion of 
exposure diversity. Accordingly, legal force should assist in shaping the direction of 
technology development into the way towards the exposure diversity goal. 
If lawmakers can regulate code and code can regulate individuals’ behaviour, then 
this logical conclusion provides us with an effective way to shape the conduct of 
individuals. Therefore, an understanding of the interaction between law and technological 
structures is essential if regulations tend to have the achievement of exposure diversity. 
The effective encouragement for exposure diversity depends upon the sum of the 
protections from both law and technology. Likewise, the negative change in the provision 
of diverse content depends upon both the changes in law and the changes in technology. 
 
3. Example of technology design in privacy law: ‘data protection by design’ 
The regulation of technological structure to achieve a desirable outcome has been 
implemented in other areas of law. One of the current debates is in privacy law, the 
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concept of ‘data protection by design’. This section, therefore, discusses data protection 
by design as an example of how policymakers embed technological design in legal 
regulation. 
a. The concept of privacy by design 
Privacy by design is the focus on the privacy implications of new technologies at 
the design stage. The idea of this approach is simple: ‘embed privacy within a 
technological system as an integral part of the design, and do so ex ante and throughout 
the technological lifecycle, rather than try to fix it ex post, when it is often too late and 
expensive’.136 It argues that effective protection of online privacy cannot be achieved by 
legal frameworks alone; it also needs to be secured through technological means. It 
suggests a paradigm shift with respect to taking privacy seriously as a requirement in the 
design of the Internet. Privacy by design insists that privacy is to be considered as a 
threshold system requirement and should not be traded-off without significant 
consideration. Therefore, privacy by design is the approach which moves from a reactive 
remedy to a proactive role of selection intermediaries (default setting). In other words, 
websites’ owners have the legal duty to design their web pages with respect to the privacy 
of users. 
The concept of ‘privacy by design’ was coined by Cavoukian, IPC for Ontario. It 
is derived from the concept of ‘privacy enhancing technologies’ (PETs) 137 which was 
first used in the report ‘Privacy-enhancing technologies’ in 1995.138 This report was the 
result of a joint project set up by the IPC of Ontario, Canada and the Dutch data protection 
authority. The report explored a new approach to privacy protection and placed much 
emphasis on the approach to treat PETs as a policy tool, rather than just a technological 
one. As Cavoukian suggests: 
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‘…[T]he future of privacy cannot be assured solely by compliance with regulatory 
frameworks; rather, privacy assurance must ideally become an organisation’s default 
mode of operation…’139 
 Accordingly, privacy by design deserved some more occasional discussion by 
policymakers. For instance, in 2010, the International Conference of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) in Jerusalem adopted a resolution that recognised 
privacy by design as an essential component of the fundamental privacy protection.140 It 
also encouraged the adoption of the foundational principles of privacy by design which 
is proposed by Cavoukian141 as the guidance for an organisation's default mode of 
operation. Furthermore, the ICDPPC encouraged national authorities to promote privacy 
by design in their jurisdictions. 
In the EU, privacy by design has developed from rather an abstract idea or a 
standard practice to a binding legal requirement.142 The first, but not yet classified as 
privacy by design, is Article 17 of the Directive 95/46/EC which lays down the data 
controllers' obligation to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures.143 
Besides, Recital 46 calls for such measures to be taken both at the time of the design 
processing system and at the time of the processing itself.144 Whereas the above 
provisions of the Directive are helpful towards the promotion of privacy by design, these 
provisions are not sufficient in ensuring that privacy is embedded in technological design 
in practice. Users are also not in a position to take relevant security measures by 
themselves in order to protect their own or other persons’ personal data.145 
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Following the 2009 European Consultation, the European Parliament published a 
comprehensive proposal to replace the 1995 Directive with GDPR. Article 25 of the 
GDPR has entitled ‘Data protection by design and by default’ and reads as follows: 
‘1. … the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for 
processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement 
data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to 
integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements 
of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.  
2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each 
specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount 
of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and 
their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data 
are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of 
natural persons.’146 
Article 25 of the GDPR obliges technology designers and data controllers to take 
technological data protection into account at the planning stage of information procedures 
and systems. It requires that the protection of personal information should not only 
maintain security but also should be default settings and automatically enforce as much 
as possible in a way to avoid or minimise the amount of personal data processed. 
Providers of services also have to demonstrate that they have taken all measures required 
to comply with the requirements in the GDPR. Overall, the new legal framework suggests 
the addition of several dimensions from the Directive 95/46/EC; such as time, scope, 
subject matter, and substantive principles. For example, it provides that the technological 
measures should be applied at the initial design and throughout the lifecycle of the 
processing. 
b. The 7 foundational principles of data protection by design 
Article 25 of the GDPR proposes a broad and open standard rather than a precise 
rule. This concept could be about designing a broad range of things and could make it 
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difficult to establish a common and sufficiently concrete design methodology. 
Nevertheless, Cavoukian has provided the seven foundational principles as a guideline 
and framework to accomplish data protection by design objectives.147 In many articles of 
the GDPR, the seven foundational principles appear as required measures for service 
providers to comply with. Also, the principles are becoming a reference for the 
application of diversity by design in practice and for policymakers to develop guideline. 
This subsection, therefore, will discuss these principles since it will be used as a basis for 
the implementation of diversity by design in the next section. 
The first principle is ‘proactive not reactive’. This principle aims to prevent 
privacy invasive events before they happen. Data protection by design does not wait for 
privacy risks to materialise and only offer remedies for resolving privacy infractions. For 
example, the GDPR has provisions which require data controllers to develop adequate 
measures to assess risks which may occur in their processing activities.148 In other words, 
the organisation should avoid acting exclusively with a remedial approach. The second 
principle, ‘privacy as the default setting’, requires an organisation to consider how to 
make privacy the default into the systems. If an individual does nothing, their privacy still 
remains intact. No action is required on the part of the individual to protect their 
privacy.149 These measures are such as a purpose specification, collection limitation and 
data minimization. The third principle is ‘privacy embedded into design’. It emphasises 
that privacy should be considered at the earliest of brainstorming stages. Privacy 
protection should be embedded in the architecture of systems, operations, and business 
processes without lessening functionality for users.150 It is not bolted on as an add-on after 
the fact. The result is that privacy becomes an essential component of the core 
functionality being delivered. Privacy is integral to the system without diminishing 
functionality. 
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The next two principles are ‘full functionality—positive-sum, not zero-sum’ and 
‘full lifecycle protection’. The principle of ‘full functionality’ expresses that the privacy 
design of information systems should not be introduced at the expense of system 
functionality. It is possible to have privacy and security and both privacy and 
functionality. This principle avoids the idea that privacy protection necessarily will affect 
other interests negatively.151 The ‘full lifecycle protection’ principle ensures that privacy 
by design has been embedded into the system prior to the first step of information being 
collected and has been extended throughout the entire lifecycle of the data involved.152 In 
other words, privacy must be continuously protected across the entire domain and it 
should be no gaps between protection and accountability of relevant providers. 
The last two principles are ‘visibility and transparency’ and ‘respect for user 
privacy’. The principle of ‘visibility and transparency’ expresses the great value of 
openness; in particular, the access to intelligible information regarding the processing of 
personal data. The principle seeks to assure that all stakeholders operate according to the 
stated promises and objectives and are subject to independent verification.153 The 
principle put users in a notice of the information they are collected and processed. The 
last principle, ‘respect for user privacy’, maintains users’ privacy interests as the 
paramount. It requires architects and operators to keep the interests of the individual 
uppermost by offering measures such as strong privacy defaults, appropriate notice, and 
empowering user-friendly options. This principle refers to the ambition of creating an 
information system that empowers the user and generally supports the goal of maintaining 
his or her privacy. 
 
c. The impact of data protection by design 
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Data protection by design also faces criticism. It has been criticised for being 
vague and leaving many open questions about their application in engineering systems.154 
While lawyers and engineers may agree that privacy should be designed into new 
systems, there is little agreement as to what privacy means. The GDPR does not detail 
the meaning of data protection by design nor of privacy by default: it also does not provide 
the application in terms of corresponding privacy-preserving technical or other categories 
of solutions. Furthermore, even if Cavoukian’s seven principles present important 
elements and guidelines regarding privacy by design, they are inadequate in explanations 
of how the concept can be practically implemented into engineering practices. 
Consequently, data controllers have little clues about how they should design their 
technology in relation to privacy.   
Data protection by design, therefore, requires speciﬁcation which can be done 
through delegated acts and technical standards adopted by the European Commission. In 
particular, the Art.29WP opinions and the European Data Protection Broad will produce 
detailed opinions which offer more guidance. As the Art.29WP has stated that ‘guidance 
issued by the [European Data Protection Board] (EDPB) may be useful’.155 
However, it can be argued that the legislation of data protection by design has 
been posed as an abstract notion of technical strategy and in a technical neutral way 
because it is intentionally designed as an umbrella term for processing personal data so 
that the legislation remains relevant in the face of technical development.156 Besides, it 
should be concerned that the provision of speciﬁc requirements on how technology should 
be designed has potential risks on disrupting technological innovation.   
In practice, there are also numerous examples of feasible and successful 
applications of data protection by design.157 For example, Smart Grid is an energy meter 
which affects energy savings but has negative implications for information collected. 
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With the Ontario Smart Grid project which implements the system to include the principle 
of privacy by design (proposed by Cavoukian), the Smart Grid can operate without 
necessarily revealing detailed individual meter readings.158 Consequently, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology has recommended the privacy by design as an 
appropriate methodology in the Smart Grid. Another example, Arizona State University 
cooperates with an expert in the mobile industry to develop privacy by design roadmap 
on mobile technologies. The roadmap identifies key responsibilities across various 
stakeholders in a wide industry ecosystem; including the Device Manufacturers, 
OS/Platform Developers, and the Application Developers.159 Also, IBM develops a 
privacy-protecting RFID tag, known as the ‘clipped tag’, for the retail sector. This 
development transforms the long-range tag into a short-range tag. The consumer may tear 
off a portion of the tag and the tag may still be used at a later time for return, recall, or 
experience a product warranty.160 Lastly, by implementing the seven foundational 
principles, Ontario’s Lottery and Gaming Corporation is able to assure the privacy of 
millions of non-enrolled gamblers while allows for detect, identify and flag problem 
gamblers by using Biometric Encryption (for separating the facial recognition functions 
from the identification processes directly in the hardware, network and software).161 
Moreover, policymakers, scholars and private sectors now have developed the 
guidance based on Cavoukian’s foundational principles to implement data protection by 
design in each specific sector. For example, the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) proposes privacy by design strategies in the different 
phases of the big data value chain and provides the specifically identified privacy 
enhancing technologies for the current and future big data landscape.162 Laakkonen and 
his colleagues develop an approach that incorporates privacy by design principles to 
assess privacy risks during the digital game platforms development.163 Besides, Perera 
proposes a set of privacy by design framework to guide software engineers in the 
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systematic assessment of the privacy capabilities and existing gaps in Internet of Things 
applications and platforms.164 
In conclusion, all of these examples illustrate that law can embed technological 
design to achieve the desirable outcome. Although the obligation to design technology to 
assist legal instruments may leave many open questions regarding practical application, 
the relevant stakeholders will eventually develop technical standards for the specification 
of practical implication. This is an interaction between legal force and technology 
development. 
4. The application of diversity by design 
As discussed in the above sections, technology can assist legal regulation to achieve 
a desirable goal. This section, then, explores the application of diversity by design to 
encourage exposure diversity; it is divided into two subsections. By borrowing the 
principles from data protection by design, the first subsection examines the character of 
diversity by design as a fundamental framework for a new regulatory regime. It should 
be noted that this thesis does not provide a specific obligation of how technology should 
be particularly designed since selection intermediaries are various and the operation of 
the algorithmic system is complicated. Besides, a provision of speciﬁc requirements can 
intervene the innovation of technology. Therefore, the final subsection demonstrates 
examples of how selection intermediaries could possibly be designed to contribute to the 
promotion of exposure diversity. These examples are based on the classification of the 
exposure diversity concept discussed in Chapter 2: i.e. discovering the difference, 
exposing to diverse media outlets/speakers, facilitating comparison, and promoting 
serendipity. 
a. The 7 foundational principles of diversity by design 
By borrowing the 7 foundational principles of data protection by design created 
by Cavoukian, the framework of diversity by design can be considered as the following:  
First, ‘proactive not reactive’, this principle requires selection intermediaries to 
provide proactive measures to promote exposure diversity rather than reactive measures 
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to remedy after filter bubble occurs. Selection intermediaries should actively develop 
their technical structure to assist diverse content presented to audience. They should also 
prevent one side of views from overwhelmingly appears in individuals’ result 
recommendations. For example, Facebook should actively present different point of 
views in the US election or UK referendum instead of waiting for complaints about its 
blocking or censoring one side of opinions and then resolving the problems once they 
have occurred. Also, selection intermediaries should create algorithms to monitor an 
abnormal increase of repeated posts to prevent bombarding of partisan opinions or fake 
news. Therefore, selection intermediaries have to ensure that their organisation’s policies 
and concrete actions have reflected a commitment to diversity by design. This principle 
can also be done by developing a regulatory system to monitor the risks of filter bubbles 
and to correct any negative impacts before they occur. Particularly, the provision of 
diversity impact assessment is a process which can assist selection intermediaries in 
identifying and minimizing the risks on exposure diversity when a new system or 
initiative interface is introduced. 
Second, ‘diversity by default’, one of the most effective yet most challenging 
methods of promoting exposure diversity is to ensure that the default settings of selection 
intermediaries (the settings that apply when the user is not required to take any action) 
are as diversity-supportive as possible. Diversity by default seeks to provide exposure 
diversity assurance by ensuring that diverse content is automatically presented in the 
screen features of selection intermediaries: it should present the topic a user is interested 
as well as suggest contributions from a different perspective. For instance, selection 
intermediaries may develop their personalization algorithms that present news from both 
Democrat and Republican sources rather than merely encourage comments among the 
like-minded. Search engines may design their algorithms and screen features to 
automatically provide search results in a form of clusters displaying controversial 
opinions to facilitate comparison. Diversity by default requires selection intermediaries 
to consider how to make exposure diversity to be automatically protected in any process, 
settings or business practices. In other words, diverse content is presented to users even 
if the individuals do nothing to adjust the settings of selection intermediaries since it 
should be built into the system by default.  
The third principle is ‘diversity embedded into design’. This principle emphasises 
that exposure diversity should be considered at the earliest of brainstorming stages. The 
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starting point for designing the system of selection intermediaries must always be 
maximally diversity-enhancing. Precisely, programmers should pay particular attention 
to the potential risk of filter bubble when designing algorithms of selection 
intermediaries. Practitioners should embed the encouragement of providing different 
viewpoints in the process of creating systems, operations, and business processes. For 
example, when presenting search results, search engines could design their presentation 
of search results to display, close to the normal results, links to other content that relate 
or contradict to the normal results (e.g. Google’s Top Stories and Related Picks 
functions165). Functions and widgets of social media may be created regarding the notion 
of serendipity to display content which users have never seen or at random. As a result, 
exposure diversity is integral to the design and architecture of selection intermediaries 
and becomes an essential component of the core operation of selection intermediaries. 
The fourth principle is ‘full functionality: positive-sum’. The full functionality 
principle rejects the zero-sum view that exposure diversity must always compete with 
other legitimate interests such as the right of selection intermediaries, corporate’s 
business interests, system efficiency and technological innovation. In contrast, diversity 
by design acknowledges that divergent interests must co-exist, and exposure diversity can 
be achieved without the expense of other functionalities that we value. The provision of 
diverse content does not conflict with business interest of selection intermediaries. This 
can be seen in the case of BBC which is a public broadcasting service serving media 
plurality and at the same time being the leading broadcasting (have largest market share) 
in the UK. Although people tends to prefer opinions which support their views, they are 
also interested in seeking out the differences, especially when the topic is a major event 
which has controversial issues or in the election periods.166 Therefore, the provision of 
exposure diversity by selection intermediaries does not make users leave their platforms. 
In contrast, selection intermediaries which promote exposure diversity will attach people 
who search for various views. Besides, the full functionality principle includes 
considering the interests of relevant parties such as business entities, users and technical 
                                                          
165 See Section 4.b ‘exposure to diverse media outlets/speakers’ of this Part. 
166 Seth Flaxman et al., ‘Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news consumption’ (2016) 80 POQ 298;  
Kyle Heatherly et al., ‘Filtering out the other side?’ (2017) 19(8) NMC 1271; Q. Vera Liao and Wai-Tat 
Fu, 'Beyond the Filter Bubble: Interactive Effects of Perceived Threat and Topic Involvement on Selective 
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expertise. The practical standard and guidelines of diversity by design, thus, should be 
created by conducting consultation with these people. 
 The fifth principle is ‘full system protection’. It means that exposure diversity 
should be ensured since the first element of the system and should be continuously 
concerned across the entire operation of selection intermediaries. Particularly, exposure 
diversity must be concerned in the process of data collection, distinguishing opinions and 
visualising content. The protection of exposure diversity includes the design of algorithms 
regarding data selection and prioritization, customization and channeling, and 
personalization. In other words, diversity by design must be embedded into algorithms, 
functions, screen features and the entire process of presenting recommendation results.  
The sixth principle is ‘visibility and transparency’. The principle assures that 
selection intermediaries make information about their operation relating to the processes 
of providing recommendation results readily available to regulators and all individuals. 
This is because transparency is essential to establish accountability and trust. Visibility 
and transparency can be created by the specific provision in the regulatory system. 
Precisely, to ensure that selection intermediaries operate according to the stated promises 
and objectives of diversity by design, they should be subject to independent verification. 
For example, selection intermediaries should be imposed an obligation to report 
supervisory regulators when selection intermediaries intend to adopt a new operation or 
change their systems. The power of the regulators to assess diversity risk by requesting 
all necessary information and conducting inspections of business is also subject to this 
principle. The discussion about a regulatory system regarding this principle will be 
provided in the next section.  
The last principle, ‘respect diversity from user’s perspective’, requires the 
operators of selection intermediaries to keep the interests of the individual as the 
paramount. At its core, the provision of diverse recommendation results should be 
appropriately designed around the needs of the individuals for self-improvement, not to 
satisfy the preference of agreeable content. This principle can be interpreted that selection 
intermediaries use their best capacity to serve the interests of the individuals regarding 
exposure diversity. For instance, selection intermediaries which hold considerable power 
to influence people’s views should comply with a higher standard than a small platform 
to implement diversity by design. The higher standard can be in the form of using a higher 
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technology in their design of service or providing a number of functions, algorithms or 
screen features supporting exposure diversity. If powerful selection intermediaries with 
the capacity to lift the standard of diversity by design merely comply with an average 
standard set for every selection intermediaries, the interests of individuals regarding 
exposure diversity will be loosened. This principle is ambitious of making selection 
intermediaries to empower users to be a well-informed citizen and active audience.  
To summarise, diversity by design is a systematic approach whereby exposure 
diversity is embedded into the underlying technology or the entire architecture of 
selection intermediaries, from the very early design stage rather than being bolted on 
afterwards or ignored. By implementing exposure diversity at the design stage, selection 
intermediaries have a legal duty to design their services to contribute to the promotion of 
exposure diversity. Then, it raises a crucial question on how the concept can be 
pragmatically implemented into technical engineering. Similar to privacy by design, 
selection intermediaries may have little clue of the application of diversity by design. The 
following subsection, therefore, illustrates the example of how the technical structure of 
selection intermediaries can be designed to achieve exposure diversity. 
b. Examples of the application of diversity by design 
This subsection examines the examples of the application of diversity by design 
on selection intermediaries. Since the concept of exposure diversity has various aspects, 
it leaves many open questions about what can be the grounds for designing in diversity. 
The classification of the exposure diversity concept discussed in Chapter 2 will be used 
as a basis. As discussed in Chapter 2, exposure diversity is not seen as valuable in itself 
but it is regarded as a means to achieve different media policy objectives (the focus here 
is on ‘enlighten people’ and ‘contribute to democratic debate’).167 To achieve these 
objectives, exposure diversity can be classified into the forms of: (i) discovering the 
difference, (ii) exposing to diverse media outlets/speakers, (iii) facilitating comparison, 
and (iv) promoting serendipity. Looking at the diversity by design principles and taking 
this classification as a starting point, the studies from other academic fields will be 
provided to demonstrate how selection intermediaries could possibly be designed to 
                                                          
167 See Part I.2b Classification of exposure diversity, p.47-48. 
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promote exposure diversity. The examples of the implementation of diversity by design 
on selection intermediaries can be created as the following: 
i. Discovering the difference 
Discovering the difference is commonly seen as a fruitful and necessary condition 
for people to discover the truth and set their personal values and beliefs.168 According to 
Mill, the truth emerges from the debate between different viewpoints.169 This idea stresses 
that the possession of various information is a prerequisite for eliminating misconceptions 
of fact and evaluating different viewpoints to reach the truth. Also, exposure of 
individuals to diverse and antagonistic viewpoints is a fundamental requirement for their 
moral and intellectual development. This is because all of the components for creating 
individual growth are constituted by what information environment and the state of the 
world they perceive. Thus, exposure to different views is what people need in order to 
understand and appreciate divergent standpoints, cultures and opinions. From this 
perspective, the conflict between contrasting views raises awareness, tolerance and 
respect for difference.170 Ultimately, ‘discovering the difference’ assists people in 
becoming well-informed citizens by enabling them to have enough materials to make 
informed choices.171 
The design for ‘discovering the difference’ should consider diversity in the aspect 
of viewpoints, sources, or geographical coverage. Selection intermediaries need to 
present viewers with alternative or complementary content from different political or 
cultural backgrounds. Particularly, in the screen feature of a page, it should present the 
topic a user is interested as well as suggest contributions from a different perspective.  
One possibility is to design screen features to promote exposure diversity. 
Currently, the standard comment lists used in a social media page do not well provide 
diverse comments since people often read only a few comments on top. Screen features 
of selection intermediaries can be designed in various forms. For example, in the 
developments of technological design, Opinion Space designs a feature to visualise user 
opinions onto a two-dimensional map (which is called ‘space interface’) rather than in a 
                                                          
168 Kari Karppinen, Rethinking Media Pluralism (FUP 2013) 30. 
169 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (J W Parker and Son, 1859). 
170 Kris Dunn and Singh Shane, ‘Pluralistic Conditioning’ (2014) 21(1) Democratization 1, 4. 
171 See Jonathan Gilmore, ‘Expression as Realization’ (2011) 30(5) Law and Philosophy 517. 
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conventional linear comment list or a chronological list interface.172 As seen in Figure 2 
below, this technique effectively places all participants onto one level playing field. On 
the space interface, points far apart correspond to participants with very different opinions 
while participants with similar opinions are proximal. The size and brightness of each 
point are determined by a weighted average of agreement from a diversity of users rather 
than those sharing similar beliefs. As another example, Diversity Donut has developed 
‘space interface’ further; it adds the level of circle to demonstrate the level of contrast 
opinions. The point near the middle of the circle represents similar view of the user’s 
opinion while a further away point indicates disagreement views (see Figure 2).173 By 
comparing to a chronological list interface, navigating this space interface encourages 
users to better find and consider diverse comments, especially the opinions with different 
values from their own. 174  
Figure 2: Opinion Space175(left) Diversity Donut (right) 
 
 
                                                          
172 Siamak Faridani et al., ‘Opinion Space’ (Proceedings of the 28th International CHI, 10-15 April 2010) 
1175; see also Jeffrey Heer and danah boyd, ‘Vizster’ (Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on 
Information Visualization, 23-25 October 2005) 5. 
173 David Wong et al., ‘The Diversity Donut’ (Proceeding of the CHI’11 Extended Abstracts, 7-12 May 
2011) 1471. 
174 For further example see Sean Munson, ‘Designing Interfaces for Presentation of Opinion Diversity’ 
(Proceeding of the CHI’09 Extended Abstracts, 4-9 April 2009) 3667; Kiran Garimella, ‘Exposing Twitter 
Users to Contrarian News’ (International World Wide Web Conference Committee, 3-7 April 2017). 
175 Opinion Space <https://opinion.berkeley.edu/>. 
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In addition, one could think of a function in social media which provides people 
to notice different comments or opinions on a certain topic. It can be in a form of 
facilitating people to evaluate value or to verify the accuracy of comments. For instance, 
Reﬂect adds a ‘listening box’ next to every comment where other readers can add concise 
summary bullet points (see Figure 3).176 When other readers afterwards hover over a 
summary bullet point, the relevant texts in the original comment that the bullet point refers 
to is highlighted for people to read the original comment and other listeners’ 
interpretations. The original commenter can also respond to each bullet point whether the 
interpretation is accurate, somewhat accurate, or inaccurate (which is shown to future 
readers with a coloured +, - or ! ). Besides, anyone can dispute the neutrality, accuracy, 
and validity of any summary bullet points. This function nudges readers to listen to other 
users and forms a diverse discursive environment. Reflect is now enabled on, for example, 
WordPress plugin, Slashdot and MediaWiki extensions. 
                                                          
176 Travis Kriplean et al., ‘REFLECT’ (Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), 9-23 March 
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Figure 3: Mechanics of the Reﬂect interface177 
 
Another possibility to design a function to promote ‘discovering the difference’ is 
by providing links to additional commentary or discussion. It is another way to enable 
users to contextualise and confront with alternative or contradictory views. For example, 
Rbutr is a Chrome extension (and now also on a Twitter reply widget) that provides a list 
of links to other arguments directly rebutting the article users are reading (see Figure 4).178 
The content may be a direct debunking or may contain contrasting evidence. Any 
webpage can be rebutted, even the rebutting pages can be counter-rebutted. Also, readers 
can submit their own rebuttal to add to the list. Therefore, readers can follow discussions 
across several websites with a range of viewpoints on one subject. It gives users a 
comprehensive view about the strengths and weaknesses of different arguments and 
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awareness of other angles. Although Rbutr is an extension function in the browser, this 
technique of Rbutr can technically be applied in search engines. When presenting search 
results, search engines can display, together with the reading results, links to other content 
that discuss certain search result. 
Figure 4: Rbutr179 
Not only screen features and functions, selection intermediaries may develop their 
algorithms to produce diverse result recommendations towards a specific viewpoint. In 
particular, Munson presents an algorithm called Sidelines that increases the diversity of 
results in news and opinion aggregators.180 Also, Garimella creates an algorithm tested 
on Twitter that bridges across people of opposing sides.181 
ii. Expose to diverse media outlet/speakers 
This form of diversity by design would look at a guarantee that all segments of 
the public (such as minority groups, underprivileged social groups, underrepresented 
media outlets, and cultural groups) can find themselves a space for the public attention. 
Central to this idea leans on democratic deliberation which emphasises participative 
contribution in public debate and the openness to different speakers and ideas.182 A good 
argument can arrive from any parts of the society, especially from the challenge of the 
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181 Kiran Garimella et al., ‘Reducing Controversy by Connecting Opposing Views’ (Proceedings of the 
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marginal voices. Therefore, all groups should have a real share of people’s attention and 
no one group or individual should have been neglected or subordinated.183 This can also 
be considered as the assurance of different interests to have equal opportunity for being 
concerned and influencing public discourse.184 It ensures that no permanent majority or 
single group is a privilege to influence others. Consequently, exposure to different sources 
prevents a single voice to be misled as a public consensus and reduces the risk of the 
unchecked irresponsibility power due to the absence of clashing with an opposite group. 
Selection intermediaries could provide a feature that guides people’s attention 
towards a wide range of sources. They could also design their presentation to give a 
chance or prominence to minority groups or new political parties. The design of screen 
features can have an important role in this context. For example, in the commitment 
Google proposed to the European Commission,185 Google offered to display links 
references to three pertinent competing services close to its own services (see Figure 5). 
The provision is also presented in a format that makes users clearly aware of these 
alternatives and is visually comparable to the links to Google’s own services. Although 
this proposal is directly related to competition issues, this approach can also be adopted 
to encourage exposure of individuals to diverse outlets.  It gives people a real choice 
between different speakers and will benefit them to choose diversely and compare content 
wisely. 
Figure 5: Google’s proposal186 (left) ‘Top Stories’ (right) 
 
                                                          
183 This corresponds to theories of ‘radical pluralism’ presented by Karpinnen (see Kari Karppinen, 
Rethinking Media Pluralism, 70-78. 
184 See Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP, 2011). 
185 Google, ‘Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 - Foundem and others’, (Google, 3 April 2013) < 
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Although the Google’s commitment was objected by the Commission, in 
December 2016, Google changed their search result presentation by launching ‘Top 
Stories’. This new feature is in a card-style set of three stories presented in horizontal (see 
Figure 5). ‘Top Stories’ is similar to the Google’s commitment. Google did not give the 
reason or motivation behind the change; however, the new design provides a better 
opportunity for speakers to appear to a much wider audience.  
Besides, Google provides a new feature displayed under ‘Top Stories’, called 
‘Related picks’ (see Figure 6). It gives users another option for expanding their search to 
see additional content. When users click on those related picks, it shows them more 
suggested top stories. In 2017, Google also launches another feature, ‘People also search 
for’, in mobile search results. This feature appears below organic results after users click 
on a website link from the organic results. It displays the related search query suggestions 
that users can scroll through left and right. All of these Google features encourage people 
to read more sources; although they are categorised by topics not groups of outlets or 
speakers. It is a good example that selection intermediaries can design their features to 
assist minority groups, marginal voices or underrepresented media outlets to be 
significantly more visible. Therefore, the design of screen features will aid people to be 
aware of the presence of other sources. 
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To expose people to diverse media outlets, selection intermediaries could also 
develop algorithms or recommendation systems in a way that match people with different 
political or cultural interests. In particular, a measure might be the change of 
personalization algorithms to include more categories and diverse panels rather than 
merely encourage conversation among the like-minded. Personalization algorithm is a 
kind of information ﬁltering which presents customised information based on some type 
of user proﬁles.189 User proﬁles may include such as age, country, education, and 
preferences. A system can build a user proﬁle in two ways: explicitly and implicitly. The 
former is a customization of information by users themselves while the latter is a 
determination by the system through various factors, such as data mining, browsing 
history, IP address, and cookies.190 In general, the goal of user proﬁling is to collect 
information about the subjects in which a user is interested. However, this is not to say 
that personalisation per se cannot be exploited to have a positive effect on exposure 
diversity. As Bozdag comments: 
‘We should come with design suggestions to minimize the bad effects and 
improve the good effects of this technology instead of trying to get rid of it all together. 
The question is then not whether to have personalization or not, but how to design morally 
good personalization technology.’191 
In particular, personalisation technology can recognise people’s media 
consumption history and uses this information to recommend content in relation to 
people’s preference. Thus, it can be exploited to provide diverse sources in the issues 
which are in the interest of users or to suggest more new groups of speakers which users 
have never seen (or less likely to consume).192 For instance, Zhou introduces a new 
algorithm, ‘heat-spreading’, designed speciﬁcally to seek out novel items and at the same 
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time enhancing the personalisation of user recommendations.193 This hybrid algorithm 
allows us to simultaneously increase both accuracy and diversity of recommendations. 
Another example is a software designed for a recommender system proposed by 
Kamishima. It produces recommendations that present news from both Democrat and 
Republican sources if users specify themselves as neutrality towards ‘political 
affiliation’.194 Therefore, as illustrated here, personalisation algorithms can actually be 
designed and used to expose diverse media outlets or speakers. 
iii. Facilitating comparison 
Alternatively, diversity by design can be in the form of facilitating comparison. 
Its role is to improve users’ ability to weigh and compare diverse views on social or 
political matters for an understanding of difference. Modern democracy requires choices 
that truly compare between incompatible views.195 Elections and the right to vote have a 
meaning only when there is an equal competition between the distinct political ideas 
presented to people. Therefore, the clash of conflict opinions and the process of 
comparing and weighing are an enduring feature of democratic participation and the 
political process.196 This is basically the idea behind the marketplace of ideas concept. 
Under this approach, the public confrontation can be seen as the leverage and bargaining 
between incompatible views in order to convincingly influence the debate.197 The 
essential preconditions are, therefore, that participants can be exposed to necessary 
conflict viewpoints and that different opinions are in a form allowing proper comparison. 
To facilitate comparison, result recommendations presented by selection 
intermediaries should lead users to perceive the existence of different aspects. This is 
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related to the design regarding data collection, distinguishing opinions and visualising the 
opinion clusters. Different aspects should represent in the way that each group is 
meaningful and the diﬀerences between them are clear. Also, different groups should be 
presented fairly in terms of placement and amount of allocated space. Obviously, the 
conventional linear list which users need to scroll down a long list has failed to get a 
comparative view of diverse opinions. 
The provision of comparison can be in many forms and at various points of focus. 
For example, Bobble is a web browser extension that allows users to compare how their 
search results differ from the results that are returned to other users (see Figure 7).198 By 
capturing a user’s search query and reissuing it with hundreds of other worldwide users, 
it distributes search results worldwide that perform the same search query each time the 
user performs a search. It provides a variety of different points by displaying search 
results that only the user received in yellow and results that he misses but others have 
received in red. Therefore, users contemporaneously see which results are displayed on 
their browser but not on others, and vice versa. This technique alerts users to be aware of 
how their online experience is being potentially distorted by personalisation. 
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Figure 7: Bobble199 
 
Search engines may design their algorithms and screen features to present search 
results in a form of clusters revealing controversial groups. For instance, Newscube is a 
prototype system that detects different aspects of news from various sources and 
automatically displays readers with multiple classified perspectives on a news event.200 
The selected news is grouped by the similarity of salient aspects and is presented to 
readers with a clustered overview of the aspects of the event. Each group is allocated with 
a similar amount of space and is positioned in a 2-column grid layout (see Figure 8). As 
such, it effectively helps readers to easily find different aspects and compare diverse 
biased views of the event. NewsCube is different from other search engines which simply 
list search results in an arbitrary order. 









Similarly, Jin Do proposes the ‘intelligent interface’ prototype (which can be 
applied on Facebook) that automatically clusters and visualises diverse opinions about a 
controversial topic.202 It presents user’s own opinion on the left and at the same time 
displays other four clusters on the right which are diﬀerent from the user’s stance (see 
Figure 8). Each cluster shows keywords that summarise the associated comments so that 
the user can quickly guess the overall opinion in each cluster. Each cluster is also 
clickable and will lead to the actual comments that are associated with that cluster. 
‘Facilitating comparison’ can focus on people’s stances and reaction in a debate. 
Social media may design a function to reflect the consideration of tradeoffs between 
different perspectives on a certain topic. For example, ConsiderIt is an interface which 
enables users to adopt the pro/con lists others have contributed (e.g. create, adopt, and 
                                                          
201 Souneil Park et al., ‘NewsCube’ (Proceedings of the SIGCHI CHI, 4-9 April 2009) 443. 
202 Hyo Jin Do, ‘Intelligent Interface for Seeing the World Through Different Lenses’ (Proceedings of the 
22nd IUI, 13-16 March 2017) 217. 
205 
share) in order to expose the salient points themselves (see Figure 9).203 This enables 
users to gain a new insight from the aggregated sentiments of different views and to check 
the correctness of the sentiments from a similar stance. Users can rank their view into a 
group of: full opposers, ﬁrm opposers, slight opposers, neutrals, slight supporters, ﬁrm 
supporters and full supporters. Also, they can drill down into the most salient points of 
each different group by clicking on the graph bars. The power of pro/con lists is that it 
nudges people toward the thought about both sides of a decision. 






iv. Promoting serendipity 
Serendipity, the most closely related concept to an unexpected encounter, is the 
ability to discover unknown content by chance. The concerns about serendipity 
significantly arise because personalised algorithms facilitate barriers for the awareness of 
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unfamiliar, surprising, and challenging content. As Ofcom states that ‘...when using the 
internet, the likelihood of having their views challenged or their knowledge expanded by 
chance was minimal’.205 Therefore, some scholars suggest that serendipity is a new 
goalpost for providing diversity experience on the Internet.206 The over-personalization 
problem can be solved by exposing individuals to materials and topics that they would 
not have chosen in advance. An unplanned or unanticipated encounter of new topics is 
essential for breaking the established routines and can spark an interest in investigating 
the matter further. Accordingly, diversity by design should provide the chance for people 
to encounter unpredictable viewpoints to wake individual’s curiosity. 
There are already some examples of the technical designs applying in social media 
that encourage serendipitous encounters. To illustrate, Poli is an interface designed to 
integrate a variety of social media and to take into account the elements of chance 
encounters.207 The main page of Poli exposes users to diverse perspectives from multiple 
social media (see Figure 10). It aggregates information from multiple sources and from a 
variety of perspectives, and randomly presents this information to users in a serendipitous 
fashion. This prototype interface creates an environment that exposes users to 
serendipitous diverse political information. 
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Figure 10: Poli208 
 
Also, there are some concerns that serendipity is more than just chance.209 For a 
surprising encounter to spark people’s incentive to investigate further and to not cause 
overwhelming information, it needs to resonate with familiar knowledge, interest, or 
experience of the user.210 On the basis of these insights, Serendip-o-matic, for example, 
extracts keywords and returns a surprising result which reflects user’s interests. It is a 
project of one-week time frame organised by the One Week | One Tool.211 Unlike 
conventional search tools, Serendip-o-matic is a serendipity engine.212 When clicking 
‘Make some magic!’, it takes in any text (such as an article, song lyrics, or a bibliography) 
and then delivers a series of a similar topic that hopefully broadens user’s horizons. Its 
database derives from the vast online collections, such as Europeana and Flickr. Its special 
algorithm is designed for inspiration and being suggestive to discover materials users 
                                                          
208 Ibid. 
209 See e.g. Klaus Schönbach, ‘The Own in the Foreign’ (2007) 29(2) Media, Culture and Society 344. 





never knew existed. Therefore, the tool supports accidental discoveries and some results 
are more serendipitous than other search engines. 
One could think of a function or widget in social media that provides serendipity, 
for example, a sidebar of a screen feature which displays articles at random pertaining to 
a keyword. There may be an option which displays less popular or not mainstream lists 
(such as ‘less viewed’ feature) next to the content selected by users. Additionally, 
algorithms may be designed to look at users’ search history and present sources users do 
not normally pursue (blending with normal sources). The different way of analysing data 
and aggregating content allows a random of different types of content to be exposed to 
people.213 This can be seen from Twitter which is considered as a serendipitous platform 
(especially when compared to Google and Facebook).214 Also, many organisations create 
bots to be used on Twitter to provide random tweets onto user’s feed. For example, the 
Digital Public Library of America launches @DPLAbot, a Twitter bot that tweets links 
to random items located in its collections (see Figure 11). It works by first grabbing a 
random noun, searching in the database and sharing the first result it found. By using this 
type of bots, selection intermediaries can expose serendipitous result recommendations 
to users. Therefore, it depends on the design of the system in a way that presents users 
with surprising and random information. 
                                                          
213 For the examples of research in algorithms designed to promote serendipity see Leo Iaquinta et al., 
‘Introducing Serendipity in a Content-based Recommender System’ (Conference on Hybrid Intelligent 
Systems, 10-12 September 2008) 168; Maximilian Jenders et al., ‘A Serendipity Model for News 
Recommendation’ in Steffen Hölldobler et al. (eds.), Advances in Artificial Intelligence (Springer 2015) 
111; Qiuxia Lu et al., ‘Serendipitous Personalized Ranking for Top-N Recommendation’ (International 
Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, 4-7 December 2012) 258; Udeep 
Tandukar and Julita Vassileva, ‘Ensuring Relevant and Serendipitous Information Flow in Decentralized 
Online Social Network’ in Allan Ramsay and Gennady Agre (eds.), Artificial Intelligence (Springer 2012) 
79; Christine Bauer and Markus Schedl, ‘Introducing Surprise and Opposition by Design in Recommender 
Systems’ (Conference on User Modeling, Adaptation and Personalization, 9-12 July 2017) 350; Denis 
Kotkov et al., ‘A Serendipity-Oriented Greedy Algorithm for Recommendations’ (International Conference 
on Web Information Systems and Technologies, 25-27 April 2017) 32. 
214 Liam Andrew, ‘I’m feeling lucky’ (NiemanLab, 16 July 2014) <http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/07/im-
feeling-lucky-can-algorithms-better-engineer-serendipity-in-research-or-in-journalism/> 
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In conclusion, this section has illustrated a number of ways that selection 
intermediaries can design their service in order to encourage exposure diversity. 
Depending on the underlying conception of exposure diversity, technological design 
highlights the different aspects for nudging people towards a more valuable and diverse 
choice. Also, any implementations of diversity by design need to be supported by 
empirical studies and multidisciplinary areas which are a combination of technical, social, 
behavioural, and communications sciences. The ideas presented here are a starting point 
that could help framing future strategies to reach the exposure diversity goal. 
5. Further issues about the application of diversity by design  
The last section proposes some ideas and examples of how a regulatory framework 
concerning diversity by design can be implemented. For example, who should have the 
role to decide the standards of diversity by design; what is the process of assessment; 
what forms or standards should it be; should there be any sanctions; and should every 
selection intermediary have the same weight of duty? All of these issues have profound 
and in-depth details to consider. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
                                                          
215 <https://dp.la/apps/12> 
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provide a clear framework to regulate selection intermediaries in any specific 
jurisdictions. The conceptions and suggestions in this section are starting ideas which can 
be a basis for a further research. 
a. Standards Committee 
The aspect of exposure diversity and the pragmatic implementation of technical 
design have various details so it may not be possible to enact a specific legal provision of 
how technology must be particularly designed. Therefore, an option is to establish a body 
as a Standards Committee (‘the Committee’) in order to set norms and practical guidelines 
in the application of diversity by design. The Committee should be an independent 
regulatory body. By taking the UK and the EU as examples, the UK, the Committee 
should be Ofcom (particularly, the sub advisory committee)216; while in the EU, the 
members of the Committee should be comprised of representatives of independent 
regulators in each Member State (e.g.  the Contact Committee in the current AVMSD 217, 
or the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services)218. 
The creation of standards of diversity by design can broadly be divided into the 
development of two tasks: dealing with the assessment of exposure diversity and setting 
the standards of technical application. To deal with exposure diversity issues, the 
Committee can be a body to identify which aspects of exposure diversity should be 
concerned; e.g. minority voices, different political aspect, or serendipitous encounter. 
Also, in what form of design the value of exposure diversity will be presented. It has to 
set an indicator to measure exposure diversity in a certain technical design, e.g. 
vertical/horizontal exposure diversity or internal/external exposure diversity.219 To 
develop the standards, the Committee has to conduct consultations with the stakeholders 
(e.g. scholars, business entities, and people) and give them reasonable opportunity to 
participate and give comments.Therefore, the documents it produces should have a legal 
binding.  
                                                          
216 Within Ofcom, there are a number of committees such as the Content Sanctions Committee, the Fairness 
Committee and the Elections Committee. There are also a number of advisory committees required by 
section 20 and 21 of CA 2003. 
217 Article 23a. of AVMSD. 
218 See a new legislative proposal amending the AVMSD. 
219 See Chapter 2 Part I.2b. 
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To set the standards of technical application of diversity by design, the Committee 
should provide participative space for the association of representatives of selection 
intermediaries. In other words, a group of selection intermediaries may exert control over 
their own behaviour through the code of conduct. The code of conduct can set out the 
standards of any aspects of technological design in relation to a particular service. For 
instance, it can encourage how an interface should apply in practical terms to promote 
exposure diversity. This form of cooperation has many advantages. It effectively 
formulates a higher level of understanding in practice due to technical expertise and 
special knowledge. Accordingly, it could be considered as a reasonable obligation and it 
would produce voluntary compliance than externally imposed regimes of control. Also, 
it is possible to adapt or change the standards in a ﬂexible and smooth manner because 
the code of conduct acts relatively informally and tend to gain the trust of the regulated 
group. 
There are various degrees of cooperation between the Committee and private 
sector for setting the technical standards. For instance, the Committee may empower the 
private association to draw up a code of practice as long as it does not conflict with the 
indicators or value of exposure diversity. The private association is responsible for 
regulating their operations while the Committee retains overall sign-off on major changes 
to the code.220 Another way of cooperation is that the Committee contributes a code of 
conduct by the recommendation of the private association. In this case, once draft codes 
have been prepared by the private association, they must be submitted to the Committee. 
The Committee then gives proposed amendments and approves the code. Alternatively, 
the Committee and the private association may set a joint commission to finalise a draft 
code. On the other hand, the code of conduct may be applied by the private sector but the 
Committee is not bound to approve the code.221 In such case, the Committee must provide 
an opinion on whether the draft code complies with its standards regarding exposure 
diversity. 
                                                          
220 See, for example, the model of The Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP). BCAP is 
responsible for writing and maintaining the UK Code of Broadcast Advertising, but Ofcom still has overall 
legal responsibility to maintain standards in broadcast advertising. 
221 See, for example, the model of the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC). BBFC began as a 
voluntary body to provide some guidance to local authorities. The local authorities may rely on the decisions 
of the BBFC in this regard. 
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The standards of diversity by design can be in a form of guidelines, 
recommendations, or advise for supervisory regulators on specific issues.222 For example, 
the Committee may issue guidelines on the identification and the assessment of risk and 
on the means of mitigating risk to exposure diversity. These forms of opinion do not have 
any specific legal status (soft law), unlike the standards and the approved codes of 
conduct. However, in practical term, these will be regarded as persuasive and will be a 
very powerful reference for regulators to apply a degree of discretionary judgement. 
b. The assessment of diversity by design  
Another major challenge is how to assess diversity by design. Due to complexity 
of exposure diversity, there is no general consensus on the appropriate method for 
measuring exposure diversity at the present.223 A good starting point is the MPM. It is a 
tool designed to identify potential risks to media pluralism in the Member States of the 
EU. The core characteristic of the MPM is a risk-based approach: in other words, it 
provides a tool for diagnosis, not therapy. The instrument is designed to flag up structural 
conditions that carry the threats and potential problems of media pluralism. It aims for 
quantitative and objective analysis and is compatible with the varying normative, culture 
and economic approaches. Its indicators and measurements provide a helpful information 
in a systematic and in-depth analytical way which addresses different aspects in which 
media pluralism is settled.224 
In 2016, the MPM included a set of 20 indicators relating 4 different areas (basic 
protection, market plurality, political independence and social inclusiveness) and still 
covers an aspect of the legal, economic and socio-political area.225 The MPM measures 
do not only indicate the area of supply and distribution, but also includes indicators for 
                                                          
222 Guidelines may intend to be more discursive and general. Recommendations are more specific and 
prescriptive. Best practices are more practical conduct. 
223 For examples of scholar’s proposal see James Webster, ‘Diversity of Exposure’ in Philip Napoli (ed.), 
Media Diversity and Localism (LEA 2007) 309; Philip Napoli, ‘Deconstructing the Diversity Principle’ 
(1999) 49(4) J.Com 7; Philip Napoli, ‘Rethinking Program Diversity Assessment’ (1997) 10(4) Journal of 
Media Economics 59; Steven Wildman, ‘Indexing Diversity’ in in Philip Napoli (ed.), Media Diversity and 
Localism (LEA 2007) 151; Natascha Just, ‘Measuring Media Concentration and Diversity’ (2009) 31(1) 
Media, Culture and Society 97. 
224 For further discussion of MPM see Peggy Valcke et al., ‘The European Media Pluralism Monitor’ (2010) 
2(1) J.M.L 85; Peggy Valcke, ‘A European Risk Barometer for Media Pluralism’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 185. 
225 Elda Brogi, ‘Monitoring media pluralism in Europe’ (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 
2016). 
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exposure diversity.226 The MPM points towards the importance of actual exposure and of 
creating the conditions that the audience can be exposed to media content. As the MPM 
address: 
‘the abilities and skills of citizens that allow them to access and actually consume 
or actively use media, taking into account the notion of accessibility to the media by all 
segments of society and looking at issues such as media literacy and digital skills, and the 
availability of subtitling and audio-description services, etc.’227 
Regarding the conduct of risk assessment of exposure diversity, the MPM 
acknowledges two aspects of investigation: (i) measuring actual exposure and (ii) 
identifying possible obstacles to exposure diversity. In the aspect of actual exposure, it 
suggests to look at the ‘availability (in the sense of willingness or initiative) and ability 
(meaning skills) to access, critically asses, consume or actively make use of media by 
extracting, analysing and/or adhering to particular political beliefs and opinions being 
propagated through the media’.228 To identifying possible obstacles to exposure diversity, 
the MPM pays attention to the problem of audience polarisation by encompassing a board 
notion of political, cultural and geographical aspects. For example, there are indicators 
related to the assessment of: ‘insufficient skills or financial means to make optimal use 
of supply diversity’ and ‘actual consumption and participation of users themselves to the 
media process and public opinion’. Therefore, the assessment of diversity by design can 
adopt exposure diversity indicators regarding two aspects i.e. actual exposure and 
possible obstacles to exposure diversity in order to better understand the threats to 
exposure diversity. The MPM eventually will be an assistant to the Standards Committee 
to plan relevant standards or necessary measures. 
c. More trust more duty 
An important question in media law is regarding media power of selection 
intermediaries. Every search engine and social media has the power to influence diversity 
                                                          
226 The MPM defines media plurality in the aspect of use as ‘citizen’s abilities and skills to access and 
actually consume or actively use media; hence, this area includes the notion of accessibility of the media 
by all segments of society and looks at issues such as media literacy and digital skills, availability of 
subtitling and audio-description services’. (see European Commission, ‘Independent Study on Indicators 
for Media Pluralism in the Member States’ (Preliminary Final Report, April 2009)) 
227 Ibid., 11. 
228 Ibid 43-44. 
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of viewpoints presented to people. Consequently, any approaches of diversity by design 
are applied to every selection intermediary, not merely applied to big intermediaries such 
as Google and Facebook. However, it does not mean that every selection intermediaries 
have to equally comply with the standards of diversity by design. Since the big ones such 
as Google and Facebook tend to have more influence on what people know and consider 
to be important, they should have the higher burden or special duty to implement diversity 
by design. This notion is similar to competition law which imposes special obligation in 
exercising anti-competitive conduct on undertaking with market power or dominant 
position. 
There are two reasons for imposing a higher standard on big selection 
intermediaries. First, the number of people using selection intermediaries can also express 
the degree of trust the public and a person have over them. With these positions, they hold 
a considerable power to impact people’s public sphere: both personal and political 
activities. Thus, to prevent a concentration of power, the responsibility and certain 
standard have remained necessary to control over undue powerful entities.229 Another 
reason is fairness. Requiring a small firm to comply with the same standard as a big 
company can be considered as an excessive burden due to their shortage of financial 
investment. On the other hand, setting an average standard for every selection 
intermediaries would loosen the exposure diversity goal since the big entities have the 
capacity to lift their practices to a higher improvement. 
Measurement of media power can be considered from various perspectives: both 
supply side from providers and demand side from audiences. The most common form of 
supply side indicator is market share. It can also be determined by revenue. While the 
measurement from the supply side benefits in being straightforward to weigh each 
company’s power and size in a market, its flaw is a lack of the picture of their real 
influence reaching to the audience. Conversely, consumer side approach can represent 
media impact over public opinion, but it is trickier to precisely assess media plurality. 
This requires a metrical summary of many aspects such as usage, trust, engagement and 
                                                          
229 With regard to concentration of media power, various criteria of media ownership rules have been 
adopted: for example, limiting the number of licenses, imposing ceilings of audience shares. 
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influence. The demand side indicators are such as main source reference230, audience 
reach231, and time-exposure share232. 
The special duty to implement a higher standard can be in the form of using higher 
technology in their design of services. It may be obliged to provide or design the amount 
of functions, algorithms or screen features supporting exposure diversity more than a 
small company. Alternatively, the big intermediaries may be required to concern several 
values or goals of exposure diversity. Besides, the special duty may include the obligation 
to submit a report to the supervisory regulators in a certain period of time or to provide 
an extra assessment of diversity risk in their designs. The Committee should publish 
media power thresholds that specify the standard of special obligation in a large range of 
situations. The list may not be exhaustive and may be in the form of guidelines, 
recommendation or best practices. 
d. Diversity impact assessments and certification 
The standard of diversity by design can be strengthened through diversity impact 
assessments (DIAs) and certification. The DIAs borrowed the idea of privacy impact 
assessments (PIAs) from data protection law.233 It is a process which assists selection 
intermediaries in identifying and minimising the risks and disadvantages of new projects 
on exposure diversity. In other words, the fundamental aim of the DIAs is to weigh the 
need and potential benefit of technological innovation against the impact on filter bubble 
phenomenon. The DIAs have to be carried when a new system or an initiative interface 
is introduced. Addressing the envisaged impact of the operations at the point the system 
is designed will often be simpler and less costly. Also, once the operation has commenced, 
selection intermediaries must carry out a review to assess whether their operations are 
                                                          
230 Main source reference specifies the media provider that audience considers to be their main source. This 
approach assesses influence from subjective aspect. See Ofcom, ‘News Consumption in the UK’ (Ofcom, 
2012). 
231 Audience reach can be defined as the percentage of the total audience which is exposed to a specific 
news provider. It shows the amount of audience that each provider reaches to. See Ofcom, ‘Report on public 
interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News Corporation’ (31 
December 2010). 
232 Time-exposure base directly analyzes individual audience spending time consuming content across 
different providers. It shows the overview of each provider’s influent weight in the average individual’s 
public sphere. 
233 Article 27 of GDPR; PIAs were initially developed outside the EU. The UK Information Commissioner 
was the first supervisory authority in the EU to adopt the use of PIAs. In the UK the use of PIAs has been 
mandatory for Government departments and widely used by private sector for a number of years. 
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performed in accordance with the impact assessments and the standards.234 Consequently, 
the DIAs will help to ensure that potential problems are identified at an early stage. 
Certification can be used as a method of demonstrating the compliance with the 
standards of diversity by design. This mechanism has been a gradual development in 
many areas of regulation and will be an important strategy going forward in the future. 
Possession of certification is a sign that selection intermediaries meet the requirements or 
appropriate standards. Those who obtain a certification find evidential value in being able 
to display an assurance of seriously addressing on appliance issues. Also, holding 
certification may offer informal additional protection to selection intermediaries. 
Supervisory regulators may give a presumption of compliance but do not restrict the 
powers of the supervisory regulators and the rights of individuals to raise a complaint to 
the court. Certification, therefore, becomes a general obligation for selection 
intermediaries to gain trust from users. 
The DIAs and Certification can be run by the Standards Committee, supervisory 
regulators, representatives of selection intermediaries, or private third parties. It can be a 
cooperation between these stakeholders to set independent monitoring trustees. In 
particular, the requirements for the monitoring trustees and the standards for impact 
assessment or obtain certification may be set by the Committee. The representative 
association of selection intermediaries may submit a list of candidates to be appointed as 
the monitoring trustees to the supervisory regulators for accreditation. Candidates of the 
monitoring trustees may come from private third parties who have experience or is 
familiar with the industries and is independent of the influence or interest of selection 
intermediaries. The independent monitoring trustees must fulfil these criteria and be 
accredited by the supervisory regulators.235  
e. Supervisory regulators and enforcement system 
The final issue about the regulatory system is about regulators and enforcement. 
For the standards of diversity by design to be truly concerned and implemented, there can 
                                                          
234 When appropriate and possible, selection intermediaries should also seek the views of users. 
235 The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) states that ‘accreditation is increasingly being 
recognised as a valuable tool across a wide range of Government policy areas including better regulation, 
good governance, fair markets and public confidence. It is already being used by Government as an 
effective market-led tool for delivering policy more efficiently and to help deliver on its obligations in areas 
as diverse as healthcare, food production, energy supply, climate change and personal safety’. (see 
<https://www.ukas.com/about/the-benefits/>) 
217 
be an organisation enforcing obligations and imposing penalties when there is an 
infringement of the standards. The regulators may be the Standards Committee itself or a 
distinct organisation: but it should be an independent regulatory body. For example, in 
the UK, supervisory regulators should be Ofcom. In case of the EU, the supervisory 
regulators can be the European Commission or the Audiovisual Regulators which will be 
set out in a new proposed AVMSD.236 Also, the regulation and enforcement may be in 
the form of co-regulation between the supervisory regulators and the representative 
association of selection intermediaries. For instance, private association may be able to 
exercise regulatory power whereas the supervisory regulators retain the right to change a 
final decision or hold exclusive power to impose a legal sanction.237 
The core responsibilities of the supervisory regulators are investigative fact-
finding, taking action against infringements of the standards, imposing penalties, and 
initiating policy. In particular, in cases when selection intermediaries intend to adopt new 
operations or change their systems, selection intermediaries may submit the report of 
changing operation to the supervisory regulators. The regulators may make opinions 
whether the operation has particular concerns or is performed in accordance with the 
standard. Besides, the regulators have the power to request all necessary information and 
to conduct inspections of business. They may allow a certain period of times for selection 
intermediaries to submit a report or assessment of diversity risk. 
Where the regulators find a breach of the standards, they have the power to order 
selection intermediaries to cease the conduct and/or impose a fine. They may also order 
selection intermediaries to adopt positive measures in order to resolve an infringement. 
The decision of the regulators can be appealed to the court. The court can review the 
legality of decisions and has the power to alter the decision and the amount of fine that 
has been imposed. 
                                                          
236 See a new legislative proposal amending the AVMSD. 
237 See, for example, the model of the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) and BBFC. The ASA is 
responsible on a day-to-day basis for enforcing broadcast advertising regulatory code but certain obligations 
remain with Ofcom. While the ASA considers there is requiring a sanction, it has to refer broadcasters to 
Ofcom. Cinema films required BBFC certification as a prerequisite to its showing. The final decision, 
however, remains with the local authorities, which means that different views may be taken. These council 
may prohibit film that have BBFC approval or permit films that have been refused certification. They may 
also alter the BBFC age classification. 
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However, before the start of a formal investigation process, the supervisory 
regulators may negotiate a settlement with selection intermediaries to make legally-
binding commitments of behavioural remedies. In that case, the regulators may adopt a 
proportionate remedy and decide to bring the investigation to an end without making a 
finding as to whether there has been an infringement of the standards. This process is 
derived from Article 9 of the EU Antitrust Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. It enables a rapid 
solution of appropriate cases. Also, the regulators may reopen the proceedings if, for 
example, selection intermediaries’ future behaviours are contrary to their commitments. 
f. Looking forward to the impact of diversity by design 
The implementation of diversity by design in legal obligation will nudge the 
relevant stakeholders (such as policymakers, the private sectors and scholars) to develop 
a practical guidance and technology in a way towards the exposure diversity goal. This 
will be similar to the impact of data protection by design mentioned above. Data 
protection by design is a clear example of an interaction between legal force and 
technology development. By embedding technological design into law (although legal 
provisions may be a broad and open standard), the relevant stakeholders will eventually 
develop technical standards for a practical application.  
At present, there are a number of research relating to the concerns about exposure 
diversity in other academic fields.238 These research are not only the study in technology 
sciences as illustrated in Part 4 of this chapter but also the studies in multidisciplinary 
areas such as social, behavioural, political, media and communications sciences. 
Depending on the underlying concerns of exposure diversity, these studies examine the 
different causes, effects and related factors of exposure diversity. Therefore, the 
imposition of diversity by design in the regulatory system will open the area for this 
knowledge from other academic fields to assist lawmakers and policymakers in framing 
future diversity by design strategies to reach the exposure diversity goal. 
                                                          
238 See, for example, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., ‘Should we worry about filter bubbles?’ (2016) 
5(1) Internet Policy Review; Seth Flaxman, Sharad Goel and Justin Rao, ‘Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, 
and Online News Consumption’ (2016) 80(1) POQ 298; Augusto Valeriani and Cristian Vaccari, 
‘Accidental exposure to  politics on social media as online participation equalizer  in Germany, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom’ (2016) 18(9) NMC 1857; Michael Chan and Francis Lee, ‘Selective exposure and 
agenda setting’ (2014) 24(4) Asian Journal of Communication 301. 
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In conclusion, this part illustrates that law can encourage people to expose to more 
diverse content by obliging selection intermediaries to design their services in a way 
towards exposure diversity. It presents a number of examples that selection intermediaries 
could design their technical structure in order to encourage exposure diversity. Legal 
provision alone is not an effective way to shape the conduct of individuals; technology is 
an important supported instrument for solving exposure diversity problem. In other 
words, an understanding of the interaction between law and technological structures is 
the essential precondition for exposure diversity to be achieved. Therefore, selection 
intermediaries should be obliged to the diversity by design application in order to actively 
design their algorithms, functions and screen features to facilitate people to consume more 
diverse choices. 
 
Part III: Media Literacy 
Apart from the constraints due to technical structures as discussed in Part I and II, 
insufficient skills of people to search for diverse content is another factor which obstructs 
the achievement of exposure diversity. This Part, therefore, proposes that the measures to 
promote media literacy and empower people’s knowledge are also prominent to 
encourage people to consume more diverse content. In the first section, it starts by 
discussing the problem of people’s literacy with the concept of digital divide and the data 
from Ofcom’s report. The next section then proposes that the measures to achieve 
exposure diversity are to regulate selection intermediaries to have a legal duty to promote 
media literacy. An example approach to oblige selection intermediaries to empower 
people with media literary will be provided in the last section. 
1. The problem of people’s skills and digital divide 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, people now turn from passive audience to active 
audience. Media contents they actually consume do not solely depend on what media 
providers offer, but importantly also rely on what they seek and choose. Consequently, 
exposure diversity is increasingly a matter of possessing the right skills to find diverse 
information. However, being an active audience does not always mean being a literate 
audience. This is because, with the increased choices, the process of accessing and 
consuming media content has become more complex. In reality, people have deficient 
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skills and knowledge in response to abundant choices. This can be seen from the concerns 
of ‘digital divide’. 
Digital divide became a topic of interest during the early 1990s as the Internet and 
the use of personal computers grew in prevalence.239 Initially, the conceptualization of 
digital divide was on the gap between the inequalities in the distribution of Internet access 
and use of information technologies. It also focused on the differences caused by the lack 
of access to information such as disadvantages of marginalised groups in society and the 
fall behind of social minorities in exploiting opportunities from the digital revolution.240 
This type of digital divide is referred to as the first-level digital divide. Although at 
minimum, access to information technology is an important component, the digital divide 
is a much more complicated and multifaceted phenomenon that goes beyond the mere 
issue of physical dimension and demographic factors. At the present, scholars have 
moved away from this limited view of digital divide and have extended the discourse to 
include the topic of the skills necessary for individuals to make meaningful use of certain 
technology. This creates the so-called the second-level digital divide. 
The second-level digital divide concerns Internet usage: it is associated with factors 
such as motivations and Internet skills. In this context, skill is the ability to efficiently and 
effectively find information on the Internet. This angle of digital divide is against the idea 
that accessing to technology would automatically provide all benefits of the technology. 
As Hargittai emphasises that the study of digital divide is the matters of skills level of 
users in utilizing technology.241 Thus, the distinction between the multiple layers of an 
Internet access and online skills among Internet users should be made.242 The latter 
indicates the differences between groups of people in terms of skills necessary to 
effectively use the Internet. Individuals have diverse ways of using the Internet which is 
often determined by a variety of factors such as physical, psychological, cultural, and 
                                                          
239 See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, ‘Falling through the net’ (A Report 
on Americans’ Access to Technology Tools, 8 July 1999). 
240 For further discussion see Manuel Castells, The Internet galaxy (OUP 2002); Jan van Dijk, The 
deepening divide (Sage 2005); Matthew Eastin, Vincent Cicchirillo and Amanda Mabry, ‘Extending the 
digital divide conversation’ (2015) 59(3) J.Bro.Elec.M 416. 
241 Eszter Hargittai, ‘Second-level digital divide’ (2002) 7(4) First Monday 
<http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/942/864>.  
242 See e.g. Neil Selwyn, ‘Reconsidering political and popular understandings of the digital divide’ (2004) 
6(3) NMC 341; Pippa Norris, Digital divide (CUP 2001) 4-17. 
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ecological factors.243 As a result, there are varying levels and online skills divide among 
individuals in that highly skilled users make better use of the Internet. 
The concerns about people’s skills in Internet usage have been illustrated in 
Ofcom’s reports. From the reports, there are some indications that children’s Internet 
usage is now becoming narrower than in 2015. The majority of Internet users aged 8-11 
(66%) or 12-15 (53%) only use websites or apps they have used before.244 Besides, more 
12-15s are turning to Google for ‘true and accurate information’245 and more than one in 
four of the children and young people believe that if a search engine lists certain 
information then the results can be trusted.246 Also, only a minority of 8-11s (28%) and 
12-15s (43%) can correctly identify sponsored links on Google as advertising (consistent 
with the findings from 2016).247 This data shows the limited understanding of children on 
how search engines work. 
For the adults, there are some similar patterns in the lack of literacy. One in five of 
the adults say that if results are listed by search engines, the websites will be accurate or 
unbiased.248 The majority of Internet users are confident that they can identify advertising 
online; however, only half of them could correctly recognise or are aware of personalised 
advertising on Google.249 Also, 30% of users share links to articles on Twitter or 
Facebook without fully reading the content first.250 Whereas two in three of the Internet 
users say they make some checks for the accuracy of the information they find online, 
less than a half of users particularly check different websites (genuineness of the website, 
or credibility of the information, or whether the site is regularly updated) (see Figure 12). 
Notably, older people (aged 65 and over) are less likely to make any checks for the 
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accuracy of information and are less likely to seek a range of points of view on stories 
they are interested. 
 










As illustrated, information about people's online skills can indicate the extent 
people are able to use online media in a way that they consume valuable diverse content. 
The capability to effectively use the Internet allows people to find different types of 
information to their maximum benefits. However, most people have restrictive 
knowledge and strategies to exploit selection intermediaries when dealing with diverse 
content. If users often frustrate and confuse in dealing with technology and overwhelming 
information, then infinite available information does not mean that exposure diversity has 
been achieved.  
The problem of people’s skills and digital divide highlights a crucial concern of 
media education and media literacy. The knowledge and ability of how selection 
intermediaries can be used are considered as a key resource to achieved exposure 
diversity. As the CoE states that ‘media literacy contributes to media pluralism and 
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diversity by reducing the digital divide’.252 The European Commission also places much 
emphasis on the media literacy initiative for improving media plurality: ‘a media literate 
society would be at the same time a stimulus and a pre-condition for pluralism and 
independence in the media’253. Therefore, activities to promote media literacy and 
education are the prominent approaches to encourage people to consume more diverse 
content. The next section, then, explores the concept of media literacy. 
2. The concept of media literacy 
As discussed in the above section, media literacy can empower people to expose 
themselves to more diverse content. This section, then, examines the definition and scope 
of media literacy. The relation between media literacy, selection intermediaries and 
exposure diversity will be analysed. It also discusses how selection intermediaries can 
have a legal duty to promote media literacy through an informative approach. 
a. Definition and scope 
Historically, ‘literacy’ is the concept which remains a contested one due to various 
social contexts and social conditions. According to the widely accepted definition, 
literacy is traditionally conceived as reading and writing ability.254 This is because the 
ability to read and write is a prerequisite for being able to consume and produce 
information that is in written form. The concept of media literacy, like ‘literacy’ itself, 
has different meanings in different countries and for different stakeholders. Whereas 
media literacy is frequently acknowledged as a necessity, there is no agreement on its 
meaning. Media literacy is also a dynamic concept and it is broadened in scope as it 
evolves along the changes of technology and society. 
Traditionally, media literacy generally stresses the understanding, 
comprehension, critique, and creation of media materials.255 It also raises awareness and 
a critical approach to the role of commercial communication. This is because the concept 
was developed at a time when media ownership and content have been regarded more 
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critically whereas access to information was not seen as a significant problem. Today, as 
a major shift in information and communication technologies becoming central to the 
modern society, the concept of media literacy is being extended from its traditional focus 
on print and audiovisual media to encompass the Internet and other new media. Media 
literacy expands to encompass new forms of literacies: information literacy and digital 
literacy. 
According to UNESCO, media literacy is an umbrella concept associated with 
information literacy.256 Information literacy, according to ALA, is a set of integrated 
abilities encompassing a reflective discovery of information, an understanding of how 
information is produced and valued, and utilizing the wide range of information sources 
and tools in reaching solutions to certain problems.257 It places more emphasis on the 
access, identification, location, evaluation, and use of information materials. For 
UNESCO, information literacy is the critical and analytical skills needed for digital users 
to recognise their information needs and to recognise the power of media in our daily 
lives.258 
The European Commission describes digital literacy as one of the many 
components of media literacy.259 The UNESCO framework also defined 21st-century 
skills as the combination of various digital literacies aiming to empower users through 
critical and communicative skills. Digital literacy is the ability to understand and to 
appropriately use digital tools to identify, access, integrate, evaluate, analyse and 
synthesise information from a variety of digital sources.260 Digital skills are about having 
information and communication technology skills and competencies to be able to 
eﬀectively construct new knowledge, create media expressions, and communicate with 
others. Therefore, media-literate people are capable of exercising informed choices and 
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taking advantages of the full range of opportunities oﬀered by new communications 
technologies. 
Consequently, the US’s 1992 National Leadership Conference on Media Literacy 
provides a key concept of media literacy as the ability to access, analyse, evaluate and 
create messages across a variety context.261 In the UK, Ofcom defines a clear and concise 
definition of media literacy as ‘the ability to use, understand and create media and 
communications in a variety of contexts’.262 Precisely, media literacy is concerned with 
the development of an informed and critical understanding of the nature, technique and 
impact of media content encountered in everyday lives. It is a result of the process of 
media education. The aim of media literacy is to increase people’s awareness of how 
media are organised and influence the construction of their own reality. It is a fundamental 
skill not only for young people but also for adults and elderly people. It is regarded as one 
of the key pre-requisites for a matter of inclusion and citizenship in today's information 
society.263 
b. Media literacy, exposure diversity and selection intermediaries 
Media literacy is a powerful strategy to achieve exposure diversity in the aspect 
of autonomous value.264 A fundamental requirement of personal autonomy is the capacity 
to establish ‘self-determination’ or ‘self-government’ on behalf of oneself.265 All 
components of creating an autonomous life are constituted by information and 
communication environment individuals occupied. In this regard, central to the 
autonomous value of exposure diversity is ‘to enable or empower the individual to realise 
her personal freedom of choice and self-fulfilment through the media contents she decides 
to consume’.266 Therefore, exposure diversity in this context is the choice to choose freely 
from the sufficient variety of content exposed to the individual. For a person to be free to 
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select their choices (or ‘self-determination’), diverse viewpoints exposed to the individual 
is not sufficient: they should also have the skill to evaluate available options. These skills 
contribute to personal autonomy.  
In today's world, citizens need to develop analytical skills that allow for a better 
intellectual and emotional understanding of digital media. As Livingstone and Wang 
point out that the rapid transformations in the digital media landscape have put an 
increasing pressure on individuals to must rely on digital skills as never before to prevent 
digital exclusion.267 For instance, filter bubbles and other invisible algorithms that narrow 
people’s exposure to diverse views can be regarded as a constriction of individual 
autonomy and prevent people from accessing to what they actually want.  Media literacy 
is a means to assist people to become aware of the filter bubbles where they may be 
trapped in one. The goal of media literacy policy is to improve the ability of people to 
find diverse content and to stimulate people’s demand for diverse viewpoints. The 
measure to empower people through providing information and education does not only 
protect people from an abusive power of selection intermediaries but also turn them into 
an efficient active audience. As Tessa Jowell, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport, stated in 2004: 
‘… in the modern world media literacy will become as important a skill as maths 
or science. Decoding our media will be as important to our lives as citizens as 
understanding great literature is to our cultural lives.’268 
In this complex environment of convergence and diversification in media and 
communications technologies, people need information choices which are potentially 
autonomy-enhancing. Thus, regulation and policy now turn to information literacy 
measures and training strategies that empower the users to make the best possible use of 
information and communication services and technologies.269 As a result, skilled people 
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can protect their own interests by being critical of his sources of information and 
autonomously choosing informed choices. 
Therefore, it is obvious that media literacy is an important factor in the 
achievement of diversity of exposure. However, a more important and challenging 
question is how to practically improve the skills and knowledge of people to access more 
diverse content and who should have the role to educate people? What information and 
what form are necessary to make people be aware of the content they consume? The 
current media literacy policy merely focuses on the role of the public sector and the 
government to educate people to be a more skilled audience. The approaches applying to 
selection intermediaries to inform people regarding media literacy have not been 
considered. In particular, the European Commission emphasises that the national 
authorities have the primary responsibility to include media literacy in school curricula at 
all levels: the role played by local authorities is also very important, since they are closer 
to the citizens and support initiatives in the non-formal education sector.270 
Policy initiatives in relation to media literacy usually fall in the field of 
education. For example, The Safer Internet Plus programme (2004-2008) aims at 
empowering parents, teachers and children with Internet safety tools. It also aims at 
improving knowledge about Internet and mobile phone usage by children, their online 
behaviours and their perceptions of risk- and safety-related issues.271 Also, Media Smart 
is a not-for-profit media literacy programme for school children aged 7 to 16 years old.272 
It creates free educational materials for schools and youth organisations (for teachers, 
parents and guardians) to provide comprehension for young people about advertisements 
they come across in their daily lives. 
This thesis suggests that selection intermediaries should have a legal duty to 
promote media literacy with an objective to assist and empower people to expose to more 
diverse content. This is because, to effectively achieve media literacy, practice in every 
life is more important than formal education. Computer learning courses and books are 
not the most important sources for learning digital skills. The idea that people primarily 
are learned, or should be learned, in formal classes or educational course is a fallacy 
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derived from the perception that media literacy is always difficult to master. However, 
everyone trying to remember how they acquire information technology competencies in 
the past knows that they learn by doing and they learn from utilizing digital tools in real 
life. Most Internet users learn by trial and error. Therefore, the do-it-yourself approach is 
a much more important source of learning the skills to access a wide range of diverse 
media. As the Media Literary Task Force responds to the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport’s Creative Economy Consultation: 
‘Being, or becoming, media literate is a life-long journey of learning... it involves 
people having both technological and intellectual access to a wide range of diverse media 
…. as well as being confident enough to question and be creative with media and media 
content at work, in the home and in civil society.’ 273 
In this regard, digital tools and media particularly selection intermediaries are 
one of the most important resources for media literacy. Selection intermediaries can assist 
the skills and knowledge of people to access more diverse content by raising the 
awareness of citizens regarding the operation of their platform and technical policies. 
Much of the awareness-raising could be accomplished by informing citizens during their 
normal Internet use in everyday life via explanation or providing an array of tools to allow 
the general public to have hands-on experience. The environment where people are 
informed, practised and educated in (the extent and diversity of) daily selection 
intermediaries usage are decisive in learning the broadest of media literacy regarding 
exposure diversity skills. 
Therefore, in the age of active citizens, the duties and responsibilities of selection 
intermediaries as media entities are not only those to present diverse viewpoints in their 
recommendation results the same way as the broadcasting provide various types of 
program to passive viewers in the past. The positive duty of selection intermediaries 
should also include the compliance with the standard to enhance media literacy of 
citizens. Finding an active role of selection intermediaries to inform people to be skilled 
audience is also an increasingly important theme in achieving exposure diversity. As the 
CoE emphasises on the empowerment of users that not only the Member States and civil 
society but the private sectors are also encouraged to develop the provision of 
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information, guidance and assistance to the individual users of technologies and 
services.274 Notably, it does not mean that the importance of practice should rule out the 
necessity of formal education. For users to learn better information and digital skills, 
formal education and learning by practice are both complementary needs. This section 
only emphasises that selection intermediaries as media and digital tools can potentially 
facilitate and enhance the skills and knowledge of people to expose to more diverse 
content in a learning-by-practice approach. 
c. Informative approach 
The next major question is how or in what form selection intermediaries can 
practically raise the skills and knowledge of people to consume more diverse content. 
One of the potential strategies for selection intermediaries to encourage media literacy is 
an informative approach. The way information and choices are presented can be used as 
an efficient means for people to protect themselves. Guiding users through information 
could potentially be an attractive option to direct people towards desired outcomes. The 
informative approach offers a win-win solution: people are empowered to be more skills 
literate and drive up literacy standards, whilst selection intermediaries are allowed 
reasonable flexibility to provide content and services without restrictions from regulatory 
controls. It has long been reflected in the UK, e.g. consumer law, that the provision of 
information is one of the key tools available to enhance consumer protection. In 
particular, regulatory laws such as product liability encourage positive information 
requirements and impose the liability provision of false or misleading information.275 
Also, the private law recognises the desire of consumers to have better information about 
traders by developing a Consumer Codes Approval Scheme, established by the Enterprise 
Act 2002, and to place the right to use the Office of Fair Trading approved logo.276 
In make choices, users need information. The ability of users to make effective 
choices is affected if they lack necessary information to be aware of the relevant and 
valuable content. This is a case of information asymmetries meaning situations in which 
users have less information than services of digital information about characteristics, 
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functionality, licensing conditions, etc. Consequently, users cannot make decisions that 
reflect their true preferences or find it difficult to make truly informed or diversified 
choices. 
The informative approach is a response to the asymmetries of information 
between audience and media entities. There are not sufficient incentives for selection 
intermediaries to volunteer information; therefore the law needs to require that the 
information is provided. Potential roles of information provision are various. Selection 
intermediaries can notify their users about functions, screen features and instruction 
guides of services. It may nudge people to be aware of the risk of their behaviour and 
filter bubbles. Also, it can empower users by informing them about broader implications 
of their choices and possibly even encouraging valuable choices. Once this information 
is provided, the audience can protect their own interests by selecting the contents that are 
relevant and valuable to them, while delineating it from other noises. As Helberger 
explains:  
‘[i]nforming consumers about their choices (in the hope that they will make the 
right ones) has been repeatedly advanced as a preferable route to the traditional, 
paternalistic approach in media regulation – which regulates the offering and pre-deﬁnes 
choices’277 
Users do not only need ‘information about information’ to be able to choose 
valuable offers from all the information available on the Internet, this information has to 
be in a format that effectively assists users in the clarity of communication, comparing 
and ﬁnding content. The provision of information comprises accurate analysis, planning, 
presentation and understanding of its content, language and form. An effective 
information provision needs to be supported by multidisciplinary studies: put together 
with insights from a large number of academic disciplines such as languages, arts and 
aesthetics, information sciences, communication sciences, behaviour and cognition, 
business and law. However, the detailed discussion and analysis of information design 
are beyond the scope of this thesis.278 
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A crucial concern in this informative approach is information overload. There is 
a misunderstanding that piling more extensive information on people will make truly 
informed choices. The more information, however, the less likely it will actually be 
useful. A badly-designed information provision can actually confuse or distract viewers. 
Besides, research suggests that users tend not to read lengthy documents, even if it would 
be in their interest to do so.279 Therefore, in order to be effective, the core of informative 
approach is information reduction and standardization. To be helpful to promote exposure 
diversity, information provision needs to be reduced to the necessary minimum. Also, the 
information approach would require a certain level of standardization in order to enable 
viewers to compare different types of content and make an informed choice. The 
application of these concerns on selection intermediaries to achieve exposure diversity 
will be discussed in the next section. 
3. The application of ‘media literacy’ to selection intermediaries 
After having explored the potential contribution of an informative approach, this 
section examines the application of media literacy to encourage exposure diversity. Since 
the informative approach has various methods, this section will only provide two regimes 
for presenting two types of information by way of examples which are: notification 
(information about functions of selection intermediaries) and nudging filter bubble 
(information about the behaviour of people).  
a. Notification 
One of the most crucial types of information for achieving exposure diversity is 
information about functions of selection intermediaries. For people to effectively search 
and consume diverse content, it is necessary for them to understand functions of selection 
intermediaries which affect the flow or presentation of information. Also, if people are 
not aware of the existence of such functions, it is meaningless for selection intermediaries 
to create and provide new diversity-friendly services or functions. However, people 
scarcely know what functions selection intermediaries have and rarely exploit them 
comprehensively. They are usually not aware of the change of default settings or new 
functions which are continuously appeared all the time. Therefore, a provision of 
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knowledge about functions of selection intermediaries is a way to empower people to 
expose themselves to more diverse content. 
Information about functions of selection intermediaries can be provided in a form 
of notification. The main purpose of notification is to prompt the awareness or enable a 
reminder for actions which may risk certain concerns or values. The benefits of such 
notification are providing data for risk assessment, monitoring the situation, and 
identifying the need for a response. The notification strategy has been used as a legal 
requirement in many areas of law. For example, Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, 
amended by The Citizens’ Rights Directive280, which applies to the installation of and the 
access to cookies provides that 
‘[...]the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been 
provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 
95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. [...]’ 281 
Art.29WP broke down the provision of ePrivacy Directive into two obligations: 
to provide a clear and comprehensive information and to offer the right to refuse or 
consent as a requirement for the allowance of the use of cookies.282 It is, therefore, of 
paramount importance that users are provided with clear and comprehensive information 
when engaging in any activity that could result in such storage or gaining of access.  
Art.29WP has pointed out that the information has to be provided in simple language.283 
Also, the methods of providing information should be as user-friendly as possible.284 In 
particular, Art.29WP considers that the provision of information in the general terms and 
conditions or in the policy of the providers’ websites is ‘hidden’ to users.285 Consequently, 
it proposes that the information should be presented on the screen of the user in an 
interactive way so that it is clearly spotted by the user. 
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To this end, Art.29WP welcomes creativity on new ways of presenting the 
information to the user that would go beyond the current practices of pop-up windows. 
For example, it can be the placement of static information banners on the top of a website 
which contains a hyperlink to a privacy statement and detailed information that is needed 
for the acquisition of valid consent. Alternatively, a website can implement a splash 
screen with relevant information when the user is visiting the website.286 
To encourage exposure diversity, therefore, selection intermediaries should 
provide notifications to inform users about the functions of their websites which have 
some risks on exposure diversity, such as ‘Unfriend’ and ‘Follow’ functions on Facebook 
and ‘People also search for’ on Google Search. Besides, these notifications can appear 
when users adjust their settings of the intermediaries and when selection intermediaries 
themselves change the default of their operations. Also, notifications should be provided 
when selection intermediaries launch a new function which has an effect on how content 
exposed to people. The information provided in the notification should be clear enough 
to enable the user to make a truly informed decision. The adequate way of notifying users 
can be a presentation via pop-up windows. Nevertheless, it can be alternative ways of 
offering information to the users such as an explanation box appearing when users point 
or click on a particular function, or a random notification to suggest certain functions that 
users may not know of or rarely use. Also, when users choose to exploit functions which 
cause a negative effect on exposure diversity (e.g. ‘Unfriend’ function), there should be 
a warning describing the risk of filter bubble or a reduction of a variety of presented 
information before confirming to operate such function. 
b. Nudging filter bubble 
Another way to promote media literacy is to provide information about user’s 
usage behaviour or patterns of consumption in selection intermediaries. This type of 
information is a crucial factor to break out of filter bubble. While many people agree that 
reading a diverse set of news is good, many do not realise how skewed their own reading 
behaviour is. Although they want to find a challenge or contradict viewpoint, they do not 
know what information is filtered and are not aware whether they are seeing a very 
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different set of items than other users see. As a result, personalised filters diminish user’s 
control in such a way that they cannot get more diversity. 
Filter bubble can be acknowledged and people can come out of it by increasing 
the awareness of the presence of ﬁlters that are implemented in selection intermediaries. 
By exposing the data about their usage, users will become aware of their own biases as 
well as the bias that the system has. They, then, may consciously decide to explore items 
from other areas by interactively changing their behaviour. Consequently, it will open an 
avenue for discovering new interests. 
Selection intermediaries, therefore, should design their functions or features by 
taking the view to develop the awareness of ﬁlter bubbles and attempt to give users some 
sense of choices they choose. This can be done by summarizing data of user’s behaviour 
into the form of an infographic. With the big data selection intermediaries possessed, the 
presentation of information about the pattern of consumption is not difficult. In fact, now 
Facebook, for example, has presented a set of collected information to remind the users 
about their relationship with other people in special occasion or about the memory users 
have done year by year. 
The design of function or infographic to notify filter bubble can also be seen in 
practice. For example, Scoopinion is a news aggregation browser add-on that monitors 
not just how much time readers spend on a certain site but also the time spent on each 
line of text presented in an article.287 It analyses every news piece that people peruse, and 
all the articles are rated according to users’ behaviour. What is interesting is that 
Scoopinion has a function to provides a visual summary of one’s reading habits by 
displaying user’s media ﬁngerprint (see Figure 13). In the displays of media fingerprint, 
the larger circles illustrate the most news outlets that the user consumed. Therefore, 
provision of a visualization of users’ information consumption habits will encourage 
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Figure 13: Scoopinion288 
 
 
There are also studies from other academic fields on the possible design of 
function or feature to nudge filter bubble. For example, Balancer is a widget designed to 
nudge users to read balanced political viewpoints.289 It is a browser tool that tracks users’ 
reading activities and shows their reading behaviour and biases. The data is implemented 
as a character on a tightrope with his balance affected by the approximate histogram of 
the user’s liberal and conservative pages visited (see Figure 14). If one’s reading 
behaviour is too skewed, the character is in peril of falling. The widget represents the 
aggregate political lean of users’ reading behaviour for the week-to-date along with more 
detail when clicking on the icon in the browser window. The primary goal of Balancer is 
to increase the awareness by monitoring user’s behaviour and to make changes in 
response to read more balanced news. 
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Lastly, Nagulendra and Vassileva developed a visualization working in social 
media which is designed based on a bubble metaphor to make users more understandable 
for their ﬁlter bubbles.291 The visualization provides two alternative points of view: the 
user’s friends and the categories of content (see Figure 15). The tool shows users the 
space of the screen in two parts: ones which are inside the bubble represent the visibility 
for the users, and ones which are outside the bubble have been filtered out from result 
recommendation. Also, by clicking on a particular icon of categories or friends, the users 
can see all the details and the status updates related to that content or person. Further, it 
allows them to manually manipulate the algorithm in order to escape the bubble by 
dragging and dropping the category/friend icons inside and outside the bubble. As a result, 
this visualization encourages users to increase awareness of the ﬁlter bubble and promote 
the exploration of content that is filtered away. 
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In conclusion, media literacy is the measure to improve the ability of people to 
find diverse content and to stimulate people’s demand for diverse viewpoints. The 
approach to promote media literacy and education is important to encourage people to 
consume more diverse content. This section, therefore, proposes that selection 
intermediaries should have a legal duty to promote media literacy. 
 
In summary, this chapter proposes three significant measures to regulate selection 
intermediaries in the achievement of exposure diversity. The first approach is that the 
principles of ‘net neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ should be applied to selection 
intermediaries to guarantee people’s accessibility to diverse content on the Internet. 
Regarding net neutrality, selection intermediaries should have the obligation to operate 
in neutral: i.e. (i) not to block the transmission of content and social online activities, (ii) 
operate reasonable management to prevent commercial or other bias, and (iii) not to 
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charge for the provision of content in normal result recommendations. Also, the 
application of impartiality on selection intermediaries can be in a form of: (i) preventing 
one side of views from overwhelming result recommendations such as by dealing with 
bombarding of information and fake news; and (ii) providing diversity to be obviously 
noticed in result recommendations such as during the period of an election and 
referendum, or in a controversial issue.  
The second measure is the concept of ‘diversity by design’ that selection 
intermediaries can design the algorithms, functions and screen features of their services 
to encourage people to consume diverse content. It presents a number of examples that 
selection intermediaries could design their technical structure in order to encourage 
exposure diversity e.g. discovering the difference, exposing to diverse media 
outlets/speakers, facilitating comparison, and promoting serendipity. The implementation 
of ‘diversity by design’ in legal obligation will nudge the relevant stakeholders (such as 
policymakers, the private sectors and scholars) to develop a practical guidance and 
technology in a way towards the exposure diversity goal.  
The final approach is ‘media literacy’ that selection intermediaries should have an 
obligation to assist the improvement of people’s skills and knowledge to access to more 
diverse content.  One of the potential strategies for selection intermediaries to encourage 
media literacy is an informative approach. The way information and choices are presented 
can be used as an efficient means for people to protect themselves. This thesis proposes 
two regimes for presenting two types of information which are: (i) providing notification 
to inform users about functions of selection intermediaries and (ii) nudging filter bubble 
by providing information about the behaviour of individuals regarding their use of 
selection intermediaries to consume content.  
It is noteworthy that these three measures complement each other; therefore, 
applying these principles to selection intermediaries concurrently will reach the ultimate 
accomplishment of exposure diversity. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that exposure 
diversity is not a panacea to solve filter bubble or audience polarisation. It is possible that 





Conclusion and Ways forward 
 
This final chapter summarises the main findings of this thesis in order to answer the 
research question: ‘how and what are the appropriate approaches to regulate the role of 
new selection intermediaries to achieve exposure diversity’. 
1. The change of media landscape in the Internet age 
In the pre-internet era, traditional media which are newspapers and broadcasters 
acted as the essential intermediaries of society’s information flows. A few people who 
own media companies had controlled the power to speak effectively to a significant 
number of people while audiences were passive and had no voice. Due to the Internet and 
the convergence of technology, the media landscape has dramatically changed. The 
arrival of the Internet gives ordinary citizens the power to actively distribute media 
content to the public. As a result, the abundance of information provided by people 
represents an almost infinite choice for the public to choose from. This new form of 
communication technologies sparks some hopes to the optimists that this new technology 
will solve the problem of media plurality. Unfortunately, it reconfigures a more complex 
and challenging problem. The concern of new media network is not about the lack of 
information but rather the overload of information. The abundance of information on the 
Internet does not always contribute people to be exposed to more diverse content. The 
major problem in an environment of overflowing available information is how to find 
certain content. 
This is because of the three major changes of media landscape. First, the scarcity of 
resource in the new media is no longer the problem; but the attention of people is currently 
a matter of concern. In the environment of abundant information, the so-called ‘attention 
economy’ has emerged. In Internet network structure, it is ‘link’ that determines the 
limited attention of people. Unless knowing the exact links to a location of a webpage, it 
is impossible for the content to be found among the abundance of information. Therefore, 
controlling the links means controlling the attention of people. 
Second, the audience has shifted from a passive position to an active one. The 
behaviours of people have changed from passively receiving content from media 
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companies to actively finding what they are interested in through selection intermediaries. 
Consequently, media content they actually consume does not solely depend on what 
media providers offer, but also from what they seek and choose. However, being an active 
audience does not always mean being a literate audience. In reality, people are deficient 
in skills and knowledge in responding to abundant choices. It can result in narrowing the 
range of people’s attention to concentrate around a few sources. 
The third reason is an arrival of new selection intermediaries, specifically search 
engines and social media. These new players have the power the same way the traditional 
media has since they are the new gatekeepers on the Internet who aggregate links to 
certain websites. Also, their functions such as filtering mechanisms and personalisation 
will cause the tendency of people to select solely certain topics and activities which are 
relevant to them. Consequently, this behaviour can generate audience fragmentation and 
audience polarisation. 
Therefore, the abundance of available information does not guarantee people to 
expand their media use and does not solve the issue of media plurality. The real issue for 
media plurality now is not the availability of diverse content but the actual accessibility. 
In other words, the concerns about media plurality have moved to the diversity of actual 
content exposed to people or ‘exposure diversity’. 
2. Exposure diversity 
Exposure diversity refers to actual diverse media content and sources that are 
exposed to the audience. It is an aspect of media plurality which focuses on the audience 
side and it is distinct from diversity of source and available content which focuses on the 
supply side. As McQuail illustrates, diversity of actually selected content (or “content as 
received”) is in a different dimension of diversity of available content (or “content as 
sent”). They are two different things and do not always coincide; this is clearly illustrated 
in the Internet age where there is an almost infinite choice available for the public. 
Although diversity of available content is a necessary precondition for people to consume 
diverse content, diverse supplied content on its own cannot secure diversity of actual 
content exposed to people. 
According to van der Wurff, the content people actually choose is the one which 
actually offered to them. Therefore, he provides an additional dimension of exposure 
241 
diversity: ‘diversity of choice’ which is ‘the absolute amount of different programme 
types that viewers can choose from’.1 For Helberger, diversity of choice means the chance 
of people to consider possible alternatives. Therefore, the concerns of exposure diversity 
are about the process of making choices.2 
The importance of exposure diversity can be considered on the basis of the public 
interest i.e. freedom of speech, democratic value, and personal autonomy. For free speech 
to effectively lead to truth, free and uninhibited exposure to diverse information is 
necessary for eliminating misconceptions of fact and value. In the marketplace of ideas, 
it simply stresses the need for people to be exposed to diverse ideas for information to be 
exchanged and evaluated. Also, exposure diversity strengthens the right to reach the 
audience. If selection intermediaries impose discriminatory filters against a speaker on 
grounds that listeners would not have selected, that speaker’s ability to communicate 
freely has been undermined. Whereas it is impossible for the audience to be bound to 
listen to any speakers, exposure diversity is an indirect way for speakers to effectively 
disseminate their thought and arguments to the attention of wide audiences. 
For democratic value, the benefits of exposure diversity in democracy is that it 
assists people in society to be well-informed. The consumption of diverse information 
encourages people to discuss and question about conflicting viewpoints they known 
which is necessary for formulating their own views. By exposed to diverse information, 
individuals unconsciously become more tolerant toward disagreed opinions and accept 
differences as a normal and unthreatening facet of society; this is a desirable condition 
for open-minded discussions and being well-informed citizens. Besides, exposure 
diversity safeguards the democratic process by preventing people from listening merely 
to the like-mind partisans and as a result preventing the risk of abusive power of media 
entities and governments. Exposure diversity is also what needs to be encouraged to 
ensure that everyone has a fair chance. Providing diverse viewpoints presented to each 
individual can be regarded as equal ‘starting point’ for various opinions to influence 
public debate. 
                                                          
1 Richard van der Wurff, ‘Supplying and Viewing Diversity’ (2004) 19(2) European Joumal of 
Communication 215, 217. 
2 Natali Helberger, ‘Exposure diversity as a policy goal’ (2012) 4(1) J.M.L 65. 
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Lastly, central to the autonomous value of exposure diversity is ‘to enable or 
empower the individual to realise her personal freedom of choice and self-fulfilment 
through the media contents she decides to consume’.3 To have an autonomous life, a 
person must be free to choose the choices from an adequate range of options 
accommodating the diversity of interests and tastes. Thus, to be autonomous, diverse and 
antagonistic viewpoints have to be exposed to the attention of individuals.  
3. Insufficient existing law to achieve exposure diversity 
Exposure diversity, however, has traditionally been neglected and placed at the 
margin of media policy debates. The current existing laws and policies have traditionally 
reflected the focus on traditional media, diversity of sources and diversity of content, 
rather than on search engines, social media and diversity of exposure. The existing media 
laws in Europe and the UK do not provide any measures that intend to directly regulate 
the way diverse content chosen by people. The reason why exposure diversity is hardly 
regarded in the media policies and media regulations is that the existing media laws and 
policies are originated at the time when a scarcity of spectrums was the main problem. In 
an environment where there are high barriers to entry into media market, encouraging 
production and distribution of diverse media content from diverse media entities was the 
top priority for media regulation. Therefore, the issue about exposure diversity was less 
regarded than the concern about how to guarantee a sufficient supply of different 
viewpoints from diverse sources.  
Also, competition law is not applicable to sufficiently protect exposure diversity. 
This is because objectives of competition law and those of exposure diversity are 
different. Competition law is purposely created to protect the competitive market and 
consumer welfare. It, therefore, does not always encourage diverse media content 
exposed to people. Besides, there are differences between the issues under the concerns 
of competition law and exposure diversity. While operations of selection intermediaries 
can influence the volume of diverse content exposed to people, most of these actions do 
not tend to be considered as the anticompetitive conducts under competition law. 
Therefore, competition law is not appropriate and suitable to regulate selection 
intermediaries to influence diversity of viewpoints exposed to citizens. 
                                                          
3 Natali Helberger, ‘Diversity label’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 337, 345. 
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The main media policy’s assumption is that it is inappropriate for the government 
to force the audience to choose diversely or consume certain information even the 
valuable ones. This direct interference can be regarded as unconstitutional because it 
potentially conflicts with fundamental freedoms of people. Also, there is an uncertainty 
of how the concept should be applied as possible concrete measures: it is difficult to set 
precise policy goals in the area of exposure diversity. However, as Valcke argues, there 
are undoubtedly positive roles for the law to create the conditions which encourage people 
to exercise their freedom to effectively expose themselves to diverse content; without 
infringing individuals’ personal rights.4 
4. Regulating selection intermediaries to achieve exposure diversity 
The thesis argues that the possible concrete measure to achieve exposure diversity 
is the regulation of selection intermediaries to promote this goal. Selection intermediaries 
i.e. search engines and social media are the gatekeepers in the Internet world which 
directly influence the diversity of content exposed to people. In this situation, selection 
intermediaries emerged as the tool to gather links for the audience in order to find and 
select content. Audiences now rely on selection intermediaries to assist them to make 
choices from the infinite information. They, therefore, become the key people need in 
order to find the relevant information.  
Selection intermediaries can make content detectable, noticeable, and available in 
the attention of users. These new gatekeepers control the findability of content by 
organising and prioritising the recommendation results, filtering the media choices people 
make, and personalising the recommended content. If we consider that people can 
possibly consume diverse choices only if they have a chance to choose the alternatives, 
then exposure diversity would depend on the selection intermediaries’ process of 
providing choices. Therefore, it is clearly illustrated that selection intermediaries play a 
crucial role in expanding or diminishing the diverse content people are exposed to. 
Keeping all these impacts of selection intermediaries in mind, it is not an exaggeration 
that the possible concrete measure to achieve exposure diversity goal is the regulation of 
selection intermediaries. 
                                                          
4 Peggy Valcke, ‘Looking for the users in media pluralism regulation’ (2011) 1 J.Inf.Pol 287, 303. 
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Although the operations of selection intermediaries are under the protection of 
freedom of expression, free speech of selection intermediaries can be restricted in order 
to promote exposure diversity. The first justification is the necessity to protect free speech 
and democratic value. The protection of individual’s rights can be linked to the promotion 
of exposure diversity. As Joseph Raz argues, ‘freedom of expression can be supported as 
part of a pluralist argument for using the law to promote pluralism in the society’.5 Also, 
the government can restrict the operation of selection intermediaries in order to safeguard 
the democratic value. Since exposure diversity can be considered as a means to encourage 
democracy, the operations of selection intermediaries can be regulated to ensure that 
exposure diversity is safeguarded. 
Another justification is the duty and responsibility of selection intermediaries 
under media freedom. This thesis argues that freedom of selection intermediaries 
resembles media freedom. The essential role of the media is contributing the information 
and ideas underlying freedom of expression to the public debate; thus media freedom is 
guaranteed only inasmuch as it contributes to the formation of public opinion. In the 
context of selection intermediaries, the right to information of people refers to the ability 
to use selection intermediaries in order to enhance the findability of diverse information, 
ideas and resources in the public networked information environment. The right to 
information of people includes the freedom to be exposed to diverse content. 
Consequently, the operations of selection intermediaries which are under the protection 
of freedom of expression may be limited to ensure that exposure diversity is safeguarded. 
In other words, free speech of selection intermediaries has the positive role to serve the 
interest of the public rather than to protect the interest of themselves. Therefore, the 
regulation imposed on selection intermediaries to encourage exposure diversity is 
justified. 
5. Creating new regulatory regimes 
The thesis analyses three relevant measures to regulate selection intermediaries in 
order to achieve exposure diversity. By exploring factors which constrain people from 
                                                          
5 Joseph Raz, ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification’ (1991) 11(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
303, 323. 
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being exposed to diverse content as mentioned above, this thesis proposes possible 
approaches to deal with these constraints. 
 Since the attention of people and the information accessibility are influenced by 
links, the obstruction of information accessibility can obviously affect diverse content 
exposed to people.6 Therefore, exposure diversity can be guaranteed by imposing the 
legal role on selection intermediaries to provide people with the actual ability to access 
information through links  
One of the main factors which significantly affect exposure diversity is the design 
of the technical structure of selection intermediaries. Exposure diversity can be 
encouraged or reduced depending on the design of the technical structure of selection 
intermediaries. Therefore, selection intermediaries should be obliged to actively design 
their algorithms, functions and screen features of their webpages to facilitate people to 
consume more diverse choices. This idea of the application of technology in the 
regulation of selection intermediaries is called ‘diversity by design’. 
Apart from the constraints due to technical structures, insufficient skills of people 
to search for diverse content is another factor which obstructs the achievement of 
exposure diversity. Therefore, the measures to promote media literacy and empower 
people’s knowledge are also prominent approaches to encourage people to consume more 
diverse content. This thesis proposes that the measure to achieve exposure diversity is the 
regulation of selection intermediaries to have a legal duty to promote media literacy.  
a. The role of selection intermediaries in providing access to information 
Since selection intermediaries combine the functions of both network providers 
and media companies, the principles of net neutrality and impartiality should be applied 
to prevent arbitrary or unreasonable manipulations of content. Net neutrality supports 
exposure diversity by ensuring diverse content to not be excluded or lost the opportunity 
to be exposed to people. Regarding the different nature of selection intermediaries and 
network operators, some adjustments of the principle are necessary. Selection 
intermediaries should have the responsibility to operate in neutral: (i) no-blocking the 
transmission of content and social online activities, (ii) reasonable management to prevent 
                                                          
6 Eszter Hargittai, ‘The Digital Divide and What to Do About It’ in Derek Jones (ed.), New Economy 
Handbook (Academic Press 2003) 821, 839. 
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commercial or other bias, and (iii) no-charging for the provision of audiovisual content 
in normal recommendation results. 
However, it should be noted that net neutrality is not the ultimate measure to solve 
every exposure diversity issue. Net neutrality has its limitation to only ensure that diverse 
content will not be excluded or lost the opportunity to be exposed to people. The principle 
of net neutrality in itself does not directly impose an obligation to present diverse 
viewpoints. Thus, selection intermediaries should have the role to operate impartiality 
which encourages exposure diversity. Impartiality principle promotes the accessibility to 
sufﬁcient alternative information. It imposes an obligation on selection intermediaries to 
present diverse viewpoints in result recommendation. This can be in the form of 
preventing one side of view from overwhelming the result recommendations such as 
dealing with bombarding and fake news. It can also in the form of providing diversity to 
be obviously noticed in the result recommendation such as in the period of election and 
referendums, or in the controversial issues. The principles of net neutrality and 
impartiality can be supported by an implementation of the so-called ‘diversity by design’ 
which is another measure to be imposed on selection intermediaries to achieved exposure 
diversity. 
b. Diversity by design 
Diversity by design is a systematic approach whereby exposure diversity is 
embedded into the underlying technology or the entire architecture of selection 
intermediaries, from the very early design stage rather than being bolted on afterwards or 
ignored. By implementing exposure diversity at the design stage, selection intermediaries 
have the legal duty to design their services to contribute to the promotion of exposure 
diversity. The concept of exposure diversity has various aspects so there are a number of 
ways that selection intermediaries could design their services in order to encourage 
exposure diversity. Depending on the underlying conception of exposure diversity, 
technological design highlights the different aspects for nudging people towards more 
valuable and diverse choices. In this thesis, exposure diversity has been classified into the 
forms of: (i) discovering the difference, (ii) exposing to diverse media outlets/speakers, 
(iii) facilitating comparison, and (iv) promoting serendipity. 
The implementation of diversity by design in legal obligation and the regulatory 
system will nudge the relevant stakeholders (such as policymakers, the private sectors 
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and scholars) to develop a practical guidance and technology in the way towards the 
exposure diversity goal. Also, by embedding technological design into law (although 
legal provisions may be a broad and open standard), the relevant stakeholders will 
eventually develop technical standards for practical application.  
At present, there are a number of research relating to the concerns about exposure 
diversity in other academic fields. These research are not only the study in technology 
sciences but also the study in multidisciplinary areas such as social, behavioural, political, 
media and communications sciences. Depending on the underlying concerns of exposure 
diversity, these studies examine different causes, effects and related factors of exposure 
diversity. Therefore, the imposition of diversity by design in the regulatory system will 
open the area for the knowledge from other academic fields to assist lawmakers and 
policymakers in framing future diversity by design strategies to reach the exposure 
diversity goal. 
Law can encourage people to expose themselves to more diverse content by 
obliging selection intermediaries to design their services in a way towards the exposure 
diversity goal. Legal provision alone is not an effective way to shape the conduct of 
individuals. Technology can also be a supported instrument for solving exposure diversity 
problems. In other words, an understanding of the interaction between law and 
technological structures is an essential precondition for exposure diversity to be achieved. 
Therefore, selection intermediaries should be obliged to the diversity by design 
application in order to actively design their algorithms, functions and screen features in 
facilitating people to consume more diverse choices. 
c. Media literacy 
Lastly, this thesis proposes that selection intermediaries should have a legal duty 
to promote media literacy in order to empower people to be exposed to more diverse 
content. This is because, to effectively achieve media literacy, practice in every life is 
more important than formal education. Most internet users learn by trial and error. 
Therefore, the do-it-yourself approach is a much more important source of learning the 
skills to access a wide range of diverse media. In this regard, selection intermediaries can 
assist the skills and knowledge of people to access more diverse content by raising the 
awareness of citizens with regard to the operation of the platform and technical policies. 
Much of the awareness-raising could be accomplished by informing citizens during their 
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normal use in everyday life via explanation or providing an array of tools to allow the 
general public to have hands-on experience. The environment where people are informed, 
practised and educated in (the extent and diversity of) daily selection intermediaries usage 
are decisive in learning the broadest of media literacy regarding exposure diversity skills. 
One of the potential strategies for selection intermediaries to encourage media 
literacy is informative approach. The potential roles of information provision are various. 
It can notify users about functions, screen features and instruction guides of services. It 
may nudge people to be aware of the risk of their behaviour and filter bubbles. Also, it 
can empower users by informing about the broader implications of their choices and 
possibly even encouraging the valuable choices. Once this information is provided, the 
audience can protect their own interests by selecting the content that are relevant and 
valuable to them. 
For example, selection intermediaries can provide notifications to inform users 
about the functions of their websites which have some risks on exposure diversity, such 
as ‘Unfriend’ and ‘Follow’ features on Facebook. An explanation box can be appeared 
when users point or click a particular function or a warning can be popped-up to describe 
the risk of filter bubbles or the reduction of a variety of information presented before 
confirming to operate such function. Besides, these notifications can be appeared when 
users adjust their settings of the intermediaries and when selection intermediaries 
themselves change the default of their operations. Also, notifications should be provided 
when selection intermediaries launch a new function which has an effect on the way 
diverse content exposed to people.  
Another way to promote media literacy is the provision of information about 
user’s usage behaviour or patterns of consumption in selection intermediaries. This can 
be done by summarising data of users’ behaviour in a form of infographic. By revealing 
the data about their usage, users will become aware of their own biases and the bias that 
the system has. They, then, may consciously decide to explore items from other areas by 
changing their behaviour. Consequently, it will open the avenue for discovering new 
interests.  
In conclusion, selection intermediaries i.e. search engines and social media are 
the tools people rely on in order to find and select what they consume in this information 
overload environment. Influencing by filters, ranking and targeted recommendations, 
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these new selection intermediaries determine the consumption behaviour of people and 
the viewpoints which are actually exposed to the audience. Considering the power of 
selection intermediaries, they have a potential to influence over people’s exposure to 
diverse media content by controlling the findability of content. Therefore, the effects of 
selection intermediaries on exposure diversity and the justifications to regulate selection 
intermediaries to promote exposure are worthy of concern. 
This thesis proposes that media law can take a positive role to create the conditions 
which encourage people to exploit selection intermediaries in order to effectively expose 
themselves to diverse content. In particular, there should be the obligations imposed on 
selection intermediaries to have an active role and duty to assist people to expose 
themselves to more diverse content. These active duties can be achieved by the following 
legal instruments: (i) the principles of ‘net neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’, (ii) diversity by 
design, and (iii) media literacy. These three measures complement each other; applying 
these principles to selection intermediaries concurrently will reach the ultimate 
accomplishment of exposure diversity. Therefore, selection intermediaries should be 
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